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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
THE REASON OF MY DISSERTATION – The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the effect 
of foreign ownership on Italian firms economic performance. This work contributes to the 
existing literature on cross-border acquisition effects on acquired companies and provides some 
new elements to the wide public debate on foreign investments in Italy. Indeed, worries about 
Italy’s low attractiveness for foreign capitals go hand in hand with the rise of “economic 
nationalism” which is nourished by the fear of foreign dependence and loss of domestic 
excellences. The acquisition of some well-known brands fuelled the debate. It is the case of 
several brands in the fashion industry, e.g. the acquisitions of Loro Piana, Bulgari, Fendi and 
Acqua di Parma by the French multinational luxury goods conglomerate LVMH.  These 
transactions are often illustrated as a loss of national identity and a failure of domestic 
entrepreneurs and politicians to retain valuable know-how. Nevertheless, another considerable 
part of the public opinion highlights the value recognized to Italian companies and the 
opportunities for modernization and internationalization that may result. In this work, we aim 
at investigating the issue with particular reference to family businesses. Family firms are a 
relevant part of the Italian entrepreneurship system and are intrinsically linked with our cultural 
background. Their peculiar characteristic, e.g. non-financial goals, stronger unity and cohesion 
around the central role of the family, lead us to expect that the entry of a foreign owner may 
have a differential impact on family firms structures. 
In the attempt to solve these doubts, we built a custom-made database of 152 majority, cross-
border acquisitions occurred between 2011 and 2014. Confirming the wide spread of familiar 
ownership, 70 firms out of 152 are family businesses. The 3-years post-acquisition performance 
of acquired companies has been under debate. Specifically, we evaluated cross-border 
acquisitions effects on the size and profitability of acquired companies, using as outcomes of 
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interests Sales, ROA and EBITDA Margin. In order to build on our knowledge of post-
acquisition results, we controlled for some factors, e.g. the acquirers’ type (industrial or 
financial buyers) and country of origin, targets’ size, industry and post-acquisition CEO change.  
A common issue raised by precedent works is the evidence of ex ante selection bias, meaning 
that acquired companies are unlikely a random sample of the population of companies, foreign 
investors may “cherry pick” best companies or “lemons grab” low performing ones. Evidences 
for cherry picking in Italy have been provided by Barbaresco et al. (2018) and Benfratello and 
Sembenelli (2006), while Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005) find that foreign MNEs do not seem 
to systematically select lower or higher productive local  target companies. To account for the 
possibility that performance differences arise from the selection of best-performing firms rather 
than by the change in ownership per se, we adopted a Difference-in-Difference methodology 
combined with a sophisticated matching method recently introduced by Iacus, King and Porro 
(2009), Coarsened Exact Matching. The combination of these two methodologies allows us to 
single out casual foreign ownership effects by comparing the post-acquisition performance of 
acquired companies (i.e. the treated group) with a sample of domestic companies with similar 
ex-ante observable characteristics (i.e. the control group). Considering this latter group of 
companies as a proper counterfactual of what the performance of treated units would have liked 
in the absence of the acquisition, we are able to extrapolate the effect of foreign acquisition on 
companies performance. Our results suggest that foreign owners are not better than domestic 
ones in driving companies profitability. Indeed, we find that foreign acquired companies 
underperform domestic ones in terms of EBITDA margin, while the effects on sales and ROA 
are not significant.  
FIRST CHAPTER - Cross-border M&As have long been a popular strategy for growth and 
internationalization. Data presented by Zephyr-Bureau van Dijk (2019) on the size of the Italian 
M&A market indicate that 65% of deals involving Italian companies are cross-border. 
However, 2019 first quarter data reveal a declining trend of the aggregate Italian M&As market 
and of inbound investments as well. Does this mean that Italian companies are becoming less 
attractive? A qualitative investigation on factors affecting the likelihood of M&As and their 
motives complements on market datas. Nevertheless, whether or not foreign ownership is 
beneficial for acquired companies performance is still under debate. Past empirical works 
provide mixed results, however the literature seems to support the existence of a multinational 
advantage, meaning that thanks to the transfer of superior skills, resources and management 
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capabilities, foreign ownership enhances subsidiaries performance. Evidences on Italian firms 
data confirm this hypothesis, showing an improvement of acquired companies performance in 
our country (Barbaresco et al., 2018; Bentivogli & Mirenda, 2017; ICE & Prometeia, 2014; 
Piscitello & Rabbiosi, 2005). 
SECOND CHAPTER – Family firms represent 85% of Italian companies and generate 70% of total 
employment in the country. Chapter 2 investigates the current state of the art in the literature 
on family firms and M&As. 32 papers from the leading business sources have been reviewed. 
In particular, 17 papers allowed us to provide a preliminary overview on family firms 
characteristics, performance and valuation, while 15 papers specifically deals with family firms 
and M&As. Their analysis led us to observe a significant disproportion on how family firms 
have been investigated in the context of mergers and acquisitions. While their position as 
acquirers has received significant attention (13 papers), their role as target of acquisitions has 
been scarcely investigated (6 papers). Concerning acquisitions initiated by family firms, 
scholars agree that such companies are less likely to acquire, prefer lower scale acquisitions 
(Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Caprio, Croci & Del Giudice, 2011; Miller, Le Breton-Miller 
& Lester, 2010;  Shim  &  Okamuro,  2011) and are on average recognized by the market as 
value creating acquirers (André, BenAmar & Saadi, 2014; Basu, Dimitrova & Peglis, 2008). 
The literature on target family firms is less conclusive. It is observed that family businesses are 
less likely to accept an acquisition proposal (Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Caprio, Croci & 
Del Giudice, 2011) and that acquirers’ market returns are lower when they acquire a family 
controlled target (Basu, Dimitrova & Peglis, 2008; Gonenc, Hermes & Van Sinderen, 2013). 
However, a broad literature vacuum exists when it comes to post-acquisition operating 
performance of acquired family firms, as well as on family firms in the context of cross-border 
acquisitions. This lack of theoretical and empirical support is what motivates the present work.  
THIRD CHAPTER – Our analysis is based on firm-level data from Italy over the period 2008-
2017. The combination of two data sources, Thomson Reuters EIKON and AIDA by Bureau 
van Dijk allowed us to identify 152 cross-border and majority acquisitions of Italian companies 
operating in the manufacturing and service industries. Since our goal is to measure the 
performance of acquired companies three years before and three years after the deal, we focused 
on acquisitions occurred in the period 2011-2014. Companies were checked one by one to 
identify the ownership composition at the acquisition time. 70 family firms have been identified 
and further classified according to the family’s future in the post-acquisition setting. 
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Interestingly, we observed that in 43% of cases the owning family decided to remain involved 
in the business even after having sold the control of the company itself.  
Before moving to a more sophisticated statistical technique, we investigated how our outcomes 
of interests change by simply comparing the 3-years average outcome for target firms before 
and after the takeover. Such comparison allows us to observe a 5.7% improvement in sales for 
aggregate data. The change is larger for family businesses, service companies, SME, when the 
CEO changes and for companies acquired by non-European and industrial buyers. The same 
analysis led us to note that return on assets (ROA) slightly improves by 0.36% and EBITDA 
margin increases by 1.66%. These improvements are more pronounced for family firms, 
manufacturing and SME companies whose CEO changed, and for companies acquired by 
European and industrial acquirers. Nevertheless, the previous results are not useful if not 
analysed in comparison to what would have happened in case the acquired company had 
remained under domestic ownership. 
FOURTH CHAPTER – The literature on acquired firms post-acquisition performance often claims 
the need of controlling for ex ante “selection bias”, which could affect the estimates of the 
impact of acquisitions. It is argued that firms acquired by foreign investors show better 
performance not because of the managerial ability of the new investor per se, but simply 
because it “cherry picks” the best performing local firms. If this is the case, a simple comparison 
between foreign-acquired and domestically-owned companies would overestimate the effect of 
the acquisition and return a biased measure of the takeover success. To single out the causal 
effect of foreign acquisition, we combine difference-in-difference with a matching technique, 
which allows to identify firms that were not acquired but had similar characteristics to firms 
that were acquired by foreigners. Conversely to Bentivogli and Mirenda (2017) and ICE and 
Prometeia (2014) that combined DID with propensity score matching, we adopt coarsened exact 
matching, a recent and intuitive method introduced by Iacus, King and Porro (2009) to improve 
the estimation of causal effects by reducing the differences in observable ex-ante characteristics 
(in our case, industry, sales, ROA and EBITDA margin) between treated and control groups. 
After we matched treated with control units, we ran a first-difference regression on the matched 
sample to investigate the effects of foreign acquisitions on sales, ROA and EBITDA margin. 
We find that foreign-owned firms exhibit a negative effect on EBITDA margin, while no 
significant effects on sales and ROA are registered. Conversely, Bentivogli and Mirenda (2017) 
and ICE and Prometeia (2014) had shown a positive effect on sales growth after the M&A, 
while no previous literature in Italy has analysed ROA and EBITDA margin. Supporting our 
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initial hypothesis, we find that family firms perform better than non-family firms and cultural 
distance is negatively associated with post-acquisition performance. However, differently from 
what we expected, when the family remains in the business following the acquisition, the 
company’s performance is deteriorated. Finally, we show that when the CEO of the acquired 
company changes, the negative effect on corporate performance is more pronounced. 
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 1. CHAPTER  
CROSS-BORDER M&AS: TRENDS, 
MOTIVATIONS AND EFFECTS ON CORPORATE 
PERFORMANCE  
1.1 Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have long been a popular strategy and represent an important 
opportunity for corporate growth. Recent data confirm the popularity and significance of the 
phenomenon: in 2018, 97.709 deals were concluded, generating a global market value of $5.304 
billion (Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk, 2019a). In this wide and well-known 
environment, the last decades saw the rising of cross-border acquisitions. Globalization and 
economic integration pushed firms to expand their horizons across their domestic borders to 
target companies headquartered in other countries. According to the 2018 World Investment 
Report published by the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
the total world value of cross-border M&A peaked at $816 billion in 2018, rising by 18% from 
previous year and representing 62% of total Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) (UNCTAD, 
2019). 
In this context, Italy is not left behind. With a total M&A value created close to $2 billion, last 
year Italy ranked fifteenth in the world in M&A value, seventh1 in Europe. More than half of 
deals concluded in our country (53% of value, 65% in number of deals) were cross-border deals, 
involving either an Italian target or an Italian acquirer (Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk, 
2019b). However, some worrying signals emerged about a slow-down in M&A deals in the 
latest months. Despite 2018 closed with an increase by 28% in value traded, the latest months 
                                                 
 
1Western European countries (value in billion) preceding Italy are Germany ($6.364), UK ($6.218), France ($3.781), 
Spain ($2.737), Netherlands ($2.385) and Sweden ($2.257). 
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of the year signed a stall in the number of deals concluded, which is perpetuating in the first 
quarter of 2019. This inverting trend fuels the debate around cross-border investments and their 
impact on the economic welfare. Indeed, traditionally Italy has always been the target of foreign 
investments, more than the exporter of investments abroad. Will the decrease in M&A activity 
perpetuate? What are the factors that affect the level of cross-border acquisitions? What are the 
consequences for target companies? 
Given the relevance of these concerns, a better understanding of the opportunities and 
challenges for firms following this strategy is fundamental. Cross border M&As are largely 
similar to domestic M&As. However, due to their international nature, they also involve unique 
challenges as targets and acquirers have different economic, institutional and cultural 
backgrounds, which can pose tremendous challenges both in the pre-deal negotiation and in the 
post-deal integration and performance. Therefore, an investigation on cross-border M&As’ 
determinants and effects is of interests for a wide range of decision makers, including policy 
makers, entrepreneurs and managers.  
The following chapter proceeds as follows. The first part will provide an overview on recent 
trends, facts and figures on Italian M&As market to understand the size and dynamics of the 
phenomenon under review. The second part will deep into the determinants of cross-border 
investments, i.e. the factors that affect the likelihood that they occur. Main motives of why 
decision makers undertake such initiatives will follow. Lastly, the chapter will conclude 
presenting the main effects on the corporate performance of acquired target companies. 
 
1.2 Trends, facts and figures on the global and Italian M&As market 
1.2.1 Italian Mergers and Acquisitions  
2018 was a positive and growing year for the Italian mergers and acquisitions market. 1,854 
deals were completed, a 32% increase compared to 1.406 deals recorded in 2017 and recovering 
the previous year decline by 30% (Figure 1). Market value supported growth as well. The Italian 
M&As market concluded 2018 generating €93.342 billion value, 28 %improvement from 
72.727 billion in 2017, containing two value-declining years in a row. The positive value trend 
is largely determined by two deals announced in 2017. Luxottica-Essilor deal and Abertis’ 
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acquisition by Atalantia and Acs2 accounted for 37% of the total market value. Discarding these 
two deals, Italian M&As would have worth €59 billion, declining with respect to precedent 
years values (Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk, 2019b). 
 
Figure 1 Italian M&A deals by value and volume 
 
Indeed, the 2018 Italian M&A market developed at two-speeds, with a boosting first semester 
and a declining second semester. Several factors contributed to the market downturn. Among 
all, the uncertainty climate resulting from the new political scenario and financial markets 
volatility due to slowdowns in growth prospects. This negative trend seems to follow on in the 
first quarter of 2019, which opened with a drop in total M&As deals value. Despite a total 
number of deals (421) higher than 2018 (382), the value traded is far below, €8 billion compared 
to €17 billion in the first quarter of 2018 (Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk, 2019c). 
Deeping into the characteristics of 2018 Italian deals, the first element it is worth noticing is a 
clear increase in valuation multiples. The average multiple for a target company acquired by 
strategic or private equity investors was 10 times the EBITDA, the highest value in the last 
decade (Table 1). Minimum multiples were paid by private equity investors acquiring minority 
                                                 
 
2 The Luxottica-Essilor deal was completed in two steps. On October 1th, 2018 Essilor acquired 62.42% of Luxottica 
shares from Delfin, the holding company owned by Del Vecchio’s family for a total value of €17.826 billion. On 
March 5th, 2019 a tender offer of 11 billion completed the transaction, followed by the deslisting of Luxottica from 
Piazza Affari and the merger between the two companies. 
The Abertis-Atlantia deal was completed on October 29th, 2018 for a total value of €16.5 billion. 
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shares, which recognized an average 9.5 times the EBITDA, still higher than the precedent 
years (9.1 times in 2017) (KPMG and Fineurop, 2019). 
 
Table 1 Average transaction multiples 2010-2018 
EV/EBITDA 
PE +  
Strategic 
buyers 
PE - MBO 
Majority  
PE  
Minority 
Strategic 
buyers 
Average 2010 7.0x 7.0x 5.7x 6.6x 
Average 2011 7.6x 6.9x 6.9x 7.2x 
Average 2012 7.3x 6.7x 6.1x 6.8x 
Average 2013 8.4x 7.5x 7.7x 6.7x 
Average 2014 9.2x 8.0x 8.5x 8.1x 
Average 2015 8.3x 7.9x 7.0x 9.6x 
Average 2016 9.1x 8.5x 7.9x 8.9x 
Average 2017 8.7x 9.4x 9.1x 9.4x 
Average 2018 10.0x 9.8x 9.5x 10.0x 
Source: Elaborations on data from Fineurop Soditic – Target Italia 
Regarding targets sectors, it is worth noticing that 2018 marked a decline in financial services 
acquisitions. The industry related M&A value halved compared to previous year, reaching just 
€8.4 billion.  Insurances were the most dynamic segment and the only growing one in the 
industry. On the other side, looking at acquirers’ typology, private equities substantially 
supported the Italian M&As market. Total deals completed by private equity investors grew by 
14%, from 206 in 2017 to 235 in 2018, for a total value of €18.355 billion. Half of them were 
foreign funds investing in Italian targets. Main deals were CvC Capital (Luxembourg) 
acquisition of Recordati from the founding family for €3 billion and the acquisition of Ntv by 
the US fund Global Infrastructure Partners for €2 billion (KPMG, 2019). 
1.2.2 Italian Cross-Borders M&As3 
Traditionally, Italy has always been a target of foreign investments more than an investor 
abroad, i.e. cross-border transactions are driven by inbound deals more than outbound deals 
(Figure 2). Interestingly, 2018 saw a deep increase in the value of outbound acquisitions, which 
grew by almost 10% as percentage of total number of deals. Still, they represent one third of 
                                                 
 
3 If not differently specified, all following data are elaboration of the author from Zephyr published by Bureau van 
Dijk. 
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inbound acquisitions. On the contrary, the latter decreased both in absolute value and as 
percentage of total deals, reaching the lowest record of 50% of total M&As. 
Inbound and outbound deals together represent 64.9% of the total market (Zephyr published by 
Bureau van Dijk, 2019b). 
 
Figure 2 Italian M&A Market Breakdown by value: Inbound, Outbound and Domestic deals as 
percentages 
 
1.2.2.1 Inbound M&As 
The value of inbound mergers and acquisitions declined for the third consecutive year in 2018 
as the market worthed an aggregate value of €46.67 billion, a 1.7% decline compared to 2017 
value (€47.514 billion). The decrease in value comes despite six deals being worth €1 billion, 
or more, and one exceeding €15 billion. In spite of that, volume improved by 32%, from 627 
deals in 2017 to 830 deals in 2018 (Inbound Italian Deals by volume and value) (Zephyr 
published by Bureau van Dijk, 2019b). 
 
Figure 3 Inbound Italian Deals by volume and value 
 
53,5% 57,6% 51,0%
64,8% 68,5%
71,5%
63,5% 65,3%
50,0%
7,9%
15,5%
8,9%
16,8% 4,0%
10,1%
10,3% 4,7%
14,9%
38,7%
26,9%
40,1%
18,4%
27,5%
18,3%
26,1% 30,0% 35,1%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Inbound Outbound Domestic
0
200
400
600
800
1.000
1.200
1.400
0
10.000
20.000
30.000
40.000
50.000
60.000
70.000
80.000
90.000
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
d
e
a
ls
D
e
a
l 
V
a
lu
e
 (
€
M
ill
io
n
)
Aggregate deal value (€ Million) Number of deals
Inbound cross-border M&As in Italy: are family businesses better off when acquired by foreign investors? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
12 
Looking at the sectors targeted by foreign investors, “Machinery, equipment, furniture and 
recycling” rank first, representing nearly half of total inbound value (€20.96 billion). “Other 
services” rank second (€5.8 billion), followed by “banks” (€5.4 billion). Table 2 shows how the 
top three ranking sectors completely reversed compared to the previous year. In 2017, the bank 
sector covered the lion’s share, representing half of total inbound value (€21.1 billion), while 
machineries targets were third with a total €4.9 billion. 
In volume terms, the ranking slightly changes. “Other services” are the more active industry 
with 198 deals completed, followed by “banks” with 174 deals and “machinery, equipment, 
furniture, recycling” with 119 deals. While value resulting from banks target felt down, volume 
on the opposite increased moving from 52 deals in 2017 to 174 in 2018. Machineries targets 
deals remained almost stable, with a slight increase from 105 deals to 119 (Table 3) 
. Regarding acquirers’ countries of origin (Table 4), the largest share of investors come from 
France (€18.6 billion), confirming 2017 position. The acquisition of a 62% stake by the French 
Essilor Interantional in Luxottica Group heavily contributed in boosting French acquirers’ 
value. The country’s nearest competitor is the United States, with €9.4 billion-worth of deals 
completed, followed by United Kingdom (€3 billion). 
In volume terms (Table 5), United Kingdom ranks first with 125 deals, a large increase 
compared to 45 deals in 2017. The United States are not far with 120 deals, followed by 
Luxembourg (48 deals). 
 
Table 2 Inbound Italian target sector by value, top 10 sectors 
Target sector 2016 2017 2018 
Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling 4.283 4.912 20.957 
Other services 7.728 7.674 5.831 
Banks 8.736 21.113 5.409 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather 2.049 1.954 2.974 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic products 8.797 1.494 2.288 
Gas, Water, Electricity 1.234 1.229 1.723 
Construction 1.760 3.689 1.561 
Post and telecommunications 24.659 1.087 1.544 
Food, beverages, tobacco 3.158 894 745 
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Table 3 Inbound Italian target sector by volume, top 10 sectors 
Target sector 2016 2017 2018 
Other services 234 174 198 
Banks 339 52 174 
Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling 150 105 119 
Gas, Water, Electricity 55 47 42 
Primary Sector (agriculture, mining, etc.) 28 5 42 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather 66 40 41 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic products 58 35 37 
Post and telecommunications 81 27 34 
Insurance companies 32 5 29 
Wholesale & retail trade 45 36 28 
 
Table 4 Inbound Italian acquirer countries by value, top 10 countries 
Country (acquirer) 2016 2017 2018 
France 9.474 6.605 18.648 
United States of America 8.336 5.983 9.452 
United Kingdom 5.996 1.719 2.984 
Virgin Islands (British) 0 0 1.830 
Switzerland 420 165 1.280 
Luxembourg 22.710 1.376 1.125 
China 230 3.478 808 
Norway 1.226 2.992 410 
Bermuda 887 282 358 
Germany 74 3.253 298 
 
Table 5 Inbound Italian acquirer countries by volume, top 10 countries 
Country (acquirer) 2016 2017 2018 
United Kingdom 208 43 125 
United States of America 238 75 120 
Luxembourg 29 16 48 
Germany 23 32 46 
France 66 31 31 
Switzerland 30 14 17 
China 9 18 16 
Norway 45 42 10 
Netherlands 15 10 10 
Bermuda 13 4 9 
1.2.2.2 Outbound M&As 
2018 was a positive year for outbound M&As which reached the highest recorded value in 
almost a decade, peaking at €14 billion, but still one third of inbound deals. The total value of 
Italian companies investing abroad quadrupled from the previous year (€3.4 billion in 2017), 
despite a nearly constant number of deals (Figure 4). The year-on-year growth was backed by 
individual deals with high valuations: five deals completed in 2018, each worth €1 billion or 
more, together accounted for 70% of the year total value. Atlantia accounted for two of these 
deals as the Italian toll road and airport holding company bought a 24% stake in Hochtief of 
Germany for €2.400 billion and acquired Aero 1 Global & International, a Luxembourg-based 
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entity with a 16% stake in Groupe Eurotunnel for €1 billion. Beside these five large deals, only 
16 outbound deals were worth more than 100 million. 
 
Figure 4 Outbound Italian Deals by volume and value 
 
Regarding targets sectors, “Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling” confirms its first 
position with €3.2 billion-worth value, followed by “Construction” (€2.4 billion) and “Food, 
beverages, tobacco” (€2.3 billion). The overall increase in the outbound M&As segment 
reflected proportionally in all sectors which all boosted the value traded. Looking at the number 
of acquisitions, “other services” rank first with 42 deals, followed by “Machinery, equipment, 
furniture, recycling” (27) and “Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic products” (18). 
 
Table 6 Outbound Italian target sector by value, top 10 sectors 
Target sector 2016 2017 2018 
Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling 840 400 3.281 
Construction 509 0 2.403 
Food, beverages, tobacco 918 55 2.328 
Post and telecommunications 0 100 1.639 
Other services 608 847 1.336 
Transport 1.412 79 1.057 
Primary Sector (agriculture, mining, etc.) 26 344 708 
Wood, cork, paper 106 0 335 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic products 173 90 161 
Publishing, printing 53 35 141 
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Table 7 Outbound Italian target sector by volume, top 10 sectors 
Target sector 2016 2017 2018 
Other services 43 34 42 
Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling 26 27 27 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic products 9 11 18 
Wholesale & retail trade 19 18 14 
Publishing, printing 11 12 11 
Food, beverages, tobacco 3 3 7 
Construction 3 1 6 
Banks 2 0 3 
Transport 4 7 3 
Education, Health 0 2 3 
 
United States are the main target country of outbound Italian deals by value in 2018 due to 
Prysmian taking over General Cable for €2.56 billion and Ferrero snapping up the US 
confectionery arm of Nestle for €2.27 billion. These two deals represent 87% of the total €5.55 
billion-worth of outbound US-targeted deals completed in 2018, which is double the aggregate 
€2.5 billion recorded for Germany, ranking second. Spain follows with a total value equal to 
€2.38 billion and 23 deals, the highest number of deals completed. 
 
Table 8 Outbound Italian target countries by value, top 10 countries 
Country (target) 2016 2017 2018 
United States of America 948 880 5.551 
Germany 264 147 2.501 
Spain 204 589 2.378 
Luxembourg 0 0 1.056 
Switzerland 228 3 369 
Russian Federation 0 7 343 
France 1.737 815 246 
United Kingdom 278 83 94 
Brazil 58 110 93 
Ukraine 351 0 34 
 
Table 9 Outbound Italian target countries by volume, top 10 countries 
Country (target) 2016 2017 2018 
Spain 15 15 23 
United Kingdom 18 19 21 
United States of America 15 17 17 
France 13 12 12 
Germany 20 10 11 
Switzerland 10 5 9 
China 2 2 4 
Croatia 0 0 4 
Brazil 2 2 4 
Netherlands 3 7 3 
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1.2.2.3 Domestic M&As 
Both volume and value of domestic M&A deals increased significantly, making 2018 the most 
active year in a decade (Figure 5). Mergers and acquisitions between Italian companies reached 
877 deals worth combined €32.79 billion. In terms of volume, this represents a 37% increase 
on the 638 deals closed in 2017, while value was up 50%, from €21.79 billion. 
Domestic value was boosted by eight deals worth more than €1 billion, alone counting for 50% 
of total domestic deals value. The largest one was the acquisition of the pharmaceutical 
developer Fimei by Rossini Investimenti, which worthed €3 billion.  
 
Figure 5 Domestic Italian Deals by volume and value 
 
Looking at the sectors targeted by domestic deals, “other services” confirm their appeal not 
only for foreign investors but also for domestic ones, with a total value of € 7.8 billion and 328 
deals. In value terms, “transport” target companies acquisitions involved the second largest 
value, marking a large increase with respect to 2017 (from €1 billion to €5 billion). The 
acquisition of motorway operator Anas International Enterprise by Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane 
(€2.86 billion) explains this growth. “Wholesale & retail trade” ranks third with a total value of 
€4 billion. “Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling” (103 deals) and “Gas, Water, 
Electricity” (65) represent the second and third most dynamic sectors for number of deals 
completed. 
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Table 10 Domestic Italian target sector by value, top 10 sectors 
Major sector (target) 2016 2017 2018 
Other services 7.509 5.207 7.838 
Transport 1.648 1.003 5.041 
Wholesale & retail trade 33 322 4.050 
Gas, Water, Electricity 5.900 1.644 3.663 
Metals & metal products 798 97 2.798 
Construction 620 595 2.422 
Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling 455 1.092 1.831 
Food, beverages, tobacco 265 34 1.586 
Insurance companies 778 1.443 1.077 
Post and telecommunications 923 164 599 
 
Table 11 Domestic Italian target sector by volume, top 10 sectors 
Major sector (target) 2016 2017 2018 
Other services 249 215 328 
Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling 73 72 103 
Gas, Water, Electricity 43 59 65 
Wholesale & retail trade 26 34 49 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic products 29 38 44 
Publishing, printing 46 39 42 
Food, beverages, tobacco 29 26 42 
Insurance companies 24 13 34 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather 20 17 31 
Transport 17 21 25 
 
 
1.3 Determinants of Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions 
The great extent to which cross-border M&As developed and the value traded in these 
transactions made the literature on the topic flourishing in the last years. However, a review of 
the existing academic research suggests that the investigation on cross-border M&As is highly 
fragmented across various disciplines, e.g. strategic management, international business, 
finance, economics, industrial organization, human resources management (Erel, Liao & 
Weisbach, 2012; Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004; Reddy, 2015; Reddy & Liang, 
2017) . Existing literature focuses on two key points of view on cross-border M&As. On one 
side, a large share of studies does not recognize cross-border deals as warranting distinctive 
examination separate from domestic M&As in general (Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath & Pisano, 
2004). On the other side, researchers have focused on the comparison among cross-border 
M&As and other types of Foreign Direct Investments, looking for the factors that affect 
managers’ strategy in entering new markets. (Chen, 2008; Nocke &Yeaple, 2007). 
 In this section, we will attempt to isolate cross-borders M&As findings to investigate 
the actual state of the art on the topic. We will start our examination outlining what researchers 
Inbound cross-border M&As in Italy: are family businesses better off when acquired by foreign investors? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
18 
have identified as the main determinants of cross-border M&As, e.g. the factors that affect the 
likelihood that firms whose head-quarters are located in different countries merge. Deepening 
our knowledge on the point will allow to better understand the peculiarities of the phenomenon, 
isolating it from domestic M&As and other FDIs strategies. In fact, the analysis focuses on 
factors that affect the realization of cross-border deals but are not present to the same extent in 
domestic mergers, such as cultural differences, geographic differences, country level 
governance differences, tax and financial effects (Erel, Liao & Weisbach, 2012). The relative 
importance of these factors justifies the choice between greenfield and brownfield investments 
(cross-borders acquisitions).  
 The most common determinants of cross-borders M&As can be clustered in three 
different groups. First, a large part of the literature focuses on country-level factors which 
summarize the macroeconomic conditions that favour or hinder international deals – market 
growth in the host country, cultural and geographical distance, exchange rate, GDP change, 
political uncertainty, institutional laws, taxation, accounting and valuation issues. Second, other 
key elements reside in the industry organization – industry booms or shocks, technological 
changes, market growth, competition. Finally, firms’ specific characteristics can affect 
managers’ decision of undertaking a cross-border deal – firm size, financial resources, 
multinational experience, local experience, international strategy, firm productivity (Reddy, 
2015). 
1.3.1 Country level factors 
Country level factors have received the largest attention by business literature. There are two 
branches of studies on the macroeconomic causes of international deals and capital flows in 
general. The first focuses on obstacles to capital flows, external push factors as financial market 
failures and asymmetric information; the second emphasizes specific countries features, pull 
factors as GDP growth, quality of institutions, openness to trade and technological differences, 
which are considered to be especially significant in the long run (Hyun & Kim, 2010). The level 
and the interaction of these factors both in the home and host country affect deals completion; 
in fact, the analysis of the host country alone is not sufficient to explain the occurrence of an 
international deal (Reddy, 2015). 
The most important aspect in international business research is culture and the impact 
differences in national culture have on acquisitions’ negotiation and performance. Past research 
has produced ambiguous results, some finding a negative effect on M&As volume and success, 
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others supporting for positive outcomes when different cultures interact (Reddy & Liang, 
2017).  
First, several researchers focused on the effect of cultural distance on the deal process. 
Differences in national culture are found to have significant impact on both deal completion 
and post-acquisition integration success (Ahern, Daminelli & Fracassi2015; Chakrabarti, 
Gupta-Mukherjee & Jayaraman, 2009). In particular, Ahammad et al. (2016) argue that the 
effectiveness of the negotiation phase is negatively affected by the home-host national culture 
difference. The set of values, norms and principles founding the country’s believes affect the 
negotiation style and tactics, the level of trust in negotiation counterparts, governance and 
decision making processes and the acquirers’ perception of target companies. All these 
elements contribute to increase the contracting costs of the acquisition (Ahammad, Tarba, Liu, 
Glaister & Cooper, 2016). Consequently, researchers find that national cultural distance is 
likely to reduce the number of cross-borders acquisitions. Analysing cross-border deals 
involving 52 countries, Ahern et al. (2015) find strong evidence that the volume of deals is 
lower when countries are more culturally distant. Moreover, a greater cultural distance reduces 
the likelihood of completing a deal that has been already publicly announced (Ahern, Daminelli 
& Fracassi, 2015). 
Many studies supporting a negative impact of cultural distance on cross-border investments 
observe that this relationship is mitigated by different factors, as previous acquisition 
experience of acquiring firm (Dikova & Sahib, 2013), top management team’s international 
orientation (Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014), target country experience (Ragozzino, 2009) 
and bidder’s country-level familiarity with the host country in terms of student and traveller 
flows (Lim, Makhija & Shenkar, 2016). These moderators motivate acquirers to undertake high 
equity stakes in culturally distant locations.  
A second stream of literature has focused on the relationship between cultural distance and the 
level of equity participation acquired through the M&A deal. Results regarding the issue are 
ambiguous. Several studies have found empirical evidence supporting low equity entry mode 
when the host country is more culturally distant (Chari & Chang, 2009), others assert that 
acquiring firms tend to take full equity in culturally distant countries. More interestingly, and 
partially solving the controversy, Malhotra et al. (2011) observe a curvilinear U-shaped 
relationship between cultural distance and equity participation. Acquiring firms tend to choose 
majority equity acquisitions at high and low levels of cultural distance, while at moderate 
distances small equity participations are preferred. The theoretical justification of this empirical 
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result is backed by a cost-benefits analysis. When home and host countries are culturally 
similar, uncertainty is lower and it is easier to deal with acquisition differences in the ex-ante 
target valuation and ex-post integration. Thus, having full control is considered to be beneficial 
as it will make easier to the acquiring firm to exert its influence and get full benefits from the 
target performance. However, as cultural distance increases, so do uncertainty, risks and costs. 
Therefore, the risk mitigation allowed by shared ownership becomes more appealing. Partial 
ownership avoids large commitments and guarantees a flexible strategy to deal with 
uncertainty. However, at high levels of cultural distance, day-to-day conflicts are likely to be 
more frequent, thus shared ownership will be more costly. The cost of integrating the two firms 
will outweigh the benefits of shared ownership, therefore favouring full ownership (Malhotra, 
Sivakumar & Zhu 2011). This U-shaped relationship is even stronger when geographic distance 
is higher; low geographic distance can compensate for the difficulties in integrating firms from 
distant national cultures, thus favouring investments. On the opposite, for firms located in 
similar national culture, higher geographic distance might result in lower monitoring and higher 
likelihood of opportunistic behaviours (Malhotra, 2012).  
Besides the interaction effect between geographical and cultural distance, researchers agree on 
the importance of geography per se. Ceteris paribus, the shorter the distance between 
companies, the higher the likelihood of observing a dynamic market of mergers and acquisitions 
between the two (Erel, Liao & Weisbach, 2012; Hyun & Kim, 2010). In addition, mergers are 
likely to occur between firms of countries that trade more commonly with one another, since 
they share a past background that reduces uncertainty. Actually, the effect of openness to trade 
and regional trade agreement on M&As has been analysed obtaining different results. A current 
of thought supports a positive impact on FDI flows, especially for smaller firms, whereas others 
observe a negative effect of trade regulations, even though the type matters: custom unions and 
free trade agreements work against cross-border M&A, while service agreements have a 
positive effect (Di Giovanni, 2005; Erel, Liao & Weisbach, 2012).  
The level of financial market development has also received the attention of researchers in 
investigating the determinants of cross-borders acquisitions. Di Giovanni (2005) argues that the 
size of the financial market, measured by the stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, affects 
firms’ decisions of investing abroad. In particular, a 1% increase of the stock market to GDP 
ratio is associated with a 0.955% increase in cross-border M&As activity (Di Giovanni, 2005). 
Interestingly, Chen et al. (2009) observe that developed stocks and bonds markets have different 
effects. Firms operating in better-developed stock markets are likely to prefer cross-border 
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M&As over domestic ones; however, the volume of cross-border M&As is lower for firms 
operating in highly developed bond markets because their more extensive use of leverage 
imposes additional constraints when financing their investments (Chen, Huang & Chen, 2009). 
Connected to that, another potentially important factor in international mergers is valuation. 
Firms in countries whose stock market has increased in value, whose currency has recently 
appreciated (e.g. effect of exchange rates) and that have relatively high market to book value 
tend to be purchasers, while firms from weaker performing economies tend to be well appealing 
as targets. However, differences in valuation or valuation advantages do not explain the 
occurrence of cross-border acquisitions alone. Indeed, changes in valuation have a great impact 
on country pairs that are more disposed towards M&As for other macroeconomic reasons (Erel, 
Liao & Weisbach, 2012). 
 Finally, literature on FDIs has emphasised the role of institutions, legal and regulatory 
frameworks in driving international investments. The value and volume of M&As is affected 
by the institutional quality of the host country, in terms of low corruption levels, less risk of 
opportunism and well-observed laws (Hyun & Kim, 2010). Additionally, differences in laws 
and enforcement explain both the patterns and intensity of cross-border M&As. Countries with 
higher accounting standards and stronger shareholders protection have more M&As, while 
targets are typically from countries with poorer investors protection compared to their acquirers 
(Rossi & Volpin, 2004). These findings are consistent with the governance argument, which 
predicts that firms in countries promoting better governance systems through developed legal 
and accounting standards will tend to acquire firms in lower-quality governance. Merging will 
allow to improve the governance of the target company by aligning target shareholders rights 
with the superior ones of acquirer’s shareholders, thus promoting a convergence in corporate 
governance standards. Moreover, better governance environments facilitate foreign 
investments because they reduce the financing constraints caused by information asymmetry 
(Chen, Huang & Chen, 2009). 
 
1.3.2 Industry level factors 
While the existing analysis on the determinants of cross-border M&As has largely targeted 
macroeconomic-country level factors and secondly firms’ specific characteristics, few attention 
has been devoted to the role of industry characteristics in determining cross-border investments. 
Indeed, some researchers claimed the need of further investigating the issue, arguing that the 
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conditions where companies operate and compete may have a significant impact on their 
decisions to merge or acquire foreign companies (Zou & Simpson, 2008; Kang & Johansson, 
2000). 
Traditional industrial organization studies address the role of market power and market growth 
as the main determinants of foreign direct investments and so of cross-border M&As. In 
particular, Kang and Johansson (2000) observe that industry characteristics as market growth, 
market structure and the degree of competition significantly affect the decision of foreign 
acquisitions. Firms operating in slow growth, excess capacity and competitive markets attempt 
to reduce the pressing effects coming from these forces by industrial restructuring, which often 
involve M&As as preferred means to greenfield investments (Kang & Johansson, 2000). 
Similarly, in the Chinese context, Zou and Simpson identified industry size, profitability, 
technology intensity and economic policy reforms as main drivers of acquisition activity (Zou 
& Simpson, 2008). 
A following stream of literature focuses on the role of industrial shocks, which vary from one 
industry to another. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) argue that rather than broad-based economic 
factors per se, it is the occurrence of industry shocks that determines the flow of mergers activity 
across industries. Industrial shocks are defined as any factor which alters industry structure, as 
deregulation, changes in input costs or innovation in existing technologies. In these contexts, 
corporate takeovers as mergers and acquisitions are often the least-cost means to face the 
economic shock (Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996). 
Following this stream of thoughts, the role of technological changes has been investigated. In 
general terms, technological intensity is positively associated with the level of acquisition 
activity. Great presence of intangible resources and intellectual capability favour more 
acquisitions into the market (Zou & Simpson, 2008), while on the other side, firms try to expand 
their business into other growth markets to hedge the risk and enhance market share (Hitt, 
Franklin & Zhu, 2006). When a technological change occurs, the level of international deals is 
stimulated in many ways. Firstly, technological innovation often results in falling 
communication and transport costs, which favours firms’ international expansion seeking to 
exploit and consolidate their competitive advantage. Second, technological change brings with 
it higher uncertainty, that coupled with soaring research and development costs, induces firms 
to seek for new partners to share risks and enjoy cooperation advantages in generating 
intangible assets (Kang & Johansson, 2000).  
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Finally, concluding the investigation on industry shocks, great importance is given to the role 
of deregulation in pushing corporate acquisitions. Ovtchinnikov (2013) observes how following 
deregulation, companies choose more frequently an M&A strategy. However, merger activity 
following deregulation is related to poor pre-deregulation industry performance. Therefore, 
post-deregulation mergers are often a form of exit from the industry by companies that were 
operating with excess capacity. The frequency of cash and bankruptcy mergers is significantly 
higher, while bid premiums are lower (Ovtchinnikov, 2013). 
1.3.3 Firm level factors 
The third group of factors affecting the occurrence of cross-border M&As are those related to 
single firms’ specificities. Few studies analysed these aspects and obviously the results are 
linked to the institutional and cultural settings in which companies operate. 
A large share of the literature on the topic focuses on the role of financial performance and 
particularly financial constraints. Looking at European non-financial acquisitions, Forssbæck 
and Oxelheim (2008) empirically demonstrate that a firm is more likely to engage in foreign 
investments when it has access to competitively priced equity, when it has cross-listed its stocks 
in a larger, more liquid equity market, when it enjoys a strong investment grade credit rating 
and when it is able to negotiate reduced taxation and/or attract subsidies (Forssbæck & 
Oxelheim, 2008). These financial advantages are even more important in predicting 
international investments in knowledge-intensive industries and in relatively illiquid and 
segmented capital markets as they help in reducing information asymmetries (Forssbæck & 
Oxelheim, 2011). A similar study has been developed by Gonzales et al. (1997) in the US. Their 
empirical analysis enables them to observe how the probability of a merger or acquisition is 
significantly explained by a number of financial variables. In particular, price/earnings, 
leverage, size (proxied by the market value of equity) and dividend payout ratio are negatively 
related to the probability of an M&A, while investments in fixed assets and current ratio 
(defined as current assets/current liabilities) have a positive effect (Gonzalez, Vasconcellos, 
Kish & Kramer, 1997). 
The greater uncertainty of cross-border M&As makes finance-specific factors more important 
than for domestic deals. International deals suffer of lower information transparency and longer 
distance, thus placing higher financial burdens on acquiring firms. As a consequence, two 
factors facilitate the preference for cross-border M&As to domestic ones; first, the availability 
of internal funds, e.g. cash liquidity, which avoids further transactions costs. Second, cross-
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listing on foreign exchange market that reinforce the company’s finance (Chen, Huang & Chen, 
2009).  
 A second group of firm-specific factors studies focuses on the acquiring company past 
experience in M&As and internationalization (Dikova & Sahib, 2013; Lim, Makhija & Shenkar, 
2016; Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014; Ragozzino, 2009; Stroup 2017). In particular, 
researchers observe that director’s experience with cross-border transactions positively 
influences the decision to undertake the first such transaction and will lead to a target selection 
in countries where directors had prior deal experience. This knowledge-advantage is recognized 
also by the market, which evaluates these deals more favourably than those announced by firms’ 
directors with no prior experience (Stroup, 2017). As mentioned above, the relevance of this 
effect is even stronger for target firms located in culturally and institutionally foreign countries 
(Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014). Besides directors’ experience with cross-border deals in 
general, local knowledge about a target country is also significant. Local experience facilitates 
further investments in a particular country and increases the chances of success for new 
acquisitions. In other words, a first-time market entry is likely to suffer of more complicated 
negotiation, information gathering, valuation and integration. These findings are in line with 
the interpretation of M&A transactions as a learning process, whereby the experiential human 
capital and past knowledge are relevant in creating and extracting value (Very & Schweiger, 
2001). 
 Lastly, some studies have deepen into the impact of firms’ size and productivity in their 
M&A strategy. Compared to domestic M&As, firms’ size plays a more important role in driving 
cross-border M&As. Larger firms face fewer financial constraints and might easily collect the 
resources needed to conclude an international transaction (Chen, Huang & Chen, 2009). On the 
opposite, the smaller the company, the higher the possibility of its acquisition (Gonzalez, 
Vasconcellos, Kish & Kramer, 1997). Additionally, firms with relatively high productivity are 
more likely to invest abroad and to choose countries for which foreign investments are relatively 
more difficult (Stroup, 2017). However, the greater the levels of productivity, the more firms 
will prefer greenfield FDIs investments over acquisitions, as they do not want to jeopardize the 
efficiency of their processes with post-deal integration (Raff, Ryan & Stähler, 2012). 
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1.4 Motives of Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions 
The precedent paragraph diagnosed the factors identified by the literature as affecting the 
likelihood of mergers and acquisitions. A complete examination on the nature of cross-border 
M&As might not abstain from going forward into the motives of such transactions, i.e. why 
companies engage in cross-border M&As.  
Existing literature devoted large attention to the motives of mergers and acquisitions in general, 
namely search for synergies, market value misvaluation, hubris, managerialism (agency 
problems) and improving market power (DePamphilis, 2018; Tripathi & Lamba, 2015). 
However, fewer studies focused on the specific motives for cross-border deals. Since the latter 
present unique characteristics, different benefits, costs and complexities, there may be 
systematic differences in the relative importance of motives for domestic versus cross-border 
acquisitions. The following paragraph will point out the specific motives for cross-border 
M&As; then, an overview on how the aforementioned general motives take place in the context 
of international transactions will follow. 
1.4.1 Cross-Border M&As Motives 
Analysing the existing literature, we can distinguish two main reasons why firms engage in 
cross-border M&As: first, as an entry mode to a new market in a faster way and avoiding trading 
costs. In this context, the International Business literature assumes M&As as substitutes for 
greenfield FDIs or export strategy. Second, to get access to the target’s specific countries 
capabilities, skills and know-how. This second view is backed by the Resource Based View of 
firms’ competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Lee, 2017; Anand & Delios, 2002).  
 
1.4.1.2 Market entry motive 
All researchers investigating the topic all agreed in naming market entry motive as the main 
driver for cross-border M&As. Firms look for companies headquartered in foreign countries, 
instead of home market ones, to establish their presence in the targeted country and facilitate 
international expansion (Ahammad & Glaister, 2010). 
The main advantage of cross-border transactions over other alternative strategies for 
international expansion is speed. Despite an M&A process might take months to be concluded, 
acquiring an existing firm is quicker than establishing a new venture from the ground. In this 
sense, the appeal of acquisitions is even more relevant in fast-growing markets where the 
opportunity cost of delaying entry is higher. Brownfield investments allow immediate access 
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to local networks of suppliers, marketing and distribution channels and clients, which would be 
time-costly to establish (Ahammad & Glaister, 2010; Chen, 2008; Hopkins, 1999; Shimizu, 
Hitt, Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004). Furthermore, foreign buyers are more likely to use 
acquisitions rather than establish a wholly owned subsidiary when they do not have clear 
advantages over rivals and when they plan to manufacture a product that they do not produce 
at home (Hopkins, 1999). In this latter case, the market entry motive overlaps with the know-
how acquisition motive. Indeed, the acquisition of a local company is ultimately finalized at 
acquiring market specific expertise, e.g. knowledge on local marketing strategies or distribution 
channels, which makes the acquirer’s offer more desirable and closed to local customers (Lee, 
2017). 
In addition to being fast, cross-border acquisitions are advantageous to greenfield investments 
because 1) they allow to establish quick critical mass; 2) they do not imply the setting up of 
additional capacity, thus worsening rivalry with incumbents; 3) they force the management at 
the headquarter level to wisely consider local constraints and adjust to local practices (Whitaker, 
2016). 
 
1.4.1.3 Resources and capabilities seeking motive 
The second considerable motive driving cross-border M&As is the desire to acquire new 
capabilities and strategic assets which are specifically located in the target’s country. 
Companies decide to engage in an M&A transaction to bring under their control a more diverse 
stock of specific assets which enable them to seize new opportunities and are complementary 
to the assets they developed in their home country. Technology assets, know-how, intellectual 
property, reputable brand name, human resources, managerial and marketing skills are all 
superior gains resulting from an acquisitions, which might be long or impractical to build 
domestically (Ahammad & Glaister, 2010; Anand & Delios, 2002; Chen, 2008; Nocke & 
Yeaple, 2007; Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004). These resources may not only 
favour the company performance in the host market, but also realize gains in the home country 
from reverse internationalization. 
Interestingly, Nocke and Yeaple (2007) distinguish between mobile and non-mobile 
capabilities; mobile capabilities are those that travel around the world and are internationally 
available. Non-mobile capabilities travel less by their very nature and are therefore country-
specific. In these terms, firms engage in FDIs to obtain non-mobile capabilities that they cannot 
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find elsewhere. The less a capability is mobile, the more cross-border M&As are appealing to 
get access to them (Nocke & Yeaple, 2007). 
The resources and capabilities seeking motive is theoretically backed by the Resource Based 
View and Resource Dependence Theory (Barney, 1991). In this context, M&As are a tool to 
reduce the buyer’s environmental interdependence and uncertainties by acquiring missing 
capabilities and enhancing existing resources (Wang & Moini, 2012). 
Acquirers tend to focus particularly on three sets of resources: 
1. Downstream capabilities, as salesforce, brand and distribution networks. These inputs 
can be more cheaply and conveniently acquired bundled in a company, rather than built 
from the ground. In this case, the resources and capabilities seeking motive is functional 
to market entry or enhancement. 
Downstream assets are characterized by low mobility, since they are strictly related to 
local customers and often developed through path-dependence (Nocke & Yeaple, 2007; 
Anand & Delios, 2002) 
2. Technology. Companies use M&As as a tool to improve operational efficiency and gain 
a synergy effect with the target existing technology (Lee, 2017; Wang & Moini, 2012). 
Despite technology is a mobile and fungible resources across borders, local relative 
competitive advantages still exist and motivate the movements of companies in lower 
costs/technologically developed countries. Indeed, different factors explain technology-
seeking behaviours. Lee (2017) shows how the country size difference matters in this 
choice. The bigger the home country relative to the host country, the more firms engage 
in technology-seeking cross-border M&As into the smaller country (Lee, 2017). 
Moreover, investors tend to acquire foreign firms when the sector in which they are 
investing is technically superior to the same sector in their home country; if no 
differences in technological level holds, greenfield investments are preferred (Anand & 
Delios, 2002). 
3. Intellectual property rights. Gaining access to intellectual property is often cited as a 
considerable reason to acquire a company. In particular, it allows to reduce the risk of 
imitation, increase market power and reinforce the brand advantage. As intellectual 
property protection systems are determined by the regulatory system of each country, 
differences in home-host countries provisions may justify foreign investments to access 
to new knowledge or enforce the proprietary one in a new country. More than for the 
other capabilities, the effect depends on the sector considered. In sectors characterized 
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by high R&D expenditure, M&A activities is more frequent, showing how companies 
may use M&As to substitute internally-produced knowledge (Campi, Dueñas, Barigozzi 
& Fagiolo,2018). 
 
1.4.2 General M&As motives in the context of international deals 
Synergies. The synergies hypothesis is the main explanation many decision makers provide 
when interviewed about why they undertook an M&A transaction. Synergies occur when the 
total value of the combined entity is higher than the sum of the target and acquirer’s value as 
stand-alone entities. Synergies may emerge from different sources, i.e. operational synergies 
due to economies of scale and scope, financial synergies due to reduction in the cost of capital, 
organizational synergies due to improved managerial operating practices (Ferreira, Santos, Reis 
& Almeida, 2012). In the context of international acquisitions, acquiring an existing foreign 
facility allows to rapidly exploit the potential for synergistic gains compared to greenfield 
investments. Another important source of synergies comes from the potential transfer of 
valuable intangible assets, as know-how, capabilities and routines which are country-specific 
to the target country. Indeed, studies conducted by Seth et al. (2000) in the US and Wang and 
Moini (2012) in Europe reveal how synergies is the main motive behind companies’ cross-
border M&As. In particular, more significant effects are originated by operating synergies, 
followed by joint sales, share of intangible resources and increased market power (Seth, Song 
& Pettit, 2000; Wang & Moini, 2012). 
 
Hubrys. The hubrys hypothesis suggests that acquirers’ managers over valuate the target firm, 
paying more than the target is worth, due to excessive overconfidence coming from past 
successful transactions, which leads them to undertake the acquisition assuming their valuations 
are correct, even if no synergies will arise (Tripathi & Lamba, 2015).  
Essentially, this irrational behaviour relies upon asymmetric beliefs by the bidder and target 
about the wealth gains association with the acquisition, with the bidder mistakenly overvaluing 
the target. As we saw, cross-border acquisitions are characterized by even greater information 
asymmetry between the two parties, thus the hubris hypothesis may be even more relevant in 
the context of cross-border acquisitions than in domestic ones (Seth, Song & Pettit, 2000). 
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Managerialism or Agency problem. The managerialism hypothesis shares with the hubris 
hypothesis the assumption of managers’ bounded rationality. Differently, it assumes that 
managers will knowingly overpay takeovers to maximise their own utility at the expense of the 
firm’s shareholders. Managers may make acquisitions to add to their prestige, influence, 
compensation or self-preservation. (Wang & Moini, 2012). International acquisitions may thus 
appear more appealing than domestic ones, as they satisfy managers’ search for prestige and 
empire building attitudes. Moreover, managers may seek to stabilize earning streams by 
acquiring foreign targets, which allow to higher risk diversification. In absence of strong 
corporate governance mechanism to control for managerial discretion, cross-border 
acquisitions may be more satisfactory at the expense of shareholders value (Seth, Song & Pettit, 
2000). 
 
Market power. One of the main drivers of M&A in the Industrial Organization literature is the 
attempt to enhance market power by absorbing rivals. In this sense, M&As may be aimed at the 
removal of actual or potential competitors to avoid escalating rivalry or consolidate the current 
position (Very & Schweiger, 2001). Market power can be obtained not only by horizontal 
mergers with competitors, but also by vertical mergers with upstream or downstream players 
and conglomerate transactions in other businesses. Foreign acquisitions may help in gaining 
market power abroad, where the company’s competitive advantage is not strong as in the 
domestic market. Especially for multinational companies competing globally, cross-border 
acquisitions serve the aim of reducing competition and partners’ bargaining power (Chen, 
2008). 
 
1.5 Cross-Border M&As effects on the target company performance 
The existing literature on mergers and acquisitions has widely explored the post-acquisition 
outcomes. The body of literature is vast, but fragmented across a vast number of issues and with 
mixed results. The majority of acquisition studies deal with the impact of M&As 
announcements on the share price of the acquirer, which is not a suitable measure in the Italian 
context characterized by privately held SMEs. Other researchers have explored the wealth 
creation opportunity for acquirer and target firms’ shareholders, the effects on the target country 
competitiveness and welfare, or the results on the performance of the acquirer and combined 
entity. Despite its importance in the entrepreneurial life cycle, in the past fewer studies 
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specifically investigated what happens to the acquired firm after an acquisition. In the latest 
years, the interest on this topic raised, and so related researches did. 
The goal of the following paragraph is hence to deepen our understanding of how the economic 
performance of acquired companies develops. The topic is of extreme interest for policy makers 
and institutions, as well as for managers and shareholders submitted with an acquisition 
proposal. However, researchers obtained mixed results. Competing forces may be at work 
simultaneously, either leading to positive or negative performance effects. For example, 
operational synergies may bring performance enhancement, while post-integration problems 
may worsen the organizational efficiency. Further, the motive that drove the acquisition, the 
level of integration between the acquirer and acquired company, culture fit may all affect the 
acquisition success for the target company. 
Two main stream of theoretical literature dealing with performance of foreign-controlled firms 
can be identified (Bentivogli & Mirenda, 2016).  
1. The first one is related to the multinational companies’ theory and the general 
hypothesis of MNEs’ performance advantage over purely domestic firms (Hymer, 
1960). Theoretical argument in favour of a superior performance of foreign firms is 
based on the OLI paradigm (ownership-location-internationalization advantages) of 
international production (Dunning, 1988). Foreign investors enjoy ownership 
advantages that grant them a competitive advantage over foreign competitors, a location 
specific advantage in the market they are entering and the ability to transfer them to 
foreign affiliate at a relatively low marginal costs. Further, firms need to overcome a 
large fixed cost of investment abroad, and hence, multinationals making FDI must have 
higher productivity than exporters and other domestic firms. Thus, MNEs are able to 
transfer proprietary assets and knowledge across countries to make their plants more 
efficient. Superior performance of foreign subsidiaries is then the result of superior 
technologies, new organizational practices, managerial skills, capital, brand reputation 
and negotiation power with suppliers and customers thanks to the parent company 
higher market potential (Markusen, 2002). Yet, it also exists the well supported 
argument that foreign subsidiaries performance may get worse due to the parent 
company liability of foreignness (Hymer, 1976), MNEs’ scarce knowledge of the local 
economy, poor culture fit, managerial and reporting issues. These contrasting arguments 
result in heterogeneous empirical evidences, although studies which support a positive 
impact of foreign acquisition on the acquired firm performance prevail by a wide margin 
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(Chang, Chung & Moon, 2013; Crinò & Onida, 2008; Damijan,  Kostevc & Rojec, 
2015; Girma & Gorg, 2007). 
2. The second stream of literature derives from the market for corporate control research 
(Manne, 1965). This alternative point of view highlights the relevance of considering 
an ex-ante selection bias in target selection as a key driver of different post acquisition 
performances. Acquirers may choose underperforming but promising companies 
(negative selection, or “lemons picking”) to remove inefficiencies and generate the full 
value of the company. On the contrary, they may target only best performing firms 
(positive selection, or “cherries” picking) so that it will be easier to capture value from 
the acquisition. Given that, MNEs superior performance may be simply the result of a 
non-random acquisition of best performers in the market. Accounting for ex ante 
selection and differences in pre-acquisition performance levels thus explains post-
acquisition outcomes.  
The relevant literature seems to support the cherry picking hypothesis (Almeida, 2007; 
Chari, Chen & Dominguez, 2009; Guadalupe, Kuzmina & Thomas, 2012; Salis, 2008; 
Zhu, Jog & Otchere, 2011), but the opposite view also received some backing (Feys & 
Manigart, 2010). Analysing a sample of Spanish firms, Guadalupe et al. (2012) 
document how foreign firms cherry-picked the most productive companies (Guadalupe, 
Kuzmina & Thomas, 2012).  Chari et al. (2009) support this position adding that US 
target firms report higher levels of sales, employment and total assets (Chari, Chen & 
Dominguez, 2009). In a Portuguese cross-sectional analysis, Almeida (2007) reveals 
that acquired companies are larger, employ a more educated workforce, pay higher 
wages and exhibit technological characteristics more similar to the acquirer’s one 
(Almeida, 2007). On the opposite, Feys and Manigart (2010) show that Belgian targets 
are on average underperforming before the acquisition compared to remained-
independent firms, in terms of lower sales growth and lower margins (Feys & Manigart, 
2010) 
Looking at the Italian context, scholars’ results are not conclusive. Barbaresco et al. 
(2018) find that Italian target companies of foreign acquisitions achieve results at least 
not lower than target of domestic acquisitions in the five year prior to the deal 
(Barbaresco, Matarazzo & Resciniti, 2018). Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005) report that 
MNEs do not seem to systematically select lower or higher productive target companies 
(Piscitello, Rabbiosi, 2005). 
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Regardless of the literature stream they belong to, scholars focused on some specific and 
recurring measures of target company performance. A wide majority of researchers investigated 
the effects on productivity (total factor and labour productivity) and on labour market-related 
measures, such as the level of employment and the level of wages. The impact these variables 
have on the target country welfare and macroeconomic indicators motivates the interest on these 
topics. Among others variables, profitability, sales and investments worth a foremost attention. 
1.5.1 Total factor productivity  
Productivity is considered to be the main indicator of how successful an acquisition has been 
for the acquired company (Damijan, Kostevc & Rojec, 2015). 
The internationalization theory mentioned above suggests that MNEs’ foreign subsidiaries 
should benefit from the transfer of proprietary assets and therefore display higher productivity 
and profitability levels compared to local firms. However, empirical studies do not always 
converge on the superior productivity hypothesis and provide mixed results. 
Using an OLS approach to a sample of Chinese companies acquired by foreign investors, Liu 
et al. (2017) find a 22% increase in total factor productivity of target firms. A stronger 
performance enhancing effect emerges when a larger technology gap exists between the country 
of the acquirer and China, and only in horizontal and conglomerate acquisitions, not in vertical 
ones. Interestingly, they also observe an inverted-U relationship between the performance of 
the target and the share of the target’s equity owned by the foreign acquirer. A large equity 
control reduces the incentives of the target management to contribute to the firm, which in turn 
reduces their performance. This result indicates that technology and management transfer are 
not the only factors that affect the target performance (Liu, Lu & Qiu, 2017). 
A lower but still significant productivity improvement is documented also by Arnold and 
Javorcik (2009) on a sample of cross-border M&As in Indonesia. Results indicate that foreign 
ownership leads to significant TFP improvement which become visible in the acquisition year 
and continue in subsequent periods. After three years, acquired plants exhibit a 13.5% higher 
productivity than non-acquired comparable companies. The rise in productivity is due to 
restructuring initiatives, as the acquired plants increase investments in fixed assets, enlarge 
production scale, hire new labour and pay higher wages. Foreign ownership does also enhance 
the integration of the target into the global economy through increased exports and imports 
(Arnold & Javorcik, 2009). Lower and slower improvements are signalled by Karpaty (2005). 
In its investigation over a sample of Swedish firms, he reveals that the increase in productivity 
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in foreign owned firms ranges between 3 and 9% according to the estimator chosen and does 
not occur immediately, but only after 3 years post acquisition (Karpaty, 2005). Similarly, 
Bertrand and Zitouna (2008) find evidence of positive and significant impact productivity of 
French companies target of horizontal acquisitions. However, the productivity enhancement 
does not translate into higher profitability, suggesting that companies redistribute efficiency 
gains at the upstream or downstream production stage through an increase in input prices or 
decrease in final good prices. Moreover, these results are stronger for cross-border M&As than 
for domestic ones, and when the acquirer comes from non-European countries (Bertrand & 
Zitouna, 2008). The importance of country-difference is highlighted by Harris and Robinson as 
well (2003). In a study of foreign acquisitions on UK targets, they reveal how plants acquired 
by US companies experience higher productivity than domestically owned plant. On the other 
side, there is little evidence of a significant productivity differential in favour of European 
parent companies owned plants (Harris & Robinson, 2003). Apparently, European integration 
reduces the difference between European and domestic acquisitions, or EU MNEs appear to be 
less skilled and/or less equipped to transfer their proprietary assets efficiently compared to their 
US counterparts (Benfratello & Sembenelli, 2006). 
The advantage of foreign acquisitions is confirmed also by Fukao et al. (2006) in Japan. Foreign 
acquisitions improve target firms’ productivity and profitability significantly more and quicker 
than acquisitions by domestic firms. The increase in productivity is visible in the three years 
window after the acquisition and is the result of technological transfer between acquirer and 
target company (Fukao, Ito, Kwon & Takizawa, 2006). 
Interestingly, analysing firm-level financial data on acquisitions in a sample of seven new 
European Union countries4, Damijan et at. (2015) confirm that target firms of foreign investors 
register above average productivity levels, and further suggest that foreign ownership yields 
different rewards according to the pre-acquisition performance. The improvement effect is 
more pronounced for smaller firms, which can better benefit of the transfer of managerial 
capabilities from the parent company and increased efficiency in the use of labour and capital. 
Moreover, the increase in performance is more significant for manufacturing firms than service 
firms (Damijan, Kostevc & Rojec, 2015). 
                                                 
 
4 Bulgaria, Estonia, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
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Differently from all precedent studies, Buckley et al. (2014) investigate foreign acquisitions 
from emerging to developed countries. In these situations we may imagine a different pattern 
of technological and managerial differences. However, the same result holds: also emerging 
countries MNEs contribute to increase the target firms productivity and sales, in particular when 
the acquiring firm can exploit prior acquisition performance (Buckley, Elia & Kafouros, 2014). 
Despite the numerous studies supporting a productivity positive effect, some scholars tested the 
opposite outcome. Salis (2008) finds no evidence of a positive causal effect of foreign 
acquisition up to two years following the deal of Slovenian target firms (Salis, 2008). In UK, 
Schiffbauer et al. (2017) report a 5.1% lower TFP of acquired firms in the acquisition year 
compared to similar companies with the same probability of being acquired. This negative 
outcome is likely the result of high restructuring costs. In the long run, no effect of foreign 
ownership on TFP is found. Interestingly, the scholars observe significant heterogeneity at the 
industry level, which potentially explains the absence of positive TFP effects at the aggregate 
level (Schiffbauer, Siedschlag & Ruane, 2017). Finally, Zhu et al. (2011) do not find significant 
impact on the target productivity following foreign acquisitions of emerging countries 
companies, which on the contrary occurs when the acquirer is domestic (Zhu, Jog & Otchere, 
2011). 
Looking at the Italian context, Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006) provide empirical evidence 
in support of this last view. According to their analysis, foreign ownership has no effect on 
Italian companies’ productivity. Confirming the results of Harris and Robinson (2003) in UK 
and Bertrand and Zitouna (2008) in France, they also find that firms under US ownership tend 
to be more productive than other nationalities ownership. This suggests that the transfer of 
technology seems to occur only if the difference between the recipient and the investment 
country is sufficiently pronounced and that US MNEs have a parent company advantage over 
others (Benfratello & Sembenelli, 2006). 
1.5.2 Labour productivity  
The impact of M&As on the target company performance in terms of labour productivity has 
been largely under investigation by both the literature on MNEs and scholars in the field of 
Industrial Organization.  
Literature supporting a positive impact on labour productivity is vast. In the above mentioned 
article on Indonesian firms, Arnold and Javorcik (2009) provide the largest estimate of such 
impact. According to their analysis, labour productivity improved by 63% after the acquisition 
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and was accompanied by new hirings and higher wages. This huge improvement is not the result 
of changes in skill-intensity. Foreign owners are able to introduce new organizational and 
managerial changes that make the production processes more efficient and use labour more 
effectively. Further, MNEs are able to attract the most experienced and motivated workers from 
local plants, which justifies the higher wages paid (Arnold & Javorcik, 2009).  
Other studies provide still positive, but much lower estimates of labour productivity 
improvements, i.e. on the order of 10-15%. For example, Guadalupe et al. (2012) report a 11% 
increase in labour productivity of Spanish firms following a foreign acquisition, mainly due to 
investments in technology and process innovation (Guadalupe, Kuzmina & Thomas, 2012). 
Conyon et al. (2002) certify a 14% increase in UK target companies (Conyon, Girma, 
Thompson & Wright, 2002).  In a study on US companies’ acquisitions, Chen (2011) confirm 
these results and point out the relevance of the acquirer’s country of origin, distinguishing 
between acquirers from industrialized and emerging markets. Compared to companies that 
received domestic acquisitions, those acquired by industrialized countries firms experience a 
labour productivity increase by 13%. On the contrary, targets of developing countries acquirers 
exhibited lower productivity gains of 23% in the four years after the acquisition (Chen, 2011).  
In Italy, several studies support these findings, agreeing on a positive effect of foreign 
ownership (Crinò & Onida, 2008; ICE & Prometeia, 2014; Mariotti, Onida & Piscitello, 2003; 
Piscitello & Rabbiosi, 2005). Mariotti et al. (2003) observe an increase in both labour 
productivity and employment level in companies subjected to foreign acquisitions compared to 
those that did not experience any ownership change. In particular, results are even stronger for 
small target firms (1-49 employees) and if the investor is a European multinational company. 
Smaller companies are less likely to present duplications and redundancies that need 
rationalization. They are usually acquired as launching pads that will need additional assets, 
thus resulting in productivity and employment improvements. On the other side, US MNEs’ 
worse performance may be due to their lower sensitivity to local labour pressures, but also to a 
different attitude towards the FDI investment. US companies are likely to set in Italy just a 
bridgehead that does not require an immediate sequential investment and adopt a try-and-see 
attitude with a slower adaptive learning on the local environment (Mariotti, Onida & Piscitello, 
2003; Piscitello & Rabbiosi, 2005). These results contrast with what Benfratello and Sembenelli 
(2006) highlighted, providing mixed conclusions to policy makers. 
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1.5.3 Employment level and wages 
The impact of foreign acquisitions on employment is often considered as a proxy for post 
acquisitions trends in acquired firms’ extent of activity. Results of empirical studies are mixed 
and no position seems to prevail. The inconclusiveness of scholars researches fuels the position 
of those who see foreign takeovers as harmful for the economic development of the country. 
Foreign acquisitions do not add to the country production capacity, but simply transfer 
ownership and control to foreign hands, often resulting in layoffs and shutting downs of some 
activities.  
Employment growth is documented by Arnold and Javorcik (2009) in Indonesia and Chen 
(2011) in the US, but only when the acquirer comes from an industrialized country (an increase 
of 24% versus a decline of 26% when the acquirer is located in a developing country). A 
significantly lower growth, but still positive (2%) is reported by ICE & Prometeia (2014) in 
Italy. 
Conversely, Girma and Görg (2006) claim that foreign acquisitions reduced the employment 
level of UK acquired firms, in particular for unskilled labour in technological intensive 
industries. Chari et al. (2009) confirm Chen (2011)’s result that US firms acquired by 
developing countries acquirers experience a decline in employment (Chari, Chen & 
Dominguez, 2009; Girma & Görg, 2006). 
Results are much more conclusive with regards to the effect on wages. Multinational theory 
suggests that MNEs pay higher wages due to their superior level of technology that explains 
their higher level of productivity. Moreover, the change in ownership often brings with it a 
change in industrial relations practices which may impact the wage structure. Foreign parent 
companies may also decide to increase compensations to “bribe” workers to avoid industrial 
relations disputes or this may come as a result of the implementation of successful working 
practices (Girma & Görg, 2007). 
Numerous evidences rely on UK data. Conyon et al. (2002) find that foreign firms pay 
equivalent employees 3.4% more than domestic firms as a result of their higher level of 
productivity (Conyon, Girma, Thompson & Wright, 2002). Girma and Görg (2007) support 
these results, reporting even higher wage premiums. They observe a significant effect on wages 
only for target firms acquired by US multinationals, while no evidence is found for EU based 
multinationals. US-owned targets benefit of an 8% and 13 percent increase in compensation for 
skilled and unskilled workers, respectively (Girma & Görg, 2007).  
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In Italy, both Crinò and Onida (2008) and Barbaresco et al. (2018) document higher wages paid 
by foreign owners. In particular, Barbaresco et al. (2018) report that the higher compensation 
level is observed in the 4 years windows post-acquisition and it is typically accompanied by an 
employment base recomposing in favour of high-skilled employees (white-collars) (Crinò & 
Onida, 2008; Barbaresco, Matarazzo & Resciniti, 2018). 
 
1.5.4 Profitability and returns  
Compared to the above mentioned variables, profitability and returns have been investigated 
more rarely. Existing literature seems to support a general hypothesis of foreign-owned 
companies’ advantage in profitability. In the US, positive evidences are found by Chen (2011) 
who reports an increase in profits by 10% and by Chari et al. (2009). Looking at ROA trend, 
they observe how ROA for acquired firms declines significantly in the first three years post 
acquisitions, but then increased from the fourth year on by 8.3%. The pattern of increased 
profitability (income/assets) and declining sales is consistent with improvements in firm-
efficiency and restructuring activities that generated beneficial effects just after the third year 
(Chen, 2011; Chari, Chen & Dominguez, 2009). The same pattern can be identified in Fukao et 
al. (2006)’s research in Japan. Similarly, no immediate improvements in profitability are 
visible, but ROA significantly improves in three and four years after the acquisition (Fukao, 
Ito, Kwon & Takizawa, 2006). In China, Chang et al. (2013) observe how foreign-acquired 
firms experience an average increase in ROA slightly above remaining local firms’ one; the 
enhancing effect is stronger for acquisitions of modernized companies with high intangible 
assets (Chang, Chung & Moon, 2013). 
Looking at Europe, results are more mixed. Feys and Manigart (2010) support the profitability 
enhancing hypothesis in Belgian foreign-acquired companies, which tend to experience similar 
sales growth of independent companies but higher profit margins (Feys & Manigart, 2010). On 
the contrary, a study conducted by Bertrand and Zitouna in France does not reveal increases in 
French target firms’ profitability in the five years post acquisition (Bertrand & Zitouna, 2008). 
The same controversial situation holds in Italy. Crinò and Onida (2008) find strong evidence of 
a foreign-owned firms disadvantage over national firms. Companies owned by multinationals 
exhibit lower ROA, EBITDA margin and EBIT per capita. Possible explanations could be 
MNEs’ transfer of profits in more fiscally convenient locations, higher international 
competition which forces to limit price margins, or lower incentives to reinvest earning to push 
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growth due to large recourse of intra firm loans (Crinò & Onida, 2008). Conversely, Bentivogli 
and Mirenda observe a net increase of 1.8% in ROE and 1.7% in cash flows on assets following 
foreign acquisition (Bentivogli & Mirenda, 2017). In a more recent study, Barbaresco et al. 
(2018) obtain other results. According to their findings, foreign-owned companies are more 
profitable than national comparable companies are. Actually, both groups experience a decrease 
in ROI in the three years post-acquisition due to the impact of the 2008 economic crisis. 
However, acquired companies deterioration was lower, -0.5% compared to -2.7%, suggesting 
that foreign-owned companies better responded to the macroeconomic adverse situation. In 
particular, European owners have a slightly higher impact than US and UK parent companies 
(Barbaresco, Matarazzo & Resciniti, 2018). 
 
1.5.5 Other variables 
A marginal part of the literature investigated some other performance variables, such as the 
level of debt, sales and incentives to innovation and investments. 
With regard to the level of indebtedness, scholars seem to agree on a lower level of financial 
leverage in multinational companies. Bentivogli and Mirenda observe a decrease by 2.8% in 
the debt/assets ratio (Bentivogli & Mirenda, 2017). The same result is documented also by 
Crinò and Onida (2008), who highlight that MNEs are less dependent on debt (measured by 
total debt/total capital, debt/equity ratio, profits/total capital) than national firms. MNEs are 
characterized by a lower weight of short term liabilities over total debt, lower cost of debt and 
less intense recourse to bank loans, but rather to other types of liabilities as bonds (Crinò & 
Onida, 2008). Both studies point out that differences are stronger in the service sector than in 
the manufacturing one.  
On the contrary, sales trends differ across the studies. Bentivogli and Mirenda (2017), Buckley 
et al (2014), Chen (2011), Liu et al. (2017), ICE & Prometeia (2014) all provide evidences for 
a sales improvement in foreign-acquired targets, even though with different magnitude effect 
(ICE & Prometeia register a 2.8% increase, Bentivogli and Mirenda a 7%, while Chen reports 
a much higher improvement, 29%). Barbaresco et al. (2018) point out that manufacturing firms 
enjoy a significant increase in their export sales, thanks to the higher international presence 
provided by the foreign acquirer (Barbaresco, Matarazzo & Resciniti, 2018). On the other side, 
Chari et al. (2009) and Feys and Manigart (2010) observe sales decline. 
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Finally, MNEs’ transfer of superior technology and proprietary assets results in higher 
innovation levels post foreign acquisition. Acquired firms are more likely to innovate and 
invest, both in the purchase of new machinery and fixed assets and in the adoption of new 
methods of production organization (Guadalupe, Kuzmina & Thomas, 2012; Liu, Lu & Qiu, 
2017).  
 
1.6 Conclusions 
The precedent chapter helped us in deepening our understanding of the magnitude of the cross-
border M&As phenomenon, its trend, driving factors and effects on corporate performance.  
Inbound acquisitions, which have always been the driver of Italian cross-border deals, 
sensitively decreased in 2018, partially compensated by an increase of outbound investments. 
Data on 2019 first quarter confirm a declining trend of the Italian M&As market. Given this 
changing scenario, an investigation on the nature and components of cross-border deals is 
extremely relevant for a wide range of decision makers, including policy makers, entrepreneurs 
and managers. Indeed, the analysis of main country, industry and firm-levels determinants of 
cross-border M&As dug into the factors that affect the level of international deals, main 
obstacles to the deal completion and identification of likely-to-be targets and acquirers. Cultural 
distance, macroeconomic conditions (e.g., GDP growth or capital markets trend), industry 
shocks, technological changes, corporate financial performance and managers’ international 
experience emerged as the most relevant factors to keep monitored. The impact they can 
exercise on the single deal also depends on the motives behind the acquisition. Two factors 
seem to prevail over the wide range of M&As’ reasons. Cross-border deals are seen as a means 
of international expansion and market entry and/or as instrumental to acquire specific and 
valuable resources and capabilities, characterized by low international mobility. 
Whether the foreign acquisition is valuable for the target company as well and not only for the 
acquirer is still a matter of debate. The literature obtained mixed results in the analysis of the 
effects on the target company’s productivity, level of employment, wages, profitability and 
other relevant variables. However, the prevailing position supports the existence of a foreign 
ownership premium: through the transfer of superior technology, assets, managerial and 
organizational skills, foreign owners succeed in enhancing the target company performance 
.  
 2. CHAPTER 
FAMILY BUSINESSES AND M&AS 
2.1 Introduction  
Family firms are a widespread and pervasive control structure. In Italy, 85% of active 
companies are family controlled and they generate 70% of total employment in the country 
(AIDAF, 2018). The overlap between the family system and the business rationales creates 
unique dynamics and challenges. Family owners live the company as an extension of the family, 
contributing strong commitment and personal attachment to it. The will to transfer the business 
to future generations is the foremost goal and drives long-term decisions aimed at the business 
continuity. Different decision-making processes, organizational culture and investment policies 
are thus prominent characteristics of family firms. These peculiarities lead us to expect that 
family businesses will also perform differently when involved in a so disruptive venture as a 
merger or acquisition. Unfortunately, empirical research on family businesses and M&As is 
still partial. While family firms’ characteristics as acquirers have received significant attention, 
there is still scarce evidence on target family firms and their post-acquisition operating 
performance. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, no studies have extensively investigated 
family firms in the context of cross-border acquisitions. 
According to us, an in-depth analysis of how family ownership affects the success of M&As 
and the following performance may be extremely timely and meaningful, given the relevance 
of the family business control structure in our country. In short, what the following chapter will 
try to answer is “How do mergers and acquisitions differ when a family business is involved?”. 
We will outline what the literature studied on family businesses and M&A transactions in other 
to explore what we already know on the topic. To this purpose, thirty-two studies from leading 
economic journals have been carefully selected and examined. The core issues and empirical 
insights resulting from their analysis are presented throughout the chapter. 
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2.2 Methodology and state of the art 
The literature on family businesses is broad and covers numerous fields. Family controlled 
firms have been analysed under the lens of finance, accounting, management, organization, 
internationalization and any other business or economic science. Of course, a complete 
examination of family business is beyond the scope of this work, whose interest is limited to 
the differential impact families can have on the merger and acquisitions activity of their 
business. Therefore, we selected only papers related to that topic, or that could provide useful 
insights on those family businesses characteristics that may be relevant in understanding why 
they represent a deal-differentiating factor. Thirty-two papers have been thoroughly selected 
and analysed (Table 12a and 12b). To identify them we used several business and academic 
sources. Main databases consulted were Business Source Complete by EBSCO, Elsevier 
ScienceDirect and Springer Link Books. The use of key words such as “Family Businesses and 
M&As”, “Family business investments” or different combinations of these key elements 
provided us some first valuable results. The research was then expanded consulting references 
cited by first articles and doing specific researches on influential journals, e.g. “Family Business 
Review”, “Family Business Strategy”, “Strategic Management Journal” and many others. The 
results of this investigation were thirty-two papers covering the fields of strategy, management 
and finance.  
The analysed time period starts in 1955 (Shim & Okamuro, 2011) and finishes in 2012 
(Bettinazzi, Miller, Amore & Corbetta, 2018). It is worth noticing that the majority of papers 
analysed end-of-the-century beginning-of-the-new-century datas. Apparently, the first years of 
the 2000s marked a rise in interest on the topic. Similarly, a large number of papers focuses on 
the United States as country of analysis (nine out of thirty-two works). Countries investigated 
are United States (Anderson, & Reeb, 2003a; Anderson, & Reeb, 2003b; Basu, Dimitrova & 
Paeglis, 2009; Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Feldman, Amid & Villalonga, B., 2019; Gómez-
Mejía, Patel & Zellweger, 2018; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester & Cannella, 2007; Miller, Le  
Breton-Miller &  Lester, 2010; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), Canada (André, Ben-Amarm& 
Saadi, 2014; Ben-Amar & André, 2006), East Asia (Chen, Huang & Chen, 2009; Shim & 
Okamuro, 2011; Wong, Chang & Chen, 2010) and Continental Europe (Andres, 2008; Bannò 
& Zaninotto, 2014; Baronchelli, Bettinelli, Del Bosco & Loane, 2016; Barontini & Caprio, 
2006; Maury, 2006; Bettinazzi, Miller, Amore & Corbetta, 2018; Bianco, Golinelli & Parigi, 
2009; Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013; Caprio, Croci & Del Giudice, 2011; Caroli, Cucculelli & 
Pongelli, 2015; Chirico, Gómez-Mejia, Hellerstedt & Withers, 2019; Favero, Giglio, Honorati 
& Panunzi, 2006; Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2010; Gonenc, Hermes & Van Sinderen, 
2013; Minichilli, Corbetta & MacMillan, 2010; Sraer & Thesmar, 2007).  
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Table 12 Summary of analysed papers on family firms characteristics, performance and valuation 
Author Year Country Type of 
companies 
in the 
sample 
Study time Definition of family business Content Main findings 
Anderson, R. C., & 
Reeb, D. M.  
2003a United 
States 
Listed 1992-1999 It exists fractional equity 
ownership of the founding 
family and / or the presence of 
family members serving on 
the board of directors 
Family firms 
performance 
Family firms perform better than nonfamily firms. The relation 
between family holdings and firm performance is nonlinear. When 
family members serve as CEO, performance is better than with 
outside CEOs. 
Anderson, R.C., & 
Reeb, D.M. 
2003b United 
States 
Listed 1993-2000 It exists fractional equity 
ownership of the founding 
family and / or the presence of 
family members serving on 
the board of directors 
Family firms 
characteristics 
Family firms experience less diversification than, and use similar 
levels of debt as, nonfamily firms.  
Andres, C.  
 
2008 Germany Listed 1998-2004 The founder and/or family 
members hold more than 25% 
of the voting shares 
Family firms 
performance 
Family Businesses are more profitable, but only when the founding 
family is still active either on the executive or the supervisory board. 
Bannò, M. &  
Zaninotto, E. 
2014 Italy Private 1986-2010 A family owns more than 
50% of shares if it is private. 
The threshold is reduced to 
20% for listed companies. 
Family firms 
and entry 
mode 
The higher the level of family ownership, the higher the likelihood of 
a wholly owned subsidiary abroad. Family management involvement 
is not relevant. 
Baronchelli, G., 
Bettinelli, C., Del 
Bosco, B.  & Loane, 
S. 
2016 Italy Private - A family  directly  or  
indirectly  owns  the  majority  
(51%) of  the  voting  shares 
Family firms' 
FDIs 
Higher family involvement corresponds to lower FDIs in psychically 
distant countries, especially when the firm is young.  
Barontini, R. & 
Caprio, L. 
2006 Continental 
Europe 
Listed 1999-2001 The largest shareholder owns 
at least 10% of ownership 
rights and controls more than 
51% of direct voting rights or 
more than double of the direct 
voting rights of the second 
largest shareholder. 
Family firms 
valuation and 
performance 
Valuation and operating performance are significantly higher in 
founder-controlled corporations, and are at least not worse than 
average in descendants-controlled corporation. 
Bettinazzi, E., 
Miller, D., Amore, 
M.D. & Corbetta, G. 
2018 Italy Private 2002-2012 A family owns the majority of 
equity shares and holds at 
least a board position 
Ownership 
similarity and 
the likelihood 
of M&As 
Family controlled firms are more likely to choose another family 
controlled firm as partner for an M&A. 
Bianco, M., 
Golinelli, R. & 
Parigi, G. 
2009 Italy Private 1996-2007 Self Evaluation Family firms 
sensitivity to 
uncertainty 
Family firms are significantly more sensitive to uncertainty: this 
might contribute to explain why in some situations they perform 
better, whereas in others they do worse.  
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Caroli, M.G., 
Cucculelli, M. & 
Pongelli, C. 
2015 Italy Private 1998-2008 A family owns more than 
50% of shares. 
Family firms 
and entry 
mode 
Family managers prefer equity entry modes, professional mangers 
tend to prefer non-equity, short term entry modes. 
Denison, D., Lief, C. 
& Ward, J.L. 
2004 World Listed and 
non listed 
1998-2003 1) had family voting 
ownership of 15% or more, 
and 2) had family members 
holding critical leadership 
positions, or family control of 
the company’s governing 
body 
Family firms 
and corporate 
culture 
Family firms perform better because they have a stronger 
organizational culture. 
Favero, C., S. 
Giglio, M. Honorati, 
F. & Panunzi 
2006 Italy Listed 1998-2003 An individual or a family 
controls at least 20% of equity 
shares 
Family firms 
valuation and 
performance 
Family firms have superior accounting performance, but only when 
led by a non-family manager. Their market valuation is higher only 
when the founder is in control. 
Gómez-Mejía, L. R., 
Makri, M. &  
Kintana, M.L. 
2007 World Listed 1998-2001 Two conditions: two or more 
directors  have a family 
relationship and family 
members  hold at least 10% of 
voting stocks 
Family firms 
diversification 
Family firms prefer less diversification. They tend to opt for domestic 
rather than international diversification. Those that go the latter route 
prefer to choose regions that are ‘culturally close’. 
Maury, B. 2006 Western 
Europe 
Private 1998-2003 10% of voting rights in the 
hands of a family, individual, 
unlisted firm 
Family firms 
valuation and 
performance 
Family firms are more profitable than non-family firms only when 
the family is active. Active and passive family control are associated 
with higher firm valuations. 
Family firms prefer diversifying acquisitions. 
Miller, D., Le 
Breton-Miller, I., 
Lester, R. H.  & 
Cannella, A. A., Jr. 
2007 United 
States 
Listed 1996-2000 Multiple members of the same 
family are involved as major 
owners (at least 5% of equity) 
or insiders (officers or 
directors) 
Family firms 
valuation 
Family firms performance is highly sensitive to the definition of 
family firms, in particular the distinction between lone founder and 
multiple family members involved. Only businesses with a lone 
founder outperform. 
Minichilli, A.,  
Corbetta,  G. & 
MacMillan,  I. 
2010 Italy Listed and 
non listed 
2005 A family owns more than 
50% of shares if it is private. 
The threshold is reduced to 
30% for listed companies. 
Family 
management 
and firm 
performance 
There is a U-shaped relationship between the ratio of family 
members in the top management team and firm performance.  The 
presence of a family CEO is beneficial for firm performance. 
Sraer, D., Thesmar, 
D. 
2007 France Listed 1994-2000 The founder or the founder's 
family owns more than 20% 
of voting rights 
Family firms 
valuation and 
performance 
Family firms largely outperform widely held corporations. 
This result holds for founder-controlled firms, professionally 
managed family firms, and also for descendants run firms.  
Villalonga, B. &  
Amit, R. 
2006 United 
States 
Listed 1994-2000 The founder or a member of 
the family is officer, director 
or owns 5% of the firm's 
equity. 
Family firms 
valuation 
Family ownership creates value only when the founder serves as 
CEO or as Chairman with a hired CEO. When descendants serve as 
CEOs, firm value is destroyed. 
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Table 13 Summary of analysed papers on family firms and M&As 
Authors Year Country Type of 
companies  
Study 
time 
Family 
Firm  
Definition of family 
business 
Content Main results 
André, P., Ben-
Amar, W., & 
Saadi, S.  
2014 Canada Listed 1997-2006 Acquirer The founder or his family is 
the largest shareholder of 
the firm, at a minimum 
threshold of 10 % of voting 
shares 
Market returns to 
acquirer announcement 
when it is a family firm  
Acquirer's family ownership and announcement 
period abnormal returns are positively related, but 
decreasing at high levels of ownership. Founder 
CEO undertake better high tech M&As than 
descendant or hired CEO. 
Basu, N., 
Dimitrova, L. & 
Paeglis, I.  
2009 United 
States 
Listed 
(newly 
public 
firms) 
1993-2000 Acquirer  The founder or his/her 
descendants either hold at 
least 5% of the firm’s 
outstanding shares or are 
actively involved in the 
management (or 
governance) of the firm. 
Market returns to 
acquirer announcement 
when it is a family firm  
The relationship between acquirer family ownership 
and announcement period abnormal returns is 
negative.  
Target Market returns to 
acquirer announcement 
when the target is a 
family firm  
Acquisitions of targets with low levels of family 
ownership are associated with greater value 
creation. 
Bauguess, S. & 
Stegemoller, M.  
2008 United 
States 
S&P 500 1994-2005 Acquirer The founder or a member of 
his or her family is a 
director or owner with at 
least 5% of equity shares. 
Market returns to 
acquirer announcement 
when it is a family firm  
Family firms destroy value when they acquire and 
they are not likely to make diversifying acquisitions 
more than non-family firms. 
Target Family Firms 
probability of being 
target of an acquisition 
Family firms are less likely to be acquired. 
Ben-Amar, W.  
&  André, P.  
2006 Canada Listed 1998-2002 Acquirer An individual or family 
holds the ultimate largest 
controlling block in a 
company 
Market returns to 
acquirer announcement 
when it is a family firm  
Positive acquirer's abnormal returns are higher for 
family firms. 
Bouzgarrou, H. 
& Navatte, P 
2013 France Listed 1997-2006 Acquirer An individual or a family 
controls more than 51% of 
voting rights, or controls 
more than double the voting 
rights of the second largest 
shareholder 
Market returns to 
acquirer announcement 
when it is a family firm  
Family firms acquirers obtain higher market returns. 
The relationship depends on the control level. 
Post acquisition 
operating performance 
of family firm acquirers 
Family firms realize an improvement in their returns 
on assets, which is higher than non family firms. 
Caprio, L., 
Croci, E. & Del 
Giudice, A.   
2011 Continental 
Europe 
  1998-2008 Acquirer A family or an individual is 
the largest ultimate owner 
(in terms of voting rights) at 
the 10% threshold 
Family firms' approach 
to M&A as acquirer 
Family firms make less acquisitions. No evidence 
that family firms prefer diversifying acquisitions. 
Target Family Firms 
probability of being 
target of an acquisition 
Family firms are less likely to accept an acquisition 
proposal. The relationship between family 
ownership and likelihood of accepting a takeover 
bid is non-linear. 
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Chirico, F., 
Gómez-Mejia, 
L., Hellerstedt, 
K.&Withers, M. 
2019 Sweden Private 2004-2008 Target Owned and managed by 
two or more family 
members. 
Family firms' approach 
to M&A as a business 
exit option 
Family owners under distressed conditions are less 
likely to exit than non-family owners. When exit is 
unavoidable, they rather prefer mergers over sale or 
dissolution. 
Feito-Ruiz,  I.  
&  Menéndez-
Requejo,  S. 
2010 Europe Listed 2002-2004 Acquirer A family or an individual is 
the major shareholder 
Market returns to 
acquirer announcement 
when it is a family firm  
Family firms acquirers obtain higher market returns. 
The relationship between returns and family 
ownership is negative.  
Feldman, E.R., 
Amid, R. &  
Villalonga,  B. 
2019 United 
States 
Listed 1994-2010 Acquirer The founder or a member of 
the founder's family by 
either blood or marriage is 
an officer, director, or 
blockholder, either 
individually or as a group 
Market returns to 
acquirer' announcement 
when both, one, or 
neither of the companies 
in the transaction are 
family firms. 
Acquirer shareholder returns are highest when 
family firms buy non-family firm divesters, 
especially when family CEO acquirers buy 
businesses from non-family CEO divesters. 
Target Divester shareholder returns are highest when 
family firms sell businesses to non-family firm, 
especially when family CEO divesters sell 
businesses to non-family CEO acquirers. 
Gómez-Mejía, 
L., Patel, P. & 
Zellweger, T. 
2018 United 
States 
S&P 500 1997-2011 Acquirer At least 5% of shares and 
one member in the BOD or 
top-level executives. 
Family firms' approach 
to M&A as acquirer 
Family firms are less likely to acquire and when 
they do so, they prefer related targets. 
Gonenc, H., 
Hermes, N. & 
Van Sinderen,E. 
2013 Netherlands, 
Belgium, 
Germany 
Private 1997-2008 Target A person has a stake of 20% 
or more of shares 
outstanding 
Market returns to 
acquirer announcement 
when the target is a 
family firm 
Bidders returns are lower when they acquire family 
controlled targets compared to non family targets. 
Miller, D., Le 
Breton-Miller, I. 
& Lester, R.H.   
2010 United 
States 
Fortune1000 1996-2000 Acquirer Multiple members of the 
same family have at least 
5% of equity or are insiders 
(officer/director) 
Family firms' approach 
to M&A as acquirer 
Family ownership is inversely related to the number 
and dollar volume of acquisitions. The propensity to 
make diversifying acquisitions to increase with the 
level of family ownership.  
Shim, J.  &  
Okamuro, H.  
2011 Japan Listed 1955-1973 Acquirer The founder or his/her 
family members are among 
the ten largest shareholders 
or in the top management 
(CEO or chairman) 
Family firms' approach 
to M&A as acquirer 
Family firms are less likely to merge. The higher 
family ownership, the higher likelihood of mergers.  
Family firms acquirers' 
post acquisition 
performance 
Family firms benefit less from mergers.  Tobin's q 
and ROA and employment growth deteriorate post 
acquisition. 
Wong, Y. J., 
Chang, S. C. & 
Chen, L. Y.  
2010 Taiwan Listed 1998-2005 Acquirer The family holds more than 
50% of seats of the board.  
Market returns to 
acquirer announcement 
when it is a family firm  
Family firms are associated with lower abnormal 
returns when they announce an acquisition. 
Chen, Y. R., 
Huang, Y. L. &  
Chen, C. N.  
2009 East Asia Private 1998-2005 Acquirer The ultimate shareholder 
owns more than 20% of 
equity shares. 
Effects of financial 
constraints on family 
firms engaging in cross-
border M&As 
Family firms prefer domestic to cross-border 
acquisitions. 
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In terms of composition of the dataset, twenty-four papers analyse listed corporations, while 
just eight focus on private companies. Some of them adopt more specific discriminants, for 
example selecting just newly public firms (Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013) or distinguishing for 
firms’ size (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester & Cannella, 2007). 
2.2.1 Family Business definition 
The definition of family business is not unique and various works present great differences in 
how they identify family firms. Indeed, defining criteria mirror the entrepreneurship style and 
ownership structures of the country whereby companies are localized. Two macro criteria are 
applied: 1) holding a minimum threshold of ownership rights, and 2) having a certain board or 
management representation. 
As expected, the required ownership threshold is sensitively lower for listed companies than 
for private ones. However, even comparing listed corporations, differences exist among 
countries; for example, in the United States, holding 5% of the company stocks is considered 
sufficient to be identified as a family owner (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester & Cannella, 2007; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006). In Europe, the threshold is set at a much higher level; in Italy, either 
30 % (Minichilli, Corbetta &  MacMillan, 2010) or 20% (Bannò &  Zaninotto, 2014; Favero, 
Giglio, Honorati &  Panunzi, 2006); in Germany 25% (Andres, 2008); in France 51% 
(Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013) or 20% (Sraer & Thesmar, 2007). For private companies, the 
control of an absolute majority of voting rights is usually required, i.e. holding at least 50% of 
equity shares (Baronchelli, Bettinelli, Del Bosco &  Loane, 2016; Bettinazzi, Miller, Amore &  
Corbetta, 2018; Bannò & Zaninotto, 2014; Caroli, Cucculelli & Pongelli, 2015), even if some 
scholars lower it down to 20% (Chen, Huang & Chen, 2009; Gonenc, Hermes & Van Sinderen, 
2013). A considerable number of papers do also inspect the distribution of boards positions 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Anderson & Reeb, 2003b; Basu, Dimitrova & Paeglis, 2009; 
Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Bettinazzi, Miller, Amore &  Corbetta, 2018; Chirico, Gómez-
Mejia, Hellerstedt & Withers, 2019; Denison, Lief & Ward, 2004; Feldman, Amid & 
Villalonga, 2019; Gómez-Mejía, Makri &Kintana, 2007; Gómez-Mejía, Patel & Zellweger, 
2018; Miller, Le Breton-Miller &Lester & 2010; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Wong, Chang & 
Chen, 2010). However, just in one case (Wong, Chang & Chen, 2010) it is considered as the 
unique criterion to determine the family nature of the business, as it is usually matched with an 
ownership requirement. Interestingly, Bianco, Golinelli and Parigi (2009) do not impose any 
ex ante criteria. Using a self-evaluation questionnaire, they identify as family firms those that 
autonomously declare to be so.  
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Indeed, the use of so miscellaneous definitions may compromise the possibility to generalize 
the conclusions of each paper; companies that in a study are labelled as family firms, would not 
be recognized as so in other works. The issue is well known in the literature; indeed, many 
scholars adopt different criteria to check the robustness of their results. In particular, Miller, Le 
Breton-Miller, Lester and Cannella (2007) build their entire study on this issue and find that 
family firms performance is highly sensitive to the definition of family firms, in particular the 
distinction between lone founder and multiple family members involved. The use of different 
definitions may explain why results are often contrasting and offer an instrument to reconcile 
these differences.  
 
2.2.2 Core issues and structure of the chapter 
Despite the above mentioned differences in sample selection and variables definition, a careful 
examination of the papers allowed us to detect some common contents, which are frequently 
debated by scholars (Figure 6). The structure of this chapter will follow these core issues and 
outline the similarities and differences among various works related to the same theoretical or 
empirical research question.  
 
Figure 6 Main contents from the literature review 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author 
The left side of the picture may be referred as a preliminary or introductive part. The rationale 
of this first section is that a full comprehension of how family firms interact with mergers and 
acquisitions would not be possible without a previous definition of their main characteristics, 
benefits and costs that the family may introduce. A complete examination of family firms 
features is beyond the scope of this work, but it is useful to have a glimpse of those factors that 
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may truly affect their attitude towards, and performance in, M&As. Provided that, several 
scholars wondered whether these peculiarities may result in significant differences in the 
business operating, accounting and market performance (Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Favero, 
Giglio, Honorati & Panunzi, 2006; Maury, 2006; Sraer & & Thesmar, 2007). In that, it is found 
that family involvement and, in particular, the identity of the business leader may be particularly 
relevant. As such, common topics are the so called founder effect. i.e. the business founder 
holding the CEO position, and role of the family management. These topics are summarized in 
section 2.2 on family business characteristics, performance and valuation. 
The right side of the picture is then the core of the chapter and what really answers to the 
questions “How do mergers and acquisitions differ when a family business is involved?”. A 
first logic categorization led us to distinguish between family firms playing the role of acquirers 
and family firms being the target of a transaction. As we will see, the literature is much more 
ample concerning acquirers family firms. In particular, abundant arguments are provided on 
families’ attitude towards M&As, meaning the volume and scale of family business’ 
acquisitions (Caprio, Croci & Del Giudice, 2011; Gómez-Mejía, Patel & Zellweger, 2018; 
Miller, Le Breton-Miller &Lester & 2010; Shim & Okamuro, 2011), and their diversification 
approach (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b; Gómez-Mejía, Makri & Kintana, 2007; Miller, Le Breton-
Miller & Lester, 2010;  Bauguess  &  Stegemoller,  2008;  Caprio,  Croci  &  Del  Giudice,  
2011). Further, a wide number of studies look at acquisitions performance, in particular in terms 
of marker reaction to the acquisition announcement (André, Ben-Amar & Saadi, 2014; Basu, 
Dimitrova & Peglis, 2008;  Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; BenAmar & André, 2006; 
Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013; Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2010; Feldman, Amit & 
Villalonga, 2019; Wong, Chang & Chen, 2010). The literature results of acquirers family firms 
are presented in Paragraph 2.4. 
Concerning target family firms, the analysis is much less comprehensive. Scholars investigated 
how family ownership affects the probability of being acquired or to accept a takeover bid, and 
whether the level of family control is relevant in driving this decision (Bauguess & Stegemoller, 
2008; Caprio, Croci & Del Giudice, 2011). While no evidences are provided on target family 
firms’ post-acquisition performance, there are some insights on the market performance of 
bidders acquiring family firms (Basu, Dimitrova & Peglis, 2008; Gonenc, Hermes & Van 
Sinderen, 2013). Lastly, a paper shed lights on the attractiveness of mergers as a business exit 
option for family firms, more than for non-family controlled companies (Chirico, Gómez-
Mejia, Hellerstedt & Withers, 2019). These issues will be the content of Paragraph 2.5. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a last section, that is not included in the above graph. 
Paragraph 2.6 is dedicated to family businesses and cross-border deals, which is the ultimate 
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matter of interests of this work. To the best of our knowledge, a complete examination on family 
firms and foreign M&As does not exist, and that explains why this last topic is not present in a 
graph summarizing the actual state-of-the-art. However, we tried to build on the issue by 
gathering some insights scattered here and there in the fields of M&As and entry modes 
(Baronchelli, Bettinelli, Del Bosco & Loane, 2016; Caroli, Cucculelli & Pongelli, 2015; Chen, 
Huang & Chen, 2009; Gómez-Mejía, Makri & Kintana, 2007). 
 
2.3 Family Businesses 
Family businesses are prevalent around the world among both privately and publicly traded 
companies. In Italy, family controlled firms represent 85% of total enterprises and 66% of listed 
companies with 50 million or higher turnover. Continental Europe countries present similar 
percentages, while lower ratios can be observed in the United States (AIDAF, 2018). These 
evidences have been supported by several studies, which argue that the family control structure 
is more value efficient in Europe (Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Maury, 2006; Sraer & Thesmar, 
2007) than in the United States (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester & 
Cannella, 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006) due to the different legal and institutional 
environment. In particular, it has been demonstrated that family businesses are powerful and 
persistent arrangements in countries with weak investors’ protection, less developed financial 
markets and inactive market for corporate control (Franks, Mayer, Volpin & Wagner, 2010). 
Long-standing institutional factors as inefficient law enforcement system and a low social 
capital have been identified as the main elements motivating the wide spread of family 
businesses in Italy (Bianco, Golinelli & Parigi, 2009). In other words, the weaknesses of the 
Italian financial markets and institutions induce entrepreneurs to trust in their heirs more than 
in external professional and investors, thus transmitting the business from one generation to 
another and preserving the family ownership over time. Together with cultural reasons, this 
explains why Italian family business distinguish themselves for longevity, as 15 out of the 100 
older companies in the world are Italians (AIDAF, 2018). 
2.3.1 Family Firms characteristics 
Founding families represent an important class of large shareholders that potentially have 
unique incentive structures and a strong voice in the firm. They are widely recognized as having 
a heightened attachment to their firm compared to the owners of other organizations (Chirico, 
Gómez-Mejia, Hellerstedt & Withers, 2019). For business families, the firm is an extension of 
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the family itself, an asset to pass to future generations, rather than wealth to consume during 
their lifetimes. Control preservation and intergenerational transfer are thus their primary goals. 
This strong attachment to the business leads to different decision-making processes and 
management policies. Family firms are motivated by the preservation of their socio-emotional 
wealth (SEW), referring to the non-financial aspects or “affective endowments” of family 
owners. SEW captures the affect-related value that family owners get from the business, e.g. 
close identification with the firm that usually carries the family’s name, binding social ties 
and/or the unrestricted exercise of personal authority vested in family members. SEW gains or 
losses represent the frame of reference that family firms use to assess the value of opportunities 
(Berrone, Cruz & Gómez-Mejía, 2012). Given that, family firms often find themselves in the 
horns of a dilemma between SEW considerations and financial considerations. Financial 
rewarding opportunities may be rejected if they are perceived as a threat to the preservation of 
the affected-related value of the firm. In other words, when financial concerns and SEW 
concerns drive to opposite directions, SEW protection takes precedence. However, in financial 
duress situations, the two decision-making drivers may find themselves aligned. When the 
financial performance of the company is at risk, family owners are willing to undertake highly 
risky financial opportunities, if these would allow to preserve the own existence of the business 
and thus save the related SEW (Gómez-Mejía, Patel & Zellweger, 2018).  On the contrary, 
under strong financial performance, SEW concerns lead to adopt more conservative 
management policies aimed at reducing business risk. Several studies argue that family firms 
are typically more risk adverse than non-family firms and more sensitive to uncertainty, due to 
the undiversified nature of the family investment into the business and the desire for firm 
survival (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Anderson & Reeb, 2003b; Bianco, Golinelli & Parigi, 
2009).  Further, SEW preservation motivates them to place strong importance on the creation 
of a social community supporting the business. Family firms invest in stable relationship with 
suppliers, clients and employees. These social ties are part of the family’s need to safeguard the 
family name reputation, the robustness and longevity of the firm (Miller, Le Breton-Miller & 
Lester, 2010). 
Indeed, family owned businesses are distinguishable from non-family firms due to their more 
unified culture and strong identity (Craig, Dibrell & Garret, 2014). The family’s values and 
behavioural models are transferred to the business and progressively constitute its 
organizational culture, i.e. the set of shared values and norms held by employees, which guide 
their interaction with peers, management and clients in the organization (Schein, 1985). Family 
businesses’ organizational culture is rooted in the personality of the founder, who is recognized 
with superior natural leadership and is the moral and decisional reference point in the 
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organization.  Benevolent ties with employees, informal and personal relationships are the main 
characteristics of familiar organizational culture. This extra importance granted to the firm unity 
makes employees feel a deeper sense of belonging, embrace the family objectives and commit 
special efforts to make the company succeed in the long-run (Denison, Lief & Ward, 2004). 
 
Potential benefits of family firms 
Families are considered a unique group of active, long-term owners, holding sustainable equity 
positions in the firm. Their personal attachment and dependence on the firm provides them 
strong economic incentives to exercise an active monitoring role on managers. Moreover, 
family owners do also have the knowledge and experience required to effectively oversight 
managers, given their long tenure in the business (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; André, Ben-Amar 
& Saadi, 2014). Therefore, agency  problems  between  managers  and  large  shareholders  can  
be  reduced  or  even eliminated in family firms, thus incentivising the adoption of efficient 
policies (Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013). Further, family members do often hold management 
positions in first-hand. Active involvement allows them to deepen their knowledge of the firm 
and improve their investment decisions, particularly in knowledge-based investments like R&D 
projects or high-tech acquisitions (André, Ben-Amar & Saadi, 2014). Differently from non-
family professionals, family managers share the family’s vision and long-term orientation. This 
common perspective strengthen their incentive to collaborate and reduces the emerging of 
personal interests (Wong, Chang & Chen, 2010). Consequently, family bonds and trust provide 
family businesses with a competitive advantage over non-family firms. Adopting a Resource 
Based View approach, the family’s ownership and management bright side is reflected by the 
familiness concept, which suggests that family firms differ from non-family for the unique 
resources and capabilities they develop (Minichilli, Corbetta & MacMillan, 2010). 
 
Potential costs of family ownership 
Family members may exploit the powerful position they have in the business to extrapolate 
private benefits from the firm. Founding families have the incentives and opportunity to take 
actions that benefit themselves at the expense of firm performance, for example by making 
personal use of the firm’s resources (Gómez-Mejía, Patel & Zellweger, 2018; Wong, Chang & 
Chen, 2010). If this is the case, those that will suffer more will be non-family, minority 
shareholders. Some authors observe that in family businesses, the real agency problem is not 
among shareholders and managers, but among majority (family) and minority shareholders. 
The non-monetary objectives pursued by family shareholders may be irrelevant for the 
minority, but still introduce a distortion in how decisions are taken, running counter to the 
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optimal decision for the business. Further, managers may be loyal to the controlling family and 
act for that, not for shareholders in general (Ben-Amar & André, 2006; Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 
2013; Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2010; Maury, 2006). The risk of minority shareholders 
expropriation is higher when the family is significantly involved in the management of the firm. 
As argued above, managerial entrenchment may be beneficial for the company, but it could also 
be a means of private expropriation, e.g. through excessive compensation, related party 
transactions or special dividends. Moreover, the appointment of the CEO and top management 
team may be limited to the family members’ set, who not necessarily possess the skills and 
knowledge required for those positions. This suboptimal choice may deprive the company of 
pivotal professionalities and lead to unfavourable decision-making (Gómez-Mejía, Patel & 
Zellweger, 2018). Nepotism may also play a role in those circumstances. Due to the effect of 
nepotism, family firms may favour hiring family members and fail to retain competent but 
unrelated employees. Additionally, nepotism can systematically and favourably bias family 
CEO’s perception of its relatives employed in the firm, reducing the effectiveness in monitoring 
family agents because of the embedded parent child relationship (Wong, Chang & Chen, 2010). 
 
2.3.2 Family Firms Valuation and Performance 
The precedent arguments point out how family firms may be either a value-adding or a value-
destroying factor to their firm. According to what aspect prevails, family firms valuation and 
performance may be enhanced or lessen by the presence of the family, and both hypothesis are 
theoretically backed. Basu et al. (2009) effectively sum up the two offsetting arguments, 
referring to “incentive alignment effect” and “entrenchment effect”. Family ownership is 
expected to align shareholders and managers interests, thus increasing firm value, but could 
also lead to family entrenchment and the use of value destroying policies without fear of 
shareholders activism (Basu, Dimitrova & Paeglis, 2009).  Further, other factors may be 
relevant. Long-term orientation, personal commitments to the firm, need to maintain good 
relationships with the communities, careful investment policies may all justify an higher 
valuation recognised to family-controlled businesses and higher operating performance (Ben-
Amar & André, 2006). 
Table 14 Summary of the results of empirical studies on family firms’ performance, valuation 
and founder effectsummarizes the empirical studies analysing this issue and outlines the 
measures of performance used. 
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Table 14 Summary of the results of empirical studies on family firms’ performance, valuation and founder 
effect 
Authors Year Companies 
in the sample 
Measure of performance Do family firms 
outperform non-
family firms? 
Founder Effect 
Anderson, R. C., & 
Reeb, D. M.  
2003 S&P 500 ROA and Tobin's q Yes Yes 
Andres, C.  2008 Listed ROA and Tobin's q Yes Yes  
Barontini, R. & 
Caprio, L. 
2006 Listed ROA and Tobin's q Yes Yes 
Favero, C., Giglio, 
M. Honorati, F. & 
Panunzi 
2006 Listed ROA, ROE,  
Tobin's q 
Yes No 
Maury, B. 2006 Private Tobin’s q and ROA Yes Active vs passive 
family 
ownership, no 
clear reference to 
CEO positions 
Miller, D., Le 
Breton-Miller, I., 
Lester, R. H.  & 
Cannella, A. A., Jr.  
2007 Fortune1000+
smaller public 
firms 
Tobin's q Yes, but only 
businesses with lone 
founder.  
No when multiple 
family members are 
involved. 
Yes 
 
 
Minichilli, A., 
Corbetta, G. & 
MacMillan, I. 
2010 Listed and 
non listed 
ROA  Yes Yes 
Sraer, D., Thesmar, 
D. 
2007 Listed Sales growth, ROA, ROE, 
Market to book, 
Dividend/profit, 
debt/assets 
Yes Yes 
Villalonga, B. & 
Amit, R. 
2006 Fortune500 Tobin's q and ROA Yes, but only when 
the founder is CEO 
Yes 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author 
 
As regards to firm valuation, empirical studies support a positive effect of family ownership on 
the market value of their organizations (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Anderson & Reeb, 2003b; 
Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Maury, 2006; Sraer & Thesmar, 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
Family firms seem to obtain higher valuations than non-family firms. A common issue under 
discussion is whether family management, in particular the presence of a family CEO, affects 
the market valuations of the company. Traditionally, a positive founder effect emerges: when 
the company is led by its founder, its commitment, know-how and entrepreneurial spirit 
enhances the company value. On the contrary, descendants CEOs or professional CEOs have 
obtained more ambiguous results. Anderson and Reeb (2003a) confirm that market 
performance appears to be better only in the presence of founder CEOs and outside CEOs, while 
founder descendants have no effect on market performance. Barontini and Caprio (2006) agree 
that valuation is significantly higher in founder-controlled corporations and at least not worse 
than average in descendants-controlled ones. In other words, when descendants hold the 
position of CEO, family-controlled firms are not distinguishable from non-family ones and the 
family premium disappears. On the contrary, Villalonga and Amit (2006) clearly find that 
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descendants CEOs destroy value as they exacerbate the conflict with minority shareholders. 
Contrarily, Sraer and Thesmar (2007) argue that descendants CEOs and professional CEOs as 
well create value, mainly due to a better use of capital and labour resources.   
Interestingly, Maury (2006) adds a new element on the investigation on family firms’ value. 
Confirming that family firms are associated with 7% higher valuation compared to non-family 
firms, he also adds that this result holds regardless the participation of the family in the 
management of the firm. Active or passive family control does not affect the value recognized 
by the market to the firm (Maury, 2006). 
 Moving to the organization performance issue, family firms’ advantage still holds 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Andres, 2008; Barontini & Caprio, 2004; Favero, Giglio, Honorati 
& Panunzi, 2006; Maury, 2006; Sraer & & Thesmar, 2007). Anderson and Reeb (2003a) find 
that the accounting performance of family firms is strongly superior to the one of non-family 
firms, but the relationship between family ownership and performance is non-linear. In 
particular, performance increases until families own about one-third of the firm’s outstanding 
equity. Thereafter, performance begins to decline but still better, on average, than in non-family 
firms. The company’s age is irrelevant in driving this relationship (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a). 
Maury (2006) and Andres (2008) confirm that family firms perform better, but only when the 
family is active in the company, i.e. the family holds at least one of the top two officer positions 
(Maury, 2006) or is present in the executive or supervisory board (Andres, 2008). In other 
words, if families are just large shareholders without management representation, the 
performance of their companies is not distinguishable from other firms.  
Looking at the impact of the CEO nature on performance, results are more favourable towards 
a family CEO effect, more than a lonely founder effect. Anderson and Reeb (2003a), Andres 
(2008) and Minichilli, Corbetta and MacMillan (2010) agree that family firms outperforms non-
family ones only when the CEO is a family member, regardless whether it is the founder or an 
heir. Using a Resource Based View language, this is likely to be the effect of familiness, which 
provides family firms a unique competitive advantage (Minichilli, Corbetta & MacMillan, 
2010). Andres (2008) and Sraer and Thesmar (2007) object that all types of family-controlled 
firms do better than widely held firms, even when the CEO is an outsider. On the other side, 
there is also who supports the opposite view. Favero, Giglio, Honorati and Panunzi (2006) 
object that family firms run by the owning family (founder-controlled and heir-controlled ones) 
largely underperform other firms, while family firms with a professional CEO are best 
performers. 
Overall, these results seems to demonstrate that family firms are an effective organizational 
structure, in which potential benefits outperform the still numerous potential costs. Several 
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studies supporting higher market valuation and performance are inconsistent with the 
hypothesis of minority shareholders expropriation or widely diffused nepotism. However, these 
results point out that families are only able to induce positive effects if they have a deeper 
relationship with their business, act as steward of the firm and effectively exercise their role of 
long-term, active shareholders.  
 
 
2.4 Characteristics and performance of M&As initiated by acquirers 
family firms 
The last decade marked a great increase in interests in how mergers and acquisitions are affected 
by the presence of a family firm in the deal. Scholars have debated whether family dynamics 
affect the type of deals and their performance. However, we can observe a disproportion in how 
the topic has been debated concerning the role played by family firms. Our research led us to 
identify fifteen papers dealing with family businesses in M&As. Out of these, nine focus on 
acquirers family firms (André, Ben-Amar & Saadi, 2014; Ben-Amar & André, 2006; 
Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013; Chen, Huang & Chen, 2009; Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 
2010; Gómez-Mejía, Patel & Zellweger, 2018; Miller, Le Breton-Miller & Lester, 2010; Shim 
& Okamuro, 2011; Wong, Chang & Chen, 2010), four on both targets and acquirers family 
firms (Basu, Dimitrova & Paeglis, 2009; Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Caprio, Croci & Del 
Giudice, 2011; Feldman, Amid & Villalonga, B., 2019), and just two on target family firms 
exclusively (Chirico, Gómez-Mejia, Hellerstedt & Withers, 2019; Gonenc, Hermes & Van 
Sinderen, 2013). Main results are here presented. 
2.4.1 Family firms acquirers’ attitudes towards M&As  
The distinctive characteristics of family ownership play a role in defining firms’ investment 
policies and growth strategies. As we previously pointed out, family firms are more risk adverse 
and sensitive to uncertainty than non-family counterparts are. Their more cautious attitude leads 
them to be significantly less likely to undertake acquisitions than non-family firms (Bauguess 
& Stegemoller, 2008; Caprio, Croci & Del Giudice, 2011; Miller, Le Breton-Miller & Lester, 
2010; Shim & Okamuro, 2011). It is not only their attitude toward risk that may drive 
acquisitions behaviour, but also their different priorities, influence and monitoring capabilities. 
The familiar setting may well shape social and strategic priorities, the owners’ and business’ 
goals (Miller, Le Breton-Miller & Lester, 2010). These preferences relate directly to the 
distinctive motivations of family owners, whose main concern is to retain control and pass the 
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business on to later generations. In light of this strategy of continuity, family owners will avoid 
potentially destabilizing acquisitions that could jeopardize their control over the business and 
their close-knit social system. Indeed, the decision-making dilemma between socio-emotional 
wealth and financial objectives make acquisition decisions even harder in family businesses. 
While the financial returns of acquisitions are often uncertain, their negative downsides in terms 
of SEW are much more foreseeable (Gómez-Mejía, Patel & Zellweger, 2018). First, 
acquisitions often require external funding, by issuing new equity or through debt financing. 
The appearance of new actors, as stockholders or creditors, from outside the family will weaken 
the family control and independence, important components of SEW. Funding the acquisition 
may cause the opening to new blockholders with a particular focus on financial and tangible 
results, partially in contrast with the emotional attachment the family has. Second, acquisitions 
may compromise the well-established social networks of family firms, as the ones with long-
time employees. Third, the change in product and resource portfolios may threat the family 
reputation, the company image and the projection of the family owners onto that image. Finally, 
the scenario of a failed acquisition will be seen as a major deterrent for the family who tends to 
view the firm of an extension of the family itself. Thus, family owners frame the likely outcome 
of an acquisition as certain SEW loss with uncertain financial gains, and be reluctant to 
undertake such transactions (Gómez-Mejía, Patel & Zellweger, 2018). 
 Beside the SEW concerns, other factors explain why family firms are less likely to 
engage in M&As. Concentrated ownership structure reduces the risk of non-value enhancing 
proposals made by managers in pursue of their personal interests (e.g. hubris, managerialism, 
empire building). Back to the agency theory, due to their superior monitoring capabilities and 
particular interest in long-term conservation, family owners can avoid managers’ opportunistic 
behaviours (Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013). On the other side of the agency problem, the 
controlling family may collude with managers to exploit personal benefits, at the expense of 
minority shareholders. Acquisitions may represent an opportunity for tunnelling and 
expropriate personal resources. Furthermore, family owners often have their personal portfolio 
heavily invested in the company, and therefore they may have incentives to facilitate 
acquisitions that increase diversification in their investments. Despite theoretically backed, this 
last view has not had the support of empirical evidences, confirming that family owners usually 
add value to the company by avoiding opportunistic acquisitions (Caprio, Croci & Del Giudice, 
2011). Additionally, family entrenchment may also row against acquisition transaction. Given 
the limited pool from which family managers are selected, executives may be less than fully 
competent. In these situations, they may adopt risk-adverse strategies in which complex 
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acquisitions are avoided simply because the managerial talent needed to make them work is 
lacking (Miller, Le Breton-Miller & Lester, 2010). 
 Going further, some scholars investigated whether a specific relationship between the 
level of family ownership and likelihood of acquisitions exists. Shim and Okamuro (2011) find 
a positive linear relationship between the level of family ownership and the probability of 
M&As. Family firms that have a high ownership stake are more likely to merge than those with 
lower family ownership. This result could be partially explained by Caprio, Croci and Del 
Giudice (2011)’s argumentation. They observe that family owners are less likely to make 
acquisitions, especially when the stake held by the family is not large enough to assure the 
persistence of family control after the acquisition. In other words, given that the major family 
concern is losing control over the firm due to dilution, they will engage in an M&A transaction 
only when the stake they hold is sufficiently high to guarantee control even after dilution 
(Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Caprio, Croci & Del Giudice, 2011; Shim & Okamuro, 2011). 
Finally, beside a lower volume of acquisitions, family owners are observed to engage in smaller 
scale transactions (Miller, Le Breton-Miller & Lester, 2010). 
 
2.4.2 Mergers and Acquisitions as a diversification means  
Unlike other blockholders, family owners have most of their wealth in the family business and 
cannot diversify their personal portfolio without diluting their voting rights as well as the socio-
emotional wealth derived from their control position (Gómez-Mejía, Makri & Kintana, 2007). 
Consequently, many scholars suggest that family owners may try to diversify their wealth 
portfolio through the business itself, that is through diversifying acquisitions outside the core 
industry of the family firm. Doing so, they succeed in reducing family’s portfolio risk without 
losing control over the firm (André, Ben-Amar & Saadi, 2014).  
Several scholars who focused on the study of family firms and M&As devoted their attention 
to the diversifying nature of acquisitions undertaken by family controlled companies. However, 
the issue is still open, as results are mixed. Beside the hedging risk strategy, there may be several 
rationales explaining why families might prefer unrelated acquisitions when they acquire. First, 
diversifying acquisitions are usually associated with a lower degree of post-acquisition 
organizational integration of the acquired business. Thus, they are less apt to disrupt the 
strategic focus or corporate culture of the family firm, which are key concerns for many 
families. Second, diversifying acquisitions could be an opportunity to establish new career 
paths and new forms of training for family members, without damaging the core business 
(Miller, Le Breton-Miller & Lester, 2010). Given that, many scholars provide evidences that 
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when family businesses acquire, they prefer diversifying acquisitions (Gómez-Mejía, Makri & 
Kintana, 2007; Miller, Le Breton-Miller & Lester, 2010). 
However, valid considerations against the diversifying nature of family firms’ acquisitions 
exist. M&As to increase diversification may reduce SEW even more than related acquisitions. 
The diversification process is complex and unusual. New routines and modus operandi that 
stray away from the firm’s “true and tried” methods of operation are required. This entails 
greater uncertainty and more delegation, both of which can reduce SEW. Moreover, the family 
may lack the managerial talent and expertise needed to conclude the diversification process. 
This would force owners to hire executives from outside the family and consequentially to give 
up some control over the decision-making process. Finally, diversification strategies may bring 
with them important changes in how the business is organized and perceived from outside. This 
may engender resistance from family members that might feel their traditional sphere of 
influence is being threatened (Gómez-Mejía, Makri & Kintana, 2007). Therefore, despite 
diversification’s positive financial outcomes in terms of reduced business risk, family firms 
might prefer less rather than more diversification in order to preserve SEW, and thus choose 
related targets (Gómez-Mejía, Patel & Zellweger, 2018). 
In accordance with that theoretical reasoning, several scholars empirically confirm that family 
firms are less likely to make diversifying acquisitions (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b; Bauguess & 
Stegemoller, 2008; Caprio, Croci & Del Giudice, 2011; Gómez-Mejía, Makri & Kintana, 2007).  
To reconcile the two positions, Gómez-Mejía, Patel and Zellweger (2018) interestingly observe 
that family businesses may adopt different diversification strategies, according to the 
performance and financial situation of the firm. They introduce the notion of vulnerability, 
proxy by below aspiration level performance and the absence of slack. Increased vulnerability 
triggers a change in decision-making, heightening the propensity to prioritize financial over 
SEW concerns: meeting the firm’s financial obligations is a necessary condition for the family 
owners to enjoy any SEW. If the family fails to survive, SEW disappears. That is why in below 
aspiration level performance, SEW and financial concerns are aligned and both drive to 
acquisition decisions as an attempt to rebound the company’s growth. In particular, the decision 
to remain undiversified to save some SEW is not affordable anymore. Vulnerability  weakens  
the  family  firm’s  overall  reluctance  to  acquire  and  the reluctance to acquire unrelatedly, 
because if the firm fails to survive SEW and financial wealth would disappear altogether. On 
the contrary, related acquisitions remain the preferred ones when the company’s performance 
is healthy (Gómez-Mejía, Patel & Zellweger, 2018).  
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2.4.3 Family Firms’ Acquisitions performance 
Going further in the examination of family firms and M&As, it is worth digging into how family 
control determines not only a different attitude towards such transactions, but also a different 
M&A performance. The large majority of related literature to date (Table 15) focused on the 
stock market returns around the M&A announcement date, while a limited minority 
investigated the impact on the operating performance of the acquired business (Paragraph 
2.3.3.1). Indeed, the analysis of family firms’ M&As returns has been mainly a financial issue, 
whereby shareholders valuation is usually measured as the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
in the days around the announcement date5.  
From the theoretical point of view, two competing hypothesis may justify M&As returns by 
family firms acquirers as compared to non-family firms. If family control imposes costs on 
minority shareholders, such as tunnelling or suboptimal investments to extrapolate personal 
benefits, negative shareholders valuation should be expected when an M&A is announced. On 
the other side, family ownership enhances long-term strategies, lowers managers-shareholders 
agency costs and entails more cautious investments policies. Knowing that family firms are 
more reluctant to acquire, the market should expect that when such companies announce 
acquisitions, these acquisitions are of better average quality (Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013; 
Caprio, Croci & Del Giudice, 2011; Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2010).  
Empirical evidences mainly support this second hypothesis, showing that investors typically 
ascribe higher valuations to family firms acquisitions than to non-family firms (André, Ben-
Amar & Saadi, 2014; Basu, Dimitrova & Peglis, 2008;  BenAmar & André, 2006; Bouzgarrou 
& Navatte, 2013; Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2010; Feldman, Amit & Villalonga, 2019). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
5 CAR is calculated as the differences between daily share returns and the expected returns of individual firms in 
the stock market, taking into account market return and firm risk. Daily returns calculate the variation in the share 
price each day, related to the previous day’s price (plus dividends and corrected for splits) (Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-
Requejo, 2010).   
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Table 15 Summary of the results of empirical studies on family firms’ acquisitions performance 
Authors Year Type of 
companies 
in the 
sample 
Content Measure of 
Performance 
Do family 
firms 
acquirers 
generate 
value? 
Moderating 
factors 
André, P., 
Ben-Amar, 
W., & Saadi, 
S.  
2014 Listed Market returns to 
acquirers' 
announcement when it 
is a family firms  
Cumulative abnormal 
returns over 3 days (-
1,+1) around the 
announcement date 
Yes Level of 
family 
control 
Basu, N., 
Dimitrova, 
L. & Paeglis, 
I.  
2009 Listed 
(newly 
public 
firms) 
Market returns to 
acquirers' 
announcement when it 
is a family firms  
Cumulative abnormal 
returns over 2 days  
starting on the 
announcement date 
Yes Level of 
family 
control 
Bauguess, S. 
& 
Stegemolle, 
M.  
2008 S&P 500 Market returns to 
acquirers' 
announcement when it 
is a family firms  
Cumulative abnormal 
returns over 2 days 
starting on the 
announcement date 
No - 
Ben-Amar, 
W.  &  
André, P.  
2006 Listed Market returns to 
acquirers' 
announcement when it 
is a family firms  
Cumulative abnormal 
returns over 3 days (-
1,+1) around the 
announcement date 
Yes - 
Bouzgarrou, 
H. & 
Navatte, P 
2013 Listed Market returns to 
acquirers' 
announcement when it 
is a family firms  
Cumulative abnormal 
returns over 3 days (-
1,+1) around the 
announcement date 
Yes Level of 
family 
control 
Cumulative abnormal 
returns over 36 months 
around the 
announcement 
Yes, but 
not 
statistically 
significant 
- 
Post acquisition 
operating performance 
of family firm 
acquirers 
Acquirer's 
EBITDA/Total Assets 
three years post 
acquisition 
Yes - 
Feito-Ruiz,  
I.  &  
Menéndez-
Requejo,  S. 
2010 Listed Market returns to 
acquirers' 
announcement when it 
is a family firms  
Cumulative abnormal 
returns in the event 
window (–2, +2) 
Yes Level of 
family 
control 
Feldman, E., 
Amid, R. & 
Villalonga,B. 
2019 Listed Market returns to 
acquirers' 
announcement when 
both, one, or neither of 
parties are family 
firms. 
Cumulative abnormal 
return in the 2-day 
event windows [−1, 0] 
surrounding the 
announcement dates 
Yes Identity of 
the target: 
family vs 
non-family 
firm 
Shim, J. & 
Okamuro, H.  
2011 Listed Family firms 
acquirers' post 
acquisition 
performance 
 ROA, Tobin’s q, sales 
growth, and 
employment growth 
No  
Wong, Y. J., 
Chang, S. C. 
& Chen, L. 
Y.  
2010 Listed Market returns to 
acquirers' 
announcement when it 
is a family firms  
Cumulative abnormal 
returns over 3 days (-
1,+1) around the 
announcement date 
No  
Source: Personal elaboration of the author 
 
Moreover, Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo (2010) observe that family firms positive 
influence holds in different legal and institutional environments (i.e. civil law and common law 
countries), meaning that family ownership is a relevant factor itself, not simply a reflection of 
concentrated ownership structures and how they are regulated by the legislator. 
Several scholars propose that the effect on market performance depends on the level of 
ownership controlled by the family, but do not agree on the sign of that effect. Basu, Dimitrova 
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and Paeglis (2009) argue that acquirers with high levels of family ownership earn higher 
abnormal returns, consistent with a better alignment of the family’s interest with those of 
minority shareholders at high levels of ownership. The same result is confirmed by Bouzgarrou 
and Navatte (2013), who add that the relationship starts to be significant just for levels of pre-
acquisition ownership higher than 60%. Conversely, other scholars find out that families with 
low levels of ownership obtain better market returns. André, Ben-Amar and Saadi (2014) 
suggest that the positive relationship between family ownership and announcement period 
abnormal returns is positive, but starts to decrease for ownership levels higher than 52%. 
Investigating high-technology M&As, Andrè, Ben-Amar and Saadi (2014) conclude that the 
highest stock market reactions are observed at low levels of family ownership, due to the 
dominance of the expropriation issue when the family holds a significant stake in the business. 
Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo (2010) confirm this hypothesis and find out that 
shareholders’ ownership higher than 32% has a negative effect on acquiring firms’ abnormal 
returns.  
On the other hand, Wong et al. (2010) in Taiwan and Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008) in the 
US find that family control is significantly and negatively associated with the abnormal returns 
of acquisitions announcements, i.e. family firms destroy value when they acquire. The two 
papers provide different justifications for their counter-current results. Differently from Feito-
Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo (2010), Wong et al. (2010) argue that different empirical findings 
can be attributed to different levels of investors’ protection. In emerging market with weaker 
investors’ protection (as Taiwan is) the agency cost between majority and minority shareholders 
is higher, thus the risk of family tunnelling prevails. On the other side, Bauguess and 
Stegemoller (2008) resort to diversification costs to reconcile their results. They show that 
family firms in their sample pursue diversifying acquisitions at the same rate as non-family 
firms, but given that they are generally more focused firms to begin with, the marginal effect 
of a diversifying acquisition confers greater costs to shareholders.  
 Regarding the positive founder effect discussed above, scholars confirm that 
acquisitions announced while the founder is still the chairman or CEO obtain higher market 
returns. Founder’s heirs CEOs also determine positive effect, while firms managed by 
professional CEOs are not significantly different from non-family firms. These results confirm 
that founder CEOs may have specific understanding of the business and commitment to its 
success, thus creating a value added factor in M&As transactions as well (André, Ben-Amar & 
Saadi, 2014; Caprio, Croci & Del Giudice, 2011). 
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2.3.3.1 Family Firms’ Acquisitions performance in variables other than stocks returns 
A marginal share of the family business literature on M&As investigated acquisitions 
performance using variables other than the stock market returns. Bouzgarrou and Navatte 
(2013) use the three-year Return on Assets following the acquisition as a measure of 
performance. They show that family businesses are more efficient acquirers, but the relation 
between family control and operating performance is non-linear. In particular, positive impact 
of family control is pronounced at intermediate level of ownership, while the relation is positive 
but insignificant for low and high level of control. At intermediate level of control, the risk of 
dilution is more threatening. Therefore, family firms that undertake acquisitions carefully 
consider just those that create value and avoid dilution of family control (Bouzgarrou & 
Navatte, 2013). 
On the contrary, Wong et al. (2010) and Shim and Okamuro (2011) find out that family control 
is negatively associated with post acquisition performance. Wong et al. (2010) considers the 
change in the announcing firm’s industry-adjusted profitability in terms of Return on Equity in 
the three years post acquisition. Evidences show that family firms see a negative change in their 
operating performance. Shim and Okamuro (2011) further stress that family firms experience a 
significant deterioration in their performance in terms of industry-adjusted Return on Assets 
and employment growth. Results seem to be independent of the ownership stake held by the 
family. 
 
2.5 Characteristics and performance of M&As with target family firms 
Despite the lower amount of empirical results available, all studies agree that family control 
reduces the probability of being acquired (Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Caprio, Croci & Del 
Giudice, 2011). Family firms are less likely to be acquired and less prone to accept an 
acquisition proposal. Selling the business would mean the complete loss of the socio-emotional 
wealth derived from it and the failure of the intergenerational transfer project. Interestingly, 
Caprio, Croci and Del Giudice (2011) carry out an analysis on the effect of the largest 
shareholders’ level of ownership on the probability of accepting a takeover bid, focusing on 
companies with concentrated ownership, family and non-family businesses. They observe that 
the relationship between ownership and likelihood of accepting an acquisition proposal is non-
linear and it is significantly exacerbated by the presence of a controlling family. In general, for 
level of ownership below 20%, the likelihood of acceptance of a takeover increases with voting 
rights. When the stake is between 20% and 50%, no relation between the two variables is found, 
meaning that an increase in the stake within this range does not make takeovers significantly 
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less likely to occur. For levels beyond 50%, that is, as the company becomes more closely 
controlled, the likelihood of a takeover decreases. However, when the largest shareholder is a 
family, results are partially different. While, in general, the presence of a large shareholder with 
less than 20% of voting rights facilitates takeovers, it does not when the large shareholder is a 
family, meaning that even when the family’s stake is low, they still want to preserve their 
position. Moreover, family ownership in the 20-50% range already reduces the probability of 
the company being acquired. In shorts, for family controlled businesses, the relation between 
their stake in the company and the likelihood of being acquired is always negative, even for low 
levels of control. This result interestingly suggests that concentrated or diffused ownership 
alone are not sufficient to explain takeover approval, the identity of owners is relevant as well. 
Family control is confirmed to be an obstacle for passive takeovers (Caprio, Croci & Del 
Giudice, 2011).  
Further, family firms are even less likely to be acquired when family members are employed in 
the management team of the company. Self-interested family managers may refuse value-
enhancing proposals that would force them out of their positions and deprive them of the related 
private benefits (Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Caprio, Croci & Del Giudice, 2011). 
Conversely, other scholars point out that the peculiar characteristics of family businesses may 
make them particularly appealing as target for potential acquirers, in particular in such 
situations in which the target previous owners are expected to remain active in the business 
even in the post-transaction operations. The family is likely to be seen as a reliable and 
committed owner, motivated to see the business success in the long run. The family’s SEW 
may be depicted as an asset to acquire, which will guarantee new owners a well established 
community, loyal and trustworthy employees and collaborative previous owners (Chirico, 
Gómez-Mejia, Hellerstedt & Withers, 2019). Following this reasoning, M&As transactions 
acquiring a family firm should be expected to generate higher value. However, empirical 
evidences on the topic suggest the opposite. Basu, Dimitrova and Paeglis (2009) find out that 
greater value creation is associated to acquisitions of targets with low level of family ownership. 
When the family owns a significant stake in the company, meaning that it actually acts as a 
controlling dominant shareholder, the market does not perceive the acquisitions as a value-
creating transaction. Gonenc, Hermes and Van Sinderen (2013) find that bidders’ cumulative 
announcement returns (CARs) are lower when they acquire family-controlled target, compared 
to non-family controlled companies. According to the scholars, this evidence is consistent with 
the notion that family owners are much more reluctant to sell to an outsider and will require 
higher premiums to accept the takeover proposal. 
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 Finally, a limited number of researchers investigated the impact of similarities and 
differences between target and acquirer when it comes to family businesses. Bettinazzi, Miller, 
Amore and Corbetta (2018) suggest that the greater the similarity between two firms, the higher 
the likelihood of an acquisition between them. This result holds for family firms as well: the 
more similar two family businesses are in terms of family involvement in the management of 
the company, the higher the probability that they will choose one another as partners of an 
M&A (Bettinazzi, Miller, Amore & Corbetta, 2018). However, Feldman, Amid and Villalonga 
(2019) demonstrate the highest value is generated by transactions in which just one of the two 
parties is a family business. They suggest that an acquisition is a two-side process in which the 
identity of both parties matters and it is not sufficient to focus just on one of the two, the 
combination between the two parties is critical. Compared to a situation in which both target 
and acquirers are family businesses, transactions in which just one of the two parties is family 
controlled perform better, no matter whether target or acquirer. This result suggest that the 
unique characteristics of family firms create value just if combined with a non-family firm that 
may balance the excessive role the family may play in the business decisions (Feldman, Amid 
& Villalonga, 2019) 
 
2.5.1 Mergers and Acquisitions as a business exit opportunity 
Mergers and acquisitions are often referred as a growth strategy, but indeed, they could also 
represent a way to exit from the business. From an economic perspective, mergers are generally 
less preferable than other exit options. Compared to sale or dissolution, which involve upfront 
payment, future returns from a merger are much more uncertain. The value generating ability 
of the transaction will depend on the integration of the two businesses, people and cultures, and 
the agency issue involved with being a partial owner can further jeopardize the success of the 
transaction. Moreover, in a merger the risk and value of the transaction is shared by both parties, 
making it a more hazardous choice to exit the business (Balcaen, Manigart, Buyze & Ooghe, 
2012). 
The very possibility to partially remain in the business is what drives family businesses to 
privilege the merger option when they are forced to exit the business. Chirico, Gómez-Mejia, 
Hellerstedt and Withers (2019) argue that despite the risks involved, a merger provides family 
owners the ability to balance the dual financial-SEW considerations and a better option than 
selling or liquidating the firm, which would imply the total and irrevocable loss of all SEW 
linked to the firm. The merger option includes precedent owners as a partner in the new entity, 
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allowing the family to continue to be involved in the firm in some way, even if it is no longer 
in full control.  
Indeed, several scholars point out that family owners come to the exit decision just after a long 
period of enduring financial distress. SEW presents a psychological barrier to the firm’s 
extinction and causes family owners to tolerate and even justify increasingly negative 
performance cues while escalating their commitment to the business without resorting to exit 
(Chirico, Salvato, Byrne, Akhter & Arriaga Múzquiz, 2018). Family owners tend to avoid such 
reality, preferring to continue the operations of a failing business for affective reasons, denying 
the financially rational solution to exit the business. Exit would be a public statement of the 
firm’s demise and the complete loss of the SEW generated by the business. That is why family 
firms tend to endure financial distress more than non-family firms, and when exit is 
unavoidable, they make the decision that result in the highest combined SEW and financial 
value (merger), thus maintaining the possibility of transgenerational continuation, whereas non-
family firms will choose options with the highest financial value (sale or liquidation) (Chirico, 
Gómez-Mejia, Hellerstedt & Withers, 2019). 
 
2.6 Family Firms and Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions 
To the best of our knowledge, a complete investigation on family businesses and cross-border 
acquisitions does not exists. All studies mentioned above generally refer to mergers and 
acquisitions, without focusing on the nationalities of target and acquirers. However, as we tried 
to demonstrate in Chapter 1, cross-border acquisitions entail further complexities and thus 
deserve unique attention, separate from domestic M&As. 
A valuable insight on the topic is provided by Chen, Huang and Chen (2009), who partially 
analysed the impact of family owned acquirers on cross-border M&As in East Asian 
Economies. What the scholars interestingly observe is that family firms are less likely to engage 
in cross-border acquisitions and largely prefer domestic ones. This investment preference seems 
not to be motivated by financing constraints, as family firms exhibit the same access to external 
funding that non-family firms and would have sufficient capacity to finance the corporate 
venture. Indeed, their investment decisions are motivated and constrained by factors related to 
their organizational structure and specific families’ objectives. Acquiring a company in a 
foreign country will likely require to hire professional managers to serve the local business and 
thus to extend the decision-making power to outsiders. In this sense, cross-border transactions 
represent a threat to the preservation of family control and power. These managerial and 
organizational motives explain why family firms prefer domestic acquisitions (Chen, Huang & 
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Chen, 2009). Adding on that, Gómez-Mejía, Makri and Kintana (2007) assert that when family 
businesses choose to diversify, they prefer domestic rather than international diversification, 
since the former involves less threat to SEW. The scholars argue that geographic diversification 
triggers the well-known dilemma between risk hedging and SEW preservation. Even if the 
family firms’ executives already have substantial international experience, the increase of 
information processing demands that accompanies increasing levels of international 
diversification may call for hiring additional outside managerial talent. A new network of 
suppliers, customers and partners needs to be established and greater information asymmetries 
will characterize these relationships. In short, it is not easy for the family to transfer the 
familiness advantage abroad. Further, those companies that decide to diversify internationally 
will prefer culturally close locations, as it reduces the SEW loss. Cultural distance is a 
particularly powerful form of uncertainty for diversifying firms because it implies differences 
in managerial values, mind-sets, and norms, which may lead to losses in coordination, 
information flow, and communication within organizations (Hofstede, 1980). These potential 
issues grow as the cultural distance between the two countries increases and may jeopardize the 
family control. This suggests that family firms will choose culturally close countries, to reduce 
the information processing demands and need to depend on outsiders to interpret and adapt to 
the new culture (Gómez-Mejía, Makri & Kintana, 2007). Baronchelli et al. (2016) confirm such 
position showing that higher family involvement in the firm tends to correspond to a lower 
number of foreign direct investments in psychically distant countries. Company’s age serves as 
moderating factor, as the older the company gets, the higher the tendency to invest abroad. In 
shorts, while founding generations are more locally limited, the entry of new generations often 
coincides with a geographical expansion (Baronchelli, Bettinelli, Del Bosco & Loane, 2016).  
Given the scarcity of information provided by M&As scholars, we also investigated what the 
Internationalization literature tells about family firms. Specifically, in Chapter 1 we saw that 
cross-border M&As are often undertaken to enter a new foreign market to implement an 
internationalization strategy. However, the literature on entry modes does not devote specific 
attention to family businesses. The majority of the literature has focused on multinational 
enterprises or conversely on small and medium enterprises (Kontinen & Ojala, 2010), but 
family businesses cannot be generally categorized in these two classes, as their peculiar 
characteristics do not fit with a simple size discrimination. Caroli, Cucculelli and Pongelli 
(2015) suggest that family firms are likely to prefer equity entry modes, given the long tenure 
of their investments and their will to exercise control. However, no indications on which equity 
entry mode would be preferable is provided. Moreover, the greater risk implied by equity entry 
modes compared to non-equity choices (e.g. strategic alliances or partnerships) is inconsistent 
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with family firms’ risk adversity, thus leaving the discussion open (Caroli, Cucculelli & 
Pongelli, 2015). 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
The precedent chapter outlined the current state of the art in the family business and M&As 
literature. Family businesses are different from non-family controlled companies in their greater 
attachment to the business and higher exposure. Their focus on business continuity leads them 
to adopt more conservative policies and be more reluctant to engage in highly uncertain 
transactions as mergers and acquisitions might be. Despite that, empirical evidences show that 
acquisitions initiated by family firms obtain on average higher market valuations than non-
family firms, meaning that the market trusts in the ability of families of being value-adding 
holding companies. More concerns are present when it comes to the operating performance, 
shedding light on the need for future investigations. 
In shorts, we can summarize the main points debated as: 
1. Family firms preferences as acquirers, volume and scale of acquisitions, levels of 
diversification 
2. Value generating ability of family firms as acquirers in terms of market returns for 
acquirer shareholders (majority) and post-acquisition operating performance (minority) 
3. Impact of the level of family ownership on 
a. The probability to make an acquisition 
b. The market returns from the acquisition 
4. Role of the company’s CEO identity in driving market reactions to the acquisition 
announcement 
5. Whether acquirer family businesses prefer domestic or foreign targets and the cultural 
distance of their targets 
6. The likelihood of a family business to be target of an acquisition 
7. The market returns of bidders acquiring a family business and the relationship with 
family pre-acquisition ownership 
8. Family owners preference for mergers as a business exit option 
However, as we stressed out, existing works present some limits: first, they mainly focus on 
family firms as acquirers, while the impact of family control in the target company has been 
only partially investigated. Second, most scholars consider just listed family firms and 
investigate the effect of acquisitions on their stocks market. Private companies are almost left 
out of the debate. Third, the existing literature has not distinguished between domestic and 
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cross-border M&As. However, as we tried to demonstrate in Chapter 1, cross-border 
acquisitions present peculiar characteristics and thus deserve unique attention, separate from 
domestic M&As. Section 4 outlined the few available insights on family firms and cross-border 
acquisitions, suggesting that family firms are likely to prefer domestic acquisitions, and when 
undertaking international investments, culturally closed countries. These contributions are 
extremely valuable in explaining family businesses’ approach to cross-border M&As and to 
market entry, yet the literature vacuum remains broad. The effect on post-acquisitions operating 
performance and the role of target family firms are still uncovered. 
 
 3. CHAPTER  
MEASURING THE POST-ACQUISITION 
PERFORMANCE OF ITALIAN ACQUIRED FIRMS: 
DATA SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.1 Introduction  
The underlying ultimate goal of this work is to provide an empirical support to the great debate 
around foreign investments in Italy and whether they represent an opportunity for national 
companies, or a depletion of our skills and entrepreneurial system. In particular, our focus is on 
the familiar type of businesses who represent a substantial and pervasive component of the 
Italian economy. The literature review illustrated in the previous Chapter highlighted their 
characteristics and pointed out the literature vacuum when it comes to how family businesses 
react to foreign acquisitions and their subsequent operating performance.  
In this Chapter, we will thus illustrate the working methodology we adopted in the attempt to 
provide an answer to the aforementioned questions. Our empirical research makes use of 
difference-in-difference and coarsened exact matching methodologies. The combination of 
these two sophisticated techniques enables us to measure the effect of foreign ownership on 
target performance, accounting for the possibility that performance differences arise due to ex-
ante selection bias and not for the ownership change per se. A database consisting of inward 
cross-border acquisitions to Italy in the period 2011-2014 has been compiled matching two 
leading sources, Thomson Reuters EIKON and AIDA by Bureau Van Dijk. The resulting 152 
transactions constitute our treated group and serve as starting point for our empirical analysis. 
Their composition and characteristics are extensively illustrated in the following paragraphs. 
Within these 152 companies, we then identified 70 family firms and 82 non-family firms. 
Besides this distinction, we also accounted for some targets and acquirers characteristics; the 
former being target macro industry (service vs manufacturing), size (SME vs large companies) 
and organizational change (CEO change vs non-CEO change), while the latter including 
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acquirer country of origin (Europe vs non-Europe) and type of acquirers (industrial vs 
financial).  
The following Chapter will illustrate the methodology and rationale applied to build the treated 
and the control group. First, we will advance some research hypothesis that will guide our 
analysis based on the theoretical knowledge built in the first and second chapter. Some 
descriptive statistics on main variables will follow in order to get a first insight on the 
composition of the dataset. Finally, we will initiate our analysis on the three chosen outcomes 
of interests, a measure of size and growth (Sales) and two measures of profitability (ROA and 
EBITDA margin), to have a first view of their trends in the pre and post-acquisition phases.  
 
 
3.2 Hypothesis development 
Given the theoretical background presented in Chapter 1 on Cross-Border M&As and in 
Chapter 2 on Family Businesses, we may develop some research hypothesis that will guide our 
empirical analysis.  
 
Acquirers’ origin and cultural distance 
Paragraph 1.3.1 on “Country level determinants of Cross-Border M&As” outlined the role of 
cultural distance6 in affecting the level and complexity of foreign acquisitions. It has been 
observed that cultural distance may be an obstacle to the conclusion and success of international 
deals, as it introduces additional complexities in communication, exerting a significant impact 
in particular on some phases of the M&A process, i.e. deal negotiation and post-acquisition 
integration (Ahammad et al., 2016; Ahern et al., 2015; Chakrabarti et al., 2009).  
More in detail, firms from culturally distant countries have different organizational practices, 
such as management and strategic decision-making styles, conflict resolution strategies, human 
resources polices and codes of ethics. In general, the larger the national cultural distance 
between the acquirer and the acquired companies, the more dissimilar and incompatible their 
practices and the more complicated their transfer.  This makes acquisitions in culturally distant 
                                                 
 
6 The concept of “national cultural distance” has been firstly introduced by Hofstede (1980) and it is the most widely 
used construct of distance. Koguth and Singh (1988) define it as “the extent to which the shared norms and values 
in one country differ from those in another”. In their article on national culture and choice of entry modes, the authors 
estimated national cultural distance as a composite index based on the deviation from Hofstede's national culture 
scales.  
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countries more costly to manage (Kogut & Singh, 1988) as integration costs, information 
asymmetries and uncertainty are higher. Therefore, we may conclude that greater cultural 
distance hinders cross-border acquisitions performance. Several studies analysed in Paragraph 
1.5 supports this hypothesis. In Italy, Barbaresco et al. (2018) find that the higher the “cultural 
distance” between the target and acquiring company’s country is, the lower post-acquisition 
sales growth and EBITDA will be. Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005) and Mariotti, Onida and 
Piscitello (2003) all find that post-acquisition performance improvements occur when the 
acquirer is European.  
Hypothesis 1: Cultural distance is negatively associated with post-acquisition performance. 
 
Paragraph 2.3.1 on “family business characteristics” highlighted that family owned businesses 
are distinguishable from non-family firms due to their more unified culture and strong identity 
(Craig et al., 2014). The familiar leadership style is based on benevolent ties with employees, 
informal and personal relationships and superior trust in the leader’s skill. This stronger 
importance placed on the business values, believes and unity may further exacerbate the 
differences between target and acquirer cultures, and make the integration between the two 
cultures even harder.  
Hypothesis 1a: Cultural distance is negatively associated with post-acquisition performance 
of acquired family firms. 
 
Post-acquisition organizational change 
M&As are widely recognized as a huge organizational shock which often involves all different 
areas of the business and require a throughout change management to work. According to the 
expected level of integration, the disorder determined by such organizational changes may be 
more or less pervasive. The more the two companies are expected to symbiotically reorganize 
following the acquisition, the more the routines and polices of the target (and acquirer) company 
will have to be revised. More than that, different integration solutions will result in different 
degree of autonomy the target company is left with. The acquirer may impose its authority and 
control at different levels of the organization. For example, it may exert its control as holding 
company, meaning that is has no interest in integrating and creating value through anything 
except financial transfers, risk-sharing or general management capability. In such case, the 
acquirers’ influence is exercised at the strategic level, while the target maintains a significant 
degree of autonomy over its day-by-day operations. On the contrary, when the integration 
requires the symbiosis of the two firms, the target structure is likely to be significantly affected 
or in some cases disappear. The most visible sign of those changes is the top management team 
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composition. A confirmation of the existing management signals the acquirer’s trust in the 
target leaders, but also a will to leave the target with a certain autonomy and continuity with 
the pre-acquisition status. On the contrary, when the acquirer plans a radical change in the target 
strategic direction, the first step is likely to be a change at the top of the target structure, which 
will provide a great sign of discontinuity to the whole organization. Following this reasoning, 
we can use top management change as a proxy for post-acquisition integration and 
organizational change. Specifically, when the CEO of the company is substituted by an 
acquirer’s representative, we may conclude that the acquirer wants to exercise its full control 
and no autonomy is left to the target company. Whether this will turn into enhanced or 
deteriorated company performance is still an open issue. On one side, a so disruptive change 
may result in disorder, employee’s demotivation and lack of reference points. At least in the 
short term, resistance to change, inefficiencies, loss of some customers and employees is a 
physiological effect. This position has been empirically supported by Cannella and Hambrick 
(1993) and by Krishnan, Miller and Judge (1997) who find that the departure of executives from 
acquired firms is harmful to post-acquisition performance, especially when it regards the CEO. 
Their conclusion implies that executives from acquired firms are an intrinsic component of the 
acquired firm's resource base, and that their retention is an important determinant of post-
acquisition performance. Conversely, the appointment of an outside CEO may be a catalyst for 
change and boost a faster adoption of new policies, providing a clear sign of a new strategic 
direction. This idea is backed by Anslinger, Copeland and Thomas (1996) who show a positive 
association between managing executive turnover and company performance. According to the 
authors, a change at the top level management helps new owners to clearly set and push the 
pace of change, discipline managers and guarantee lower agency conflicts between owners and 
managers. These advantages may be particularly relevant for foreign owners, for whom, given 
the barrier of geographic distance, a day-by-day monitoring is more complex and expensive. 
Thus, the appointment of a trustworthy leader who directly represents the owner’s interests is 
often a preferable choice.   
Hypothesis 2a: CEO change is positively related to post-acquisition performance. 
Hypothesis 2b: CEO change is negatively related to post-acquisition performance. 
 
Whatever the sign of the effect is, its magnitude is likely to be exacerbated in family firms, 
whereby the personality of the family leader is rooted in the organizational culture. In 
accordance with Hypothesis 2a, the need of a CEO change may be even more urgent in family 
firms, in order to push change and integration. In particular when the pre-acquisition CEO is a 
family member, confirming its authority entails the risk that it continues to manage the business 
Measuring the post-acquisition performance of Italian acquired firms: data selection and descriptive statistics 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
75 
as if it is owned by its family, resisting to the implementation of the changes required to generate 
expected synergies. Its monitoring would place on new owners an extra burden of control. On 
the contrary, a family CEO confirmation may preserve the social capital of the firm and the 
connected internal and external relationships based on the family’s name and reputation. These 
are likely to be fundamental components of the set of resources and capabilities that constitute 
the firm’s value, which the acquirer should be concerned of. In this case, a CEO change may 
be detrimental and result in a loss of value. 
Hypothesis 2c: CEO change is positively related to post-acquisition performance of family 
firms. 
Hypothesis 2d: CEO change is negatively related to post-acquisition performance of family 
firms. 
 
Acquired family firms’ post-acquisition performance 
Chapter 2 discussed what we know so far on Family Firms and M&As. Despite a satisfactionary 
body of literature on family businesses as acquirers, there is still scarce evidence on family 
firms as target of acquisitions. Scholars agree on the fact that such companies are less likely to 
be acquired, even when the stake they hold in the business does already not guarantee a control 
position (Caprio et al, 2011) and in particular when the family is employed as C-level managers 
of the company (Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008). On top of that, it has been observed that 
acquirer’s abnormal returns to M&A announcements are lower when the target is a family firm 
(Basu et al., 2009; Gonenc et al., 2013). However, the post-acquisition operating performance 
of target family firms is still an open issue.  
Several studies presented in Paragraph 2.2.2 observe that family-firms tend to exhibit superior 
performance compared to non-family firms, in particular in terms of profitability (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003a; Andres, 2008; Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Favero et al., 2006; Maury, 2006; 
Minichilli et al., 2010; Sraer & Thesmar, 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006) and returns (Favero 
et al., 2006; Sraer & Thesmar, 2007). It may be argued that this superior performance could be 
a sufficient reason to imagine that even following an acquisition, family firms will perform 
better than acquired non-family firms. However, the logic behind this reasoning may be 
questioned; following the acquisition, the company is no more a family firm. If the reason of 
family firms superiority is the presence of the family per se, once this advantage disappears we 
cannot justify their superior performance any more. Nevertheless, the characteristics of family 
firms may ex-ante condition the post-acquisition performance. The literature points out that 
family owners have a special attachment to the firm, which makes them willing to put additional 
efforts for the preservation of the business. Following that, they are more reluctant to sell, as 
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they live the sale of the business as a loss of family identity. Thus, we may imagine that when 
the circumstances lead them to look for an acquirer, they will carefully select the new owner 
and investigate its motives and post-acquisition plans more accurately than non-family owners 
would do. On top of that, it has been observed that family owners are often willing to sacrifice 
financial rewards to maximise the possibilities of business preservation (Gómez-Mejía et al., 
2018). Therefore, when families sell their business, the community assumes that the selected 
owner is the best opportunity for the business, not necessarily the one that pays more, but the 
one that has the best project for the firm. This careful management of the pre-acquisition 
planning and negotiation is a critical success factor for post-acquisition performance. 
Finally, it may be added that in those cases in which the family represents a cost for the business 
(e.g. in case of management entrenchment, nepotism, extrapolation of private benefits), then 
the entry of a new owner is a fortiori a motive to expect superior post-acquisition performance.  
Hypothesis 3: Post-acquisition performance is higher for acquired family firms. 
 
Following the just presented reasoning, this effect should be even stronger when the family 
remains involved in the business in the post-acquisition setting. The fact that the family is 
willing to collaborate with new owners will send out a message of trust and continuity, which 
will reassure employees and the entire business community. Therefore, we could expect that 
the preservation of a role for the family in the new configuration of interests following the 
acquisition will lead to lower organizational disruption and avoid (or at least reduce) a sense of 
hostility and resistance to change that is likely to accompany the entry of a foreign owner.  
Hypothesis 3a: When the family remains in the business, post-acquisition performance is 
higher. 
 
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
3.3.1 The treated group 
To test the effect of foreign acquisitions on target companies performance, we started 
identifying a set of Italian firms that 1) have been subjected to a foreign acquisition and 2) 
whose balance sheets are available to use. Serving this dual purpose is more demanding than 
expected for more than one reason, among all the absence of a ready-to-use dataset of Italian 
inward cross-border M&As. Although some databases on FDIs or specific internationalization 
issues exist (e.g. the EFIGE Survey or the Bank of Italy’s INVID survey), their limited number 
of observations and their restricted focus do not serve our purpose. Moreover, these resources 
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only provide data on foreign controlled firms, thus limiting the possibility to identify a control 
sample and apply a difference-in-difference methodology.  
To the best of our knowledge, the only database satisfying our dual purpose is Zephyr by Bureau 
van Dijk, which contains updated information on M&As transactions along with financial 
statements data on target and acquirer companies. Unfortunately, we do not have access to 
Zephyr. Therefore, we built our dataset combining two different panels of data. First, we used 
Thomson Reuters EIKON to extrapolate a list of transactions involving Italian target 
companies. EIKON covers one million deals all over the world and provides highly reliable and 
extended data on the deal value, purpose, description, target and acquirer industries, 
capitalization and several others precious information, if desired. In particular, it fully discloses 
names and regions of target and acquirers ultimate parents’ country of origin, which is 
extremely valuable given our research interest. Thanks to this feature, we are guaranteed that 
acquisitions in our datasets are really cross-border, in that the target ultimate parent is Italian 
and the acquirer ultimate parent is not Italian. Second, we extracted financial statements 
information of target companies from AIDA (Analisi Informatizzata delle Aziende Italiane) by 
Bureau van Dijk. AIDA is a company account data system on Italian registered companies, with 
up to ten years of history. It contains detailed income statements and balance sheets, beside 
information on ownership distribution and owners’ identity, Board of Directors composition 
and commercial data.  
In order to apply a difference-in-difference method, we need to define our pre-treatment and 
post-treatment time frame. No consensus has emerged among researchers over the proper time 
period to evaluate the performance implications on M&As’ targets (Thanos and Papadakis, 
2012).  Following precedent works (Barbaresco et al., 2018; Bentivogli & Mirenda, 2017), we 
consider a 3-years period before and after the acquisition, which we believe is a sufficient period 
to detect the effect of foreign ownership, at least in the short term. Moreover, AIDA’s limitation 
to ten years of balance sheet information acted a natural constraint to the definition of our study 
time. By the time we built the M&A dataset (May 2019), AIDA displayed data from 2008 to 
2017. Some data on 2018 results were already available, but unfortunately just for a minority 
of companies. Therefore, our database focuses on M&A transactions occurred between 2011 
and 2014 and comprises a 7-year subset for each company, 3-years before the acquisition, the 
acquisition year and 3-years after it. The difference-in-difference estimation is then applied to 
the average of the 3-years pre-acquisition and the average of the 3-years post-acquisition values. 
The acquisition year serves as a reference point but is not included neither in the average-pre-
deal, neither in the average-post-deal. Therefore, if a company has been acquired in 2011, the 
dataset will contain its financial statements from 2008 to 2010 and from 2012 to 2014. If it has 
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been acquired in 2012, we have data from 2009 to 2011 and from 2013 to 2015. If it has been 
acquired in 2013, we have data from 2010 to 2012 and from 2014 to 2016. If it has been acquired 
in 2014, we have data from 2011 to 2013 and from 2015 to 2017.  
Defined the time period, we then applied some filters on acquisition characteristics. First, we 
chose to narrow down our analysis to majority acquisitions, meaning that the acquirer purchases 
at least 50,01% of the target shares. This choice implies a great reduction in the data sample, 
but guarantees higher reliability of data. Imposing the acquisition of a controlling share, we are 
sure that the acquirer truly gets the control of the target and has the power to influence its 
strategic direction. Moreover, minority acquisitions introduce some distortions in the 
transactions dataset. Consider for example the case in which an acquirer gets the control of 
more than 50,01% of the target’s shares, but structure the deal as a two-steps transactions in 
which it acquires two minority quotas few months one after the other.  EIKON recognizes each 
transaction as a separate one, despite having the same target, same acquirer and be very closed 
in time. While in the matter of fact the acquirer exerts control over the target company as if it 
acquired a majority stake in a one-shot transaction, the acquisition would result as two minority 
transactions in our database. The complexity in controlling for these and other situations led us 
to focus on majority acquisitions and preserve the reliability of data over the dimension of 
dataset.  
Second, we also introduced some filters concerning the targets and acquirers’ industry. 
Similarly to other studies (Benfretello & Sembenelli, 2006; Bentivogli & Mirenda, 2017; Feys 
& Manigart, 2010), we did not include acquisitions of financial target companies, real estate 
and governmental enterprises (see Table 15 in Appendix I for target industry distribution). The 
latter constraint was added considering the fact that financial companies have different financial 
structures and reporting requirements, which imply that the assessment of their performance 
requires a specific valuation. Concerning the acquirer industry, we included both financial and 
industrial acquirers to examine the differential effect they can induce on target performance, 
but we excluded real estates and government. The rationale is that, as our ultimate goal is the 
analysis of target companies performance, we limit our focus on those ownership changes that 
really act on the strategic direction of the acquired company. 
Given these pillars definitions, we extrapolated a list of acquisitions that meet these criteria 
from EIKON. In short, our treated group is made of deals with the following characteristics: 
 M&A transactions concluded between January 1st, 2011 and December 31st, 2014; 
 Deal status completed; 
 Percentage of shares acquired: at least 50,01%; 
Measuring the post-acquisition performance of Italian acquired firms: data selection and descriptive statistics 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
79 
 Deal form: acquisitions, acquisitions  of assets, acquisitions  of majority  interest  and 
mergers;  
 Target industry: all except financial, real estates and governments; 
 Acquirer industry: all except real estates and governments; 
 Target nation: Italy; 
 Acquirer nation: all except Italy. 
These filters provided us a list of 618 transactions. Additional cleaning were then applied. 
Looking at the transactions one by one, we eliminated those cases in which the target ultimate 
parent was not Italian, to ensure that the ultimate control of the company was in Italian hands 
before the acquisition by a foreign owner. In this way we eliminated acquisitions of companies 
registered in Italy but actually already foreign-controlled as subsidiaries of multinational 
companies. We then eliminated transactions in which the target company was re-sold within 
three years post-acquisition or whereby both the acquirer name and acquirer region were 
undisclosed. 
These cleaning applied, our dataset narrowed down to 298 transactions. The list of target 
companies was then matched with AIDA sources to access the financial statements information 
for the related 7-years period. Transactions were again checked one by one to assure 
consistency. In particular, since EIKON provides just the target company name, but no 
identifying number as “Codice Fiscale”, each company has been carefully considered in order 
to avoid mismatch due to different companies having the same “Ragione sociale”.  
The availability of information on AIDA imposed us an additional screening. 5 companies were 
not recorded on AIDA, while 35 transactions were excluded because there were not enough 
information on their financial statements. 41 transactions were disregarded because the foreign 
investor bought a business unit, a branch or certain assets which did not have separate financial 
statements from the target’s other operations before the acquisition. On the contrary, 34 target 
companies lack post-acquisition financial data because they were ceased and incorporated into 
the foreign acquirer. Other 17 transactions were eliminated because the stake acquired by the 
foreign investor has been re-sold to third parties within 3 years after the acquisition, while 2 
were resold to the previous Italian owner. 2 companies had shut down after liquidation and 7 
went bankrupt. Additionally, 1 deal was excluded since it resulted as M&A in Thomson Reuters 
but not in AIDA or in other sources (i.e. company website, newspapers, other financial 
databases). 1 deal was delated since it was actually a Joint Venture and not a M&A as reported 
in Thomson Reuters. Finally, 1 deal was discarded since the acquirer (Ferrero Trading Lux SA) 
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cannot be considered foreign even if its legal address is in Luxembourg  because  the operational 
headquarter is  still  in Italy and  the ownership is still in Italian hands. 
Due to these cleanings, the final treated group is composed by 152 cross-border acquisitions, 
whish are illustrated in Table 16. 
Table 16 Acquisitions in the treated group 
M&A 
Year 
Target name Acquirer Name  Percent of 
Shares 
Acquired  
2011 Adora ict s.r.l. Kranem Corp 100 
2011 Agrium italia s.p.a. Agrium Inc 100 
2011 Alemea technology s.r.l. Loqus Solutions Ltd 100 
2011 Alfa sistemi telemedia srl in liquidazione Kranem Corp 100 
2011 Baywa r.e. solar systems srl BayWa re GmbH 70 
2011 Biophil italia s.p.a. Lehmann&Voss&Co KG 80 
2011 Blogo.it s.r.l. Populis Ltd 100 
2011 Brioni s.p.a. PPR SA 100 
2011 Bulgari s.p.a. LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis 
Vuitt 
55,03 
2011 Capgemini bst s.p.a. Capgemini Finance et Services 100 
2011 Colombo via della spiga s.r.l. Cheil Industries Inc 100 
2011 Elcam medical italy spa Elcam Medical ACS 100 
2011 Emer s.p.a. Westport Innovations Inc 100 
2011 Esoform s.r.l. Ecolab Inc 100 
2011 Eurodifarm s.r.l. DHL Supply Chain BV 100 
2011 Glunz & jensen s.r.l. Glunz & Jensen A/S 83,5 
2011 Greif italy s.r.l.      Greif Inc 100 
2011 Gruppo mercurio s.p.a. Gefco SA 70 
2011 Immobiliare alloro s.r.l. Multi-Color Corp 100 
2011 Indra italia s.p.a. Indra Sistemas SA 77,5 
2011 Industrie fincuoghi societa' per azioni in 
liquidazione 
Kale Group 100 
2011 Itp benelli societa' per azioni ITP Energy Corp 100 
2011 La rinascente s.p.a Central Retail Corp 100 
2011 Level ip s.r.l. Prosodie SA 100 
2011 Loquendo - societa' per azioni abbreviabile 
loquendo s.p.a. 
Nuance Communications Inc 100 
2011 M.t. srl Tat Fook Tech(HK)Co Ltd 61 
2011 Mandarina duck s.p.a. E Land Ltd 100 
2011 Messinter s.p.a. IPS Pressevertrieb GmbH 51 
2011 Ntt data italia s.p.a. NTT Data Corp 100 
2011 Parboriz s.p.a. Marbour SAS 60 
2011 Scm frigo group s.r.l. in liquidazione G & L Beijer AB 51 
2011 Sgs sertec s.r.l. SGS SA 100 
2011 Sigmar italia s.p.a. Fareva Corporate France SASU 100 
2011 Telemis s.r.l. Telemis SA 100 
2011 Top rel s.r.l. in liquidazione TUEV Nord AG 100 
2011 Toshiba transmission & distribution europe 
s.p.a. 
Toshiba Corp 67 
2011 Velan abv s.r.l. Velan Inc 70 
2011 Vimercati s.p.a. Viney Auto 70 
2012 3a antonini s.r.l. in liquidazione Ziylan Ayakkabi Sanayii ve Tic 100 
2012 Aero-rossa s.r.l. Alpiq Ecopower Italia AG 100 
2012 Bel power europe s.r.l. Bel Fuse Inc 100 
Measuring the post-acquisition performance of Italian acquired firms: data selection and descriptive statistics 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
81 
2012 Blueface italia s.r.l. Blueface Ltd 100 
2012 Bovo s.p.a. Papier Mettler 100 
2012 Bps brindisi 2 s.r.l ESPF GmbH 100 
2012 Calcio lecco 1912 s.r.l. Cala Corp 79 
2012 Chelab srl Silliker SAS 100 
2012 Cimbria s.r.l. A/S Cimbria 100 
2012 Docomo digital italy s.p.a. DOCOMO Deutschland GmbH 93,709 
2012 E.r. energia rinnovabile societa' a 
responsabilita' limitata 
Antin Infrastructure Partners SAS 100 
2012 Elios 1 s.r.l. ESPF GmbH 100 
2012 Eskigel s.r.l. R&R Ice Cream PLC 100 
2012 Ferretti s.p.a. Shangdong Heavy Ind Grp Co Ltd 75 
2012 Gelit s.r.l. Ralcorp Holdings Inc 100 
2012 Interporto rivalta scrivia s.p.a. Katoen Natie NV 90,22 
2012 Marbo italia s.p.a. Elantas GmbH 100 
2012 Mizuno italia s.r.l. Mizuno Corp 100 
2012 Nardo' technical center s.r.l. Porsche Engineering Group 
GmbH 
100 
2012 Principe hotel management srl VAO Intourist 100 
2012 Remosa s.r.l. IMI PLC 100 
2012 Synopsis consulting s.r.l. in liquidazione Altair Engineering Inc 100 
2012 Taleco s.r.l. in liquidazione EcoData Group PLC 100 
2012 Teseo - s.p.a. tecnologie e sistemi 
elettronici ed ottici siglabile teseo s.p.a. 
Groupe Clemessy SA 100 
2012 Vodafone automotive italia s.p.a. Cobra Service Network SA 100 
2012 Wavetech s.r.l. Eurona Wireless Telecom SA 100 
2013 Acquaviva s.r.l. Belenergia SA 100 
2013 Albesiano sisa vernici s.r.l. Von Roll Holding AG 100 
2013 Brindisi solar s.r.l. Belenergia SA 100 
2013 Cid s.p.a. Alvimedica Medical Devices 100 
2013 Codd&date s.r.l. Vipera PLC 51 
2013 Defendi italy s.r.l. E G O Blanc und Fischer & Co 100 
2013 Domo engineering plastics italy s.p.a. Domo Chemicals NV 100 
2013 Douglas chero s.p.a. Cameron International Corp 75 
2013 Eden s.r.l. OASE Holding GmbH 100 
2013 Edif instruments s.r.l. Human Gesellschaft fuer Bioche 100 
2013 Efore s.p.a. Efore Oyj 100 
2013 Enterra s.p.a. Belenergia SA 70 
2013 F.c. internazionale milano s.p.a. International Sport Capital 100 
2013 Finder pompe s.r.l. Pump Solutions Group 100 
2013 Fives oto s.p.a. Fives SA 100 
2013 Fluence italy s.r.l. RWL Water LLC 100 
2013 Franco vago s.p.a. over seas transport 
system abbreviabile in fra nco vago s.p.a. 
Nippon Express Europe GmbH 100 
2013 Fs florence s.r.l. Constellation Hotels Holdings Ltd 100 
2013 G.t. attuatori - s.r.l. Rotork PLC 100 
2013 Geosoft s.r.l. Leica Geosystems AG 100 
2013 Immogar s.p.a. Waaree Instruments Ltd 100 
2013 Isia s.p.a. Grundfos Holding A/S 100 
2013 Kba- flexotecnica s.p.a. Koenig & Bauer AG 100 
2013 Leali s.r.l. - in liquidazione Aldel Holding BV 100 
2013 Loro piana s.p.a. LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis 
Vuitt 
80 
2013 Marazzi group s.r.l. Mohawk Industries Inc 100 
2013 Memar-monteassegni s.p.a. TechTreck Ltd 100 
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2013 Mixnet Solutions 30 SA 70 
2013 Mks instruments italy s.r.l. MKS Instruments Inc 100 
2013 Nicox farma s.r.l. societa' in liquidazione Nicox SA 100 
2013 P.h. - s.r.l. TUEV Sued AG 100 
2013 P.t.m. s.r.l. Westeel Ltd 100 
2013 Pernigotti s.p.a. Toksoz Holding AS 100 
2013 Petracer's ceramics s.r.l. Koramic Building Products NV 100 
2013 Solaria real estate Belenergia SA 100 
2013 Sumiriko italy s.p.a. Tokai Rubber Industries Ltd 100 
2013 Teko telecom s.r.l. John Mezzalingua Assoc LLC 100 
2013 Valextra s.p.a. NEO Capital LLP 60 
2013 Vimercate salute s.p.a. Barclays Infrastructure Funds 
Management Ltd 
51 
2013 Voestalpine b+hler welding fileur s.r.l. Bohler Welding Holding GmbH 90 
2013 Zeb consulting s.r.l. zeb/ 100 
2014 Audax energia s.r.l. Audax Energia SA 100 
2014 Biokosmes s.r.l. Venture Life Group PLC 100 
2014 Bologna football club 1909 - s.p.a., in 
forma abbreviata bfc s.p .a. 
BFC1909 USA SPV LLC 100 
2014 Clay paky s.p.a. OSRAM Licht AG 100 
2014 Comestero group s.r.l. anche nella 
denominazione di comesterogroup srl 
Suzo-Happ Group 100 
2014 Dac distribuzione alimentari convivenze 
s.p.a. o in forma abbreviata dac s.p.a. 
The Bidvest Group Ltd 60 
2014 Dia.metra s.r.l. Immunodiagnostic Systems 
Holdings PLC 
100 
2014 Diagnosis - societa' a responsabilita' 
limitata 
Lifebrain Ag 100 
2014 Eden technology s.r.l. Tongmake International Co Ltd 51 
2014 F.i.p.s. fabbrica italiana pompe 
sommergibili s.r.l. 
CRI Pumps Pvt Ltd 100 
2014 Flamar cavi elettrici s.r.l. Molex LLC 100 
2014 Fosber societa' per azioni Guangdong Dongfang Precision 
Science & Technology Co Ltd 
60 
2014 Garbuio s.p.a. Hauni Maschinenbau AG 100 
2014 Garo dott. Ing. Roberto gabbioneta spa Gardner Denver Inc 100 
2014 Gentium - s.r.l. Jazz Pharmaceuticals PLC 98 
2014 Health robotics srl Aesynt Inc 100 
2014 Humana italia s.p.a. DMK Deutsches Milchkontor 
GmbH 
100 
2014 I.s.a.l. s.r.l. abbreviabile ove consentito in 
isal s.r.l. 
Alfred Kaercher GmbH & Co KG 100 
2014 Industria italiana integratori trei s.p.a. aniMedica GmbH 100 
2014 Ipe s.r.l. Ergon Capital Partners III SA 66 
2014 Kkt s.r.l. Fleetmatics Group PLC 100 
2014 Konica minolta ij textile europe s.r.l. Konica Minolta Inc 100 
2014 Lifebrain s.r.l. Lifebrain Ag 100 
2014 Mitsubishi electric klimat transportation 
systems s.p.a. 
Mitsubishi Electric Corp 80 
2014 N.g.c. medical s.r.l. Medtronic Inc 70 
2014 Nuova castelli s.p.a. Charterhouse Capital Partners LLP 80 
2014 Palazzo del freddo giovanni fassi s.r.l. Haitai Confectionery & Foods Co 
Ltd 
100 
2014 Pastificio lucio garofalo s.p.a Ebro Foods SA 52 
2014 Piaggio aero industries societa' per azioni Mubadala Development Co PJSC 57,558 
2014 Pilosio s.p.a. Columna Capital LLP 100 
2014 Pixartprinting s.p.a. Vistaprint NV 97 
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2014 Recipharm italia s.p.a. Recipharm AB 100 
2014 Redecam group s.p.a. Dundee Sarea 100 
2014 Rottapharm s.p.a. Meda AB 100 
2014 S.d.n. spa Labco SA 100 
2014 Saet s.p.a. Park-Ohio Holdings Corp 100 
2014 Societa' per azioni lucchese olii e vini ShangHai YiMin No1 Foods 
(Group) Co Ltd 
90 
2014 Societa' produttori sementi spa Syngenta AG 100 
2014 Solera italia s.r.l. Solera Holdings Inc 100 
2014 Sterigenics italy s.p.a. Sterigenics International Inc 100 
2014 Steris s.p.a. Synergy Health PLC 100 
2014 Technovaa italy macplast s.p.a. Technovaa Industries LLC 100 
2014 Varroc lighting systems italy - societa' per 
azioni sigla denominazione: varroc lighting 
systems italy s.p.a. 
Varroc Engineering Pvt Ltd 80 
2014 Vodafone automotive s.p.a. Vodafone Global Enterprise 100 
2014 Welocalize italy s.r.l. Welocalize Inc 100 
2014 Wuerth elektronik stelvio kontek s.p.a. Wuerth Elektronik eiSos GmbH & 
Co KG 
100 
2014 Xtel s.r.l. Kantar Retail UK Ltd 100 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author 
 
3.3.2 The control group 
The difference-in-difference (DID) method is based on the comparison between a treated and a 
control group, a set of units in some-way similar to the treated units, but different from them in 
that they did not receive the treatment, i.e. the foreign acquisition. In this way, we obtain a 
proper counterfactual to estimate the casual effect, isolating it from other factors, for example 
pre-selection bias. The presence of a control group is what makes DID different from a time-
series estimate in which the treatment effect is simply analysed as a difference over time in the 
treated units. In order to build our control group, we used the AIDA database to extract a set of 
companies with similar characteristics to those in the treated group and which are purely 
domestic in our considered time frame. In particular, we set the following criteria on AIDA 
research tool: 
 Companies operating in the same ATECO 2007 3-digit codes in which the treated units 
operate; 
 Companies with a national and a global controlling shareholders (and ultimate owner) 
based in Italy and being an industrial company, an individual, a family or a listed 
company. Banks, financial services, insurances, private equity and venture capital 
companies, hedge funds, mutual and pension funds, foundations, governments are 
excluded by the sample; 
 Companies that are not subsidiaries of foreign owners. 
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The resulting control group is made by 121.623 companies with at least seven consecutive 
financial statement available (i.e. from 2008 to 2014, from 2009 to 2015, from 2010 to 2016 
and/or from 2011 to 2017). Differently from the treated group, a company in the control group 
can be present as more than one observation. Indeed, according to the number of years of 
accessible financial statements, the same company can be present up to 4 times. For example, 
if a company has available and complete balance sheets from 2008 to 2017, then it will be 
considered as control unit for acquisitions concluded in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014. The 
variable called “M&A effective year” will indicate the balance sheets used to build the average 
of the 3-years pre and post acquisitions, and so for which treated units it can be matched. As a 
consequence, the control group amounts to 238.413 observations. More specifically, 65.042  
companies are used as control group for M&As concluded in 2011; 65.455 companies form the 
control for M&As concluded in 2012; 51.163 companies are the control for M&As realized in 
2013 and 56.601 companies are in the control group for M&As realized in 2014.  
 
3.3.3 The treated group: descriptive statistics 
Table 17 Transactions in the treated group by year summarizes the distribution of the 152 deals 
in the treated group among the 4 years study time. The nadir in 2012 and following growth in 
2013 and 2014 confirm the general trend identified by Zephyr’s research on the Italian M&A 
market reported in Figure 1 at the beginning of this work. 
 
Table 17 Transactions in the treated group by year 
M&A Year Number of deals (treated group) 
2011 38 
2012 26 
2013 41 
2014 47 
Total 152 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author 
Looking at deals distribution by geographic region (Figure 7), it is evident how Lombardy plays 
the lion’s share with 60 deals out of 152 (39,5%), followed at great distance by Veneto with 15 
deals (9,86%). The Nord-Est7 area accounts for 15,79% of transactions in the treated group. On 
the contrary, southern regions are mostly absent from our analysis. Abruzzo, Molise, Puglia, 
Campania and Basilicata totally represent just 8 deals, 5 of which are acquisitions of 
                                                 
 
7 According to ISTAT classification, we define Nord-Est as Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Trentino-Alto Adige and 
Emilia-Romagna. Souther regions are Abruzzo, Molise, Puglia, Campania, Basilicata and Calabria. 
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Campania’s based companies, while Molise, Basilicata and Calabria are not represented at all. 
This geographic concentration confirms the common knowledge on the higher attractiveness of 
Northern companies and a two-speed development of the country. 
Figure 7 Transactions in the treated group by Italian region 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author 
Figure 8a displays the distribution of treated companies by macro-sector, meaning 
distinguishing manufacturing and service industries. Differently to other studies (e.g. 
Barbaresco et al., 2018; Piscitello & Rabbiosi, 2005), but following other recent works in Italy 
(e.g. Bentivogli & Mirenda, 2017; ICE & Prometeia, 2014) we chose to include service 
companies as well to get a full view on the Italian productive world. Companies in the 
manufacturing industries seem to be more attractive to foreign investors, who may recognize a 
more foreseeable opportunity for economies of integration. It is worth noticing that the interests 
in manufacturing companies is increasing over time, as their quota on total deals in our sample 
shows a positive trend (Figure 8b). Appendix I reports the complete lists of 3-digit ATECO 
2007 codes present in our data sample. 
Figure 8 Transactions in the treated group by macro-industry (a) and trend (b) 
Source: Personal elaboration of the autho 
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Looking at the acquirer’s side of the deal (Figure 9), 61% of deals are concluded by European 
investors. Among non-European ones, Americas-based acquirers are the most active, with 22% 
of total deals. Beside a small component of Canadian companies, Americas buyers are almost 
totally represented by US-based acquirers. Table 18 confirms that US companies are the top-
ranked acquirers in absolute value as well, followed by Germany and UK. 
 
Figure 9 Transactions in the treated group by acquirers’ region of origin 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author 
 
Table 18 Transactions in the treated group by acquirers’ country of origin 
Acquirer Country N° of deals % of total deals 
United States of America 29 19% 
Germany 24 16% 
United Kingdom 16 11% 
France 14 9% 
Japan 6 4% 
Switzerland 6 4% 
Canada 5 3% 
Belgium 5 3% 
Luxembourg 5 3% 
China 4 3% 
India 4 3% 
Spain 4 3% 
Turkey 4 3% 
Others 26 17% 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author 
Figure 10 illustrates the composition of our treated datasets looking at the CEO position, which 
we use as proxy of the organizational change the target company has gone throught. Using 
information available on AIDA (complemented with external sources when needed) we 
collected data on whether and how the person occupying the CEO position changed after the 
acquisition. Data show that in a substantial 45% of the cases, new foreign owners trust in the 
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skills and management capabilities of the target CEO and confirm its role even following the 
acquisition. On top of that, it is not uncommon that new owners flank the current CEO with a 
second one, who representing the new investors’ interest, may support the existing CEO in the 
acquisition plan implementation. Conversely, in 37% the CEO is substituted and replaced by a 
foreign owner representative.  
 
Figure 10 Treated group by post-acquisition CEO status  
Source: Personal elaboration of the author 
 
Finally, Table 19 provides some descriptive statistics on main variables for both groups of 
companies, acquired and non-acquired.  Our research interest is to measure the effect of foreign 
acquisition in terms of corporate accounting and operating performance. In particular, our 
outcomes of interest are sales, Return on Assets8 and EBITDA Margin9. These three variables 
together provide a full view on the target post-acquisition turnover, ability to growth and 
efficiently manage its resources to increase profitability. In short, changes in sales, ROA and 
EBITDA margin trends well mirror the results of a new strategic direction of the company 
following the acquisition.  
Table 19 allows a first rough comparison between treated and control groups regarding the three 
outcomes of interests, plus debt on equity in order to complete our analysis with a quick view 
at financial structure differences. Companies targeted by foreign acquisition have a lower D/E 
ratio both before and after the acquisition. In particular, in the post-acquisition time frame, D/E 
decreases for acquired companies, while non-acquired companies observe a huge increment in 
their debt level. Despite that, the greatest difference is in the average sales level, which is largely 
                                                 
 
8 ROA is defined as net  income divided by total assets, following Chang et al. (2013) and Feys and  
Manigart (2010). 
9 EBITDA margin is defined as earnings before interest tax depreciation and amortization on sales. 
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higher for acquired companies. Both groups experience an increase in average sales in the post-
acquisition period. Regarding ROA, the two groups exhibit opposite trends. While treated 
companies had a negative pre-acquisition ROA and zero-level ROA post acquisition, control 
units experienced a decrease over the same time frame. The same diverging trend can be 
observed for EBITDA margin. Acquired companies average EBITDA margin increases post-
acquisition, but the starting level was much lower than control units’ one. Overall, this first 
rough analysis would lead us to conclude that foreign investors choose larger companies with 
high turnover, but low profitability. Therefore, they do not always cherry-pick best performing 
companies, but they also select low-performing companies to restructure them. We could 
reasonably hypothesize that the main acquisition driver is the attempt to improve operational 
efficiency. However, a more sophisticated analysis is needed in order to rightly determine the 
nature and causes of these effects. The simple comparison of average data does not take into 
account other factors that may explain these differences, beside the occurrence of an acquisition 
or not. Does acquired companies performance improve because of the acquisition or because 
of ex-ante different characteristics? Descriptive statistics do not have the power to detect these 
differences; only a difference-in-difference method can resolve this doubt. 
 
Table 19 Descriptive statistics of main variables for acquired and non-acquired (data for sales in thousands of euro) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Treated group 
Avg Sales Pre 152 41.216,47 69.147,39 - 407.988,80 
Avg Sales Post 152 43.581,41 77.255,81 70,20 507.599,20 
Avg ROA Pre 152 -0,03 0,36 -4,17 0,37 
Avg ROA Post 152 0,00 0,13 -0,41 0,48 
Avg EBITDA Margin Pre 151 -0,14 3,33 -40,20 3,74 
Avg EBITDA Margin Post 152 -0,03 0,83 -7,69 1,49 
Avg Debt/Equity pre 152 2,44 5,93 -6,46 45,36 
Avg Debt/Equity Post 152 1,35 5,72 -4,78 65,71 
Control group 
Avg Sales Pre 238.261 4.687,27 98.477,00 -4,33 20.204.808 
Avg Sales Post 238.261 5.101,25 103.615,70 -26,00 21.788.564 
Avg ROA Pre 238.254 0,00 2,25 -550,00 15,25 
Avg ROA Post 238.246 -0,01 1,97 -684,00 95,44 
Avg EBITDA Margin Pre 225.102 1,79 1257,22 -106.629 551.893 
Avg EBITDA Margin Post 226.147 -1,19 341,97 -134.694,30 33.373 
Avg Debt/Equity pre 235.550 2,82 18,97 -830,91 961,87 
Avg Debt/Equity Post 231.731 9,93 63,26 -675,50 8025,13 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author 
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3.3.4 The treated group: Family businesses 
The ultimate interest of research of this work is to study whether being the target a family 
business has a differential effect on post-acquisition performance or not. Following Minichilli, 
Corbetta and MacMillan (2005), we define a family firm as a company whereby an individual 
or a family owns more than 50% of outstanding shares10. Data on ownership distribution back 
to the moment of the acquisition have been collected from AIDA, which provides year-by-year 
information on current and past owners’ identity. Where AIDA was lacking data or it was 
doubtful, it was integrated with other internet sources (press news, articles, etc.). Resulting from 
this research, we identified 70 family firms and 82 non-family firms. A dummy equal to 1 if the 
unit is a family firm and 0 if it is not was then included in the dataset. 
If the distinction between family and non-family businesses goes back to the acquisition period, 
we also investigated what happened after the acquisition. At first level, we distinguished 
between two possible outcomes: the family can either remain somehow involved in the business 
despite not being a controlling owner anymore, either exit the business. How the family remains 
in the business defines the second-level classification. First, it may save a quota of shares and 
exercise its powers as minority shareholder to the extent of its stake. Second, despite having 
sold the ownership of the company, it may maintain one or more management positions. It is 
not uncommon that new owners recognize the management skills of family members and the 
eventual benefits of preserving their leadership role in the company. Third, the precedent two 
situations may verify simultaneously, the family maintains a minority stake and is represented 
in the management team11. These three possible outcomes are defined as Ownership only, 
Management only and Ownership+Management. As before for family business classification, 
information have been retrieved from AIDA. Given the scarcity of information on management 
positions, external sources as press releases, articles, company website and LinkedIn were even 
more valuable. Indeed, clues on company’s management information are much more delicate 
to access than information on shareholders. This research constraint may explain why the 
                                                 
 
10 As pointed out in Chapter 2, the definition of family business varies across different studies and countries. We 
chose to follow a definition designed and implemented in the Italian context, whose characteristics of ownership 
concentration and shareholder activism require an ownership-based criteria and a majority rule definition. 
  
11 In this context, a separate treatment has been devoted to Board of Directors positions. If the family is present in 
the post-acquisition settlement of interests as a minority shareholder and contributing one or more directors, then 
this case is classified as Ownership only. The rationale is that directors representing a minority stake do not have 
the power to strongly affect the strategic direction of the company, neither to take operational decisions as C-level 
managers may do. Moreover, directorship positions (even the Chairman) are often representative positions, whose 
voice in decision-making is limited.  
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literature on family businesses always considers ownership holding, while more rarely takes 
management into consideration. However, considering the role of the family as leader and not 
only owners may generate valuable and new insights on the differential effect of family firms. 
Figure 11 graphically summarizes the precedent explanation. Out of the 70 family firms in our 
dataset, 40 completely left the business after having sold the majority stake, 30 somehow 
remained present in the company. Of these, the large majority (17, 56.6%) maintained a 
management role and guided the business under the foreign-owner surveillance. 8 families 
(26.7%) remained in the business as owners, renouncing to any leading role, while 5 of them 
(16.7%) kept a minority stake and maintained a representation at the C-level management.   
 
Figure 11 Family business classification 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author  
The just mentioned categorization enables us to observe that just 13 families out of 30 managed 
to preserve a minority stake in the business and did not leave a 100% control to the new owners.  
Figure 12 displays post-acquisition family ownership by 10 percentage points’ intervals. It can 
be observed how a relative majority of families (37%) preserved a minority stake between 20 
and 30% of the company’s equity. Obviously, the higher the percentage the family is able to 
keep for itself, the higher its voice in the company’ strategic direction, even if it does not holds 
the decision-making power any more. However, an active minority ownership may serve as a 
discipline factor in monitoring the conduct of the new foreign owners. 
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Figure 12 Post acquisition family ownership  
Source: Personal elaboration of the author 
Looking at the composition of the family sub-sample (Figure 13), we can observe how family 
firms do not exhibit significant differences in terms of sector distribution compared to the full 
sample. 55% of family firms operates in the manufacturing sector, while 45% in the service 
sector, confirming that the family control structure is not industry-specific, but it is diffused and 
pervasive in the whole economic system. 
 
Figure 13 Treated group, acquired family firms by macro industry 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author 
Similarly, family firms are not more subjectable to CEO changes than non-family firms. The 
percentages displayed in Figure 14: Treated group, family firms by post-acquisition CEO status 
are really similar to those presented in Figure 10 for aggregate data, which may lead us argue 
that CEOs of family firms are not perceived by foreign investors as less reliable or capable than 
those of non-family firms.  
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Figure 14: Treated group, family firms by post-acquisition CEO status 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author 
Tables 20, 21, 22 report some descriptive statistics of main variables for all family businesses 
subgroups at different classification levels. Last columns of each table report differences in 
mean and t-test conducted on standardized variables to verify whether differences between 
subgroups are statistically significant. Table 20 highlights the difference between family and 
non-family firms. Differences between the two groups are not statistically significant, except 
for average 3-years post acquisition ROA and average 3-years pre-acquisition debt on equity. 
Family firms have higher pre and post-acquisition ROA. For both groups, ROA trend is 
positive. On the contrary, family businesses underperform in terms of sales and EBITDA, but 
both dimensions improve after the acquisition, more than what they do for non-family firms. In 
terms of financial structure, they use more external resources than non-family firms, but the 
level of debt is strongly decreasing for both groups after the acquisition by a foreign acquirer. 
Table 21 analyses the first-level family business subgroups and compares main statistics for 
those companies whereby the family remained in the business and those whereby the family 
completely left the business after the ownership transfer. Again, differences are not statistically 
significant, except for post-acquisition EBITDA margin. Businesses where the family left 
experience an increase in EBITDA margin, while the opposite is true for those companies in 
which the family remained involved. The same pattern is true for ROA. On the contrary, 
companies were the family is still present after the acquisition outperform in terms of sales and 
debt on equity improvement. The second-level distinction among the three possible family 
status in the post-acquisition phase may help us in identifying some determinants of the just 
commented trends (Table 22). Unfortunately, the low number of observations does not allow 
us to identify some clear patters. T-tests results reveal that there are not significant differences 
in means between the three subgroups. The only significant differences hold between average 
sales pre and post-acquisition between Management only and Management+Ownership 
subgroups.  
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Table 20 Summary statistics of main variables for family firms and non-family firms 
 
Table 21 Summary statistics of main variables for family firms whereby the family remained in the business after the acquisition (Family IN) and those where the family 
did not remain after the acquisitions (Family OUT).  
Variable Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Difference T-Test 
Avg Sales Pre Family IN 30 43,939.93  83,524.16  -  407,988.80  9054.71 -0.50 
 Family OUT 40 34,885.22  67,516.66  226.88  331,978.30    
Avg Sales Post Family IN 30 45,782.48  100,309.40  87.22  507,599.20  8207.21 -0.39 
 Family OUT 40 37,575.27  77,527.43  509.38  414,472.70    
Avg ROA Pre Family IN 30 0.02 0.11 -0.41 0.22 0.02 -0.78 
 Family OUT 40 0.00 0.13 -0.55 0.19   
Avg ROA Post Family IN 30 0.01 0.09 -0.30 0.23 -0.01 0.28 
 Family OUT 40 0.02 0.11 -0.20 0.38   
Avg EBITDA Margin Pre Family IN 30 0.11 0.11 -0.11 0.52 1.04 -0.88 
 Family OUT 40 -0.94 6.45 -40.20 0.46   
Avg EBITDA Margin Post Family IN 30 -0.19 0.87 -3.84 0.59 -0.27 1,80* 
 Family OUT 40 0.08 0.34 -1.60 0.85   
Avg Debt/Equity pre Family IN 30 1.72 2.99 -0.01 13.83 0.32 -0.42 
 Family OUT 40 1.39 3.41 -6.46 13.40   
Avg Debt/Equity Post Family IN 30 0.62 1.79 -4.78 4.91 -0.63 0.95 
 Family OUT 40 1.26 3.36 -3.04 15.16   
Variable Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Difference T-Test
Avg Sales Pre Family firms 70 38.895,16   74.593,35        -             407.988,80  10.057,14    0,38     
Non Family firms 82 43.198,07   64.536,21        20,77        327.402,30  
Avg Sales Post Family firms 70 41.209,90   87.759,71        87,22        507.599,20  4.395,98 -     0,35     
Non Family firms 82 45.605,88   67.502,70        70,20        382.762,60  
Avg ROA Pre Family firms 70 0,011 0,121 -0,553 0,220 0,072 -1,246
Non Family firms 82 -0,061 0,473 -4,171 0,371
Avg ROA Post Family firms 70 0,017 0,100 -0,303 0,376 0,037 -1,7802*
Non Family firms 82 -0,020 0,147 -0,411 0,484
Avg EBITDA Margin Pre Family firms 69 -0,484 4,85                 -40,195 0,516 -0,638 1,175
Non Family firms 82 0,154 0,751 -4,100 3,739
Avg EBITDA Margin Post Family firms 70 -0,037 0,643 -3835,000 0,853 -0,017 0,122
Non Family firms 82 -0,021 0,960 -7,695 1,492
Avg Debt/Equity pre Family firms 70 1,535 3,215 -6,460 13,830 -1,662 1,7337*
Non Family firms 81 3,198 7,441 -2,877 45,360
Avg Debt/Equity Post Family firms 70 0,975 2,779 -4,777 15,160 -0,697 0,748
Non Family firms 81 1,672 7,364 -1,525 65,707
Inbound cross-border M&As in Italy: are family businesses better off when acquired by foreign investors? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
94 
Table 22 Summary statistics of main variables for family firms whereby the family remained in the business after the acquisition (Family IN), distinguishing among those that remained 
as managers, owners or both simultaneously.  
 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author. T-test based on standardized variables are reported in the last column. *Statistical significance at 10%level. **Statistical significance at 5%level.
Variable Group Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Difference 
(1)-(2)
T-Test 
(1)-(2)
Difference 
(1)-(3)
T-Test 
(1)-(3)
Difference 
(2)-(3)
T-Test 
(2)-(3)
Avg Sales Pre Ownership Only (1) 8 70.198          138.536       -              407.989          43.869    1,18 -  1.306      0,02 -  42.564 -  1,82*
Management Only (2) 17 26.329          49.554         788            205.877          
Ownership+Management (3) 5 68.892          71.583         5.419         169.301          
Avg Sales Post Ownership Only (1) 8 78.879          173.466       277            507.599          59.997    1,42 -  13.473 -   0,16   73.471 -  2,69**
Management Only (2) 17 18.882          27.929         87              107.736          
Ownership+Management (3) 5 92.353          106.316       93              246.128          
Avg ROA Pre Ownership Only (1) 8 0,03              0,10             0,16 -          0,18                0,00 -0,03 -0,01 0,27 -0,02 0,25
Management Only (2) 17 0,02              0,13             0,41 -          0,22                
Ownership+Management (3) 5 0,04              0,05             0,01 -          0,12                
Avg ROA Post Ownership Only (1) 8 0,00 -             0,06             0,07 -          0,13                -0,04 1,15 -0,04 1,15 0,00 -0,09
Management Only (2) 17 0,04              0,09             0,17 -          0,23                
Ownership+Management (3) 5 0,03              0,04             0,00 -          0,09                
Avg EBITDA Margin Pre Ownership Only (1) 8 0,07              0,10             0,11 -          0,21                -0,03 0,78 -0,11 1,24 -0,07 1,28
Management Only (2) 17 0,10              0,08             0,04 -          0,28                
Ownership+Management (3) 5 0,18              0,19             0,05           0,52                
Avg EBITDA Margin Post Ownership Only (1) 8 0,21 -             0,71             1,95 -          0,20                -0,08 0,22 0,14 -0,29 0,22 -0,45
Management Only (2) 17 0,13 -             0,97             3,84 -          0,59                
Ownership+Management (3) 5 0,35 -             1,02             2,19 -          0,13                
Avg Debt/Equity Pre Ownership Only (1) 8 2,98              3,21             0,12           0,83                1,67 -1,20 1,55 -1,01 -0,12 0,08
Management Only (2) 17 1,31              3,26             -              1,38                
Ownership+Management (3) 5 1,43              1,39             0,07           3,31                
Avg Debt/Equity Post Ownership Only (1) 8 0,93              2,21             3,20 -          3,61                0,51 0,88 -0,02 0,02 -0,53 0,60
Management Only (2) 17 0,42              1,88             4,78 -          4,91                
Ownership+Management (3) 5 0,95              0,85             -              2,06                
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3.3.5 Trend for sales 
As previously mentioned, our outcomes of interests are sales, ROA and EBITDA margin. 
Figure 15 shows sales trend for the 7-year period, 3 years pre-acquisition, the acquisition year 
and 3 years post-acquisition. The first clear insight is that acquisitions concluded in 2012 on 
average regarded smaller firms compared to the other periods. Moreover, the inflection point at 
time t (the acquisition year) is more pronounced than in other acquisition years, despite present 
also in 2013 and 2014’s trends. On average, post-acquisition sales are positioned on higher 
levels compared to pre-acquisition values, showing that despite an inflection due to the 
acquisition shock and following integration, a positive effect can be observed. 2013 is the only 
exception, but t+3 values are increasing and reaching pre-acquisition values. 
 
Figure 15 Average pre and post- acquisition sales (data in millions of Euro) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author (N=152) 
A further clarification on sales trends may come from pre and post-acquisition sales CAGR. 
Table 23 shows how companies in the treated group performed in terms of sales growth. A 
relative majority of acquisition targets (39%) had positive sales growth pre-acquisition and 
maintained this trend following the acquisition as well. For 20% of our companies, the foreign 
acquisition clearly re-boosted the company turnover, determining a trend shift from negative-
to-positive. On the contrary, in 24% of cases, the acquisition was detrimental to the company’s 
sales as a positive pre-acquisition CAGR turned to negative after the deal. Finally, 16% of 
company were experiencing a negative pre-acquisition sales trend that the new owners was 
unable to recover, at least in the first 3 years. 
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Table 23 Percentage of treated companies with positive and negative trend for sales (3 years CAGR) 
pre- and post-M&A  
   CAGR Pre Negative   CAGR Pre Positive  
 CAGR Post Negative  16% 20% 
 CAGR Post Positive  24% 40% 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author. Positive CAGR is defined as CAGR ≥ 0, negative CAGR is defined as CAGR <0. 
Table 24 provides some additional insights on sales trend by breaking it down to subgroups. 
Non-family firms exhibit higher sales than family firms in all 7-years period, but while family 
firms experience a positive and satisfactionary post-acquisition CAGR by 18%, non-family 
businesses register a negative trend and barely overcome pre-acquisition level of sales. It can 
be observed that manufacturing companies have higher sales levels, both before and after the 
acquisition, however the increase in sales by service companies is greater, showing larger 
opportunities for improvements (+20% vs 0%). A first look to these data quickly allows to 
understand that the acquirer’s country of origin has an impact as well. Non-European acquirer 
are attracted by larger companies and the improvement they are able to implement is greater 
than European ones (+14% vs -2%). The preservation of the same CEO apparently induces 
positive effects in the company performance, as companies whose leader did not change 
following the acquisition report higher sales and higher post-acquisition sales CAGR (+11% vs 
+1%). Looking at the acquirer type, conversely to what one can expect, it seems that industrial 
acquirers boost target’s sales more than what financial acquirers do. Post-acquisition sales of 
target of industrial acquirers clearly increase (+11%), while companies acquired by financial 
buyers exhibit a strong decrease in sales (-17%). 
 
Table 25 further expands our knowledge on post-acquisition sales growth for each subgroup by 
showing the difference in average pre and post-acquisition sales in absolute value and as a 
percentage. Overall, foreign acquisitions resulted in turnover improvement as average sales 
increased by 5.7%. The result is more pronounced for family firms, service companies and 
small and medium enterprises. Confirming what we previously pointed out, Non-European 
acquirers and industrial acquirers are more beneficial for companies performance in terms of 
sales growth. 
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Table 24 Sales trend by subgroups (data expressed in thousands of €) 
  
Obs 
Avg 
Sales 
T-3 
Avg 
Sales 
T-2 
Avg 
Sales  
T-1 
Avg 
Sales T 
Avg 
Sales 
T+1 
Avg 
Sales 
T+2 
Avg 
Sales 
T+3 
CA
GR 
Pre 
CA
GR 
Post 
 Total  
    
152    
        
39.929    
        
41.310    
        
42.350    
        
38.441    
        
42.197    
         
43.170    
         
44.484    6% 5% 
 Family Business  
 Family Business  
      
71    
        
38.004    
        
37.547    
        
40.076    
        
35.459    
        
37.194    
         
41.694    
         
43.976    5% 18% 
 Non Family 
Business  
      
81    
        
41.617    
        
44.607    
        
44.344    
        
41.055    
        
46.583    
         
44.464    
         
44.946    7% -4% 
 Sector  
 Manufacturing  
      
88    
        
50.911    
        
52.718    
        
52.248    
        
45.099    
        
52.395    
         
50.831    
         
52.425    3% 0% 
 Service  
      
64    
        
24.829    
        
25.622    
        
28.742    
        
29.286    
        
28.175    
         
32.637    
         
33.937    16% 20% 
 Acquirer's Region  
 European 
Countries  
      
93    
        
34.238    
        
36.182    
        
36.528    
        
34.704    
        
35.959    
         
34.498    
         
35.117    7% -2% 
 Non-European 
Countries  
      
59    
        
48.900    
        
49.393    
        
51.528    
        
44.332    
        
52.030    
         
56.840    
         
59.180    5% 14% 
 Type of acquirer  
 Industrial 
acquirer  
    
139    
        
39.880    
        
40.964    
        
42.496    
        
38.273    
        
42.056    
         
43.876    
         
45.170    7% 7% 
 Financial 
Acquirer  
      
13    
        
40.452    
        
45.004    
        
40.794    
        
40.241    
        
43.712    
         
35.630    
         
35.878    1% 
-
18% 
 CEO change  
 CEO change  
      
82    
        
39.293    
        
40.944    
        
41.512    
        
38.140    
        
42.889    
         
41.838    
         
43.182    6% 1% 
 No-CEO change  
      
70    
        
40.674    
        
41.738    
        
43.333    
        
38.794    
        
41.387    
         
44.731    
         
45.993    7% 11% 
 SME vs Large companies  
 SME    
    
114    
        
13.670    
        
12.501    
        
13.648    
        
13.380    
        
14.293    
         
15.474    
         
16.018    0% 12% 
 Large 
Companies  
      
38    
      
122.645    
      
127.736    
      
128.458    
      
113.625    
      
125.910    
       
126.260    
       
133.834    5% 6% 
 
Table 25 3-years average sales for the target firms before and after the M&A by a foreign company 
(data in thousands of euro)  
Avg Sales Pre M&A Avg Sales Post M&A Difference Difference (%) 
 Total firms (treated)  41.216 43.581 2.365 5,7% 
 Family Business  38.542 40.955 2.412 6,3% 
 Non-Family Business  43.561 45.884 2.323 5,3% 
 Manufacturing  51.994 52.307 314 0,6% 
 Service  26.398 31.583 5.185 19,6% 
 European  35.682 35.386 -296 -0,8% 
 Non-European  49.940 56.499 6.559 13,1% 
Industrial acquirer 41.135 43.817 2.682 6,5% 
Financial Acquirer 42.083 41.061 -1.022 -2,4% 
CEO change 40.620 43.255 2.635 6,5% 
No-CEO change  41.915 43.964 2.049 4,9% 
SME 12.862 15.338 2.476 19,3% 
Large firms 126.279 128.310 2.031 1,6% 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author. CAGR Pre and CAGR Post refer to Compound Annual Growth Rate 3 years pre-
acquisition and 3 years post-acquisition. 
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3.3.6 Trend for ROA 
Return on Assets is an indicator of how efficient a company’s management is at using its assets 
to generate earnings. In this regard, ROA patterns allow us to investigate the profitability 
situation of acquired companies. Figure 16 shows how different acquisition years exhibit 
different trends, with two standing out patterns. At the acquisition period (time t), ROA diverges 
from the rest of the distribution, but while in 2011 and 2013’s acquisitions it reaches higher 
levels, in 2012 and 2014’s deals in goes down. In both cases, ROA readjusts back to the 
previous levels from time t+1 on. A second interesting insight can be observed on post-
acquisition trends. While companies acquired in 2012 and 2014 experience an upward 
progression, 2011 and 2014’s acquisitions are declining. Extending the time period over the 3-
years time frame may allow to understand if these two opposite trends are transitory and will 
finally reconcile or if they are permanent; in this last case, intrinsic differences among 
companies subgroups may justify them.  
 
Figure 16 Average pre and post- acquisition ROA 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author (N=114, outliers were excluded) 
Table 26 further clarifies whether companies benefitted or not from the acquisition in terms of 
assets profitability, comparing pre and post-acquisition ROA trends. 25% of companies exhibit 
positive ROA trend both in the pre and post-acquisition period. 27%, instead, had negative 
ROA growth in the 3 years pre-acquisition, but then recovered and achieved positive growth in 
the post-acquisition period. On the contrary, 27% experiences the opposite path, they had 
positive ROA trend pre-acquisition but then their profitability’s growth got worse. Finally, 
another 27% had negative ROA trend before the deal and were not able to turn it into positive 
under a new owner. 
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Looking at absolute values, 79 companies out of 152 present a positive ROA trend in the 3 
years post-acquisition, while 73 companies show a negative trend. 
 
Table 26 Percentage of treated companies with positive and negative trend for ROA (3 years CAGR) 
pre- and post-M&A 
  ROA Trend Pre Negative ROA Trend Pre Positive 
ROA Trend Post Negative 21% 27% 
ROA Trend Post Positive 27% 25% 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author. Positive trend is defined as trend ≥ 0, negative trend is defined as trend <0. 
As we did for sales, Table 27 reports average ROA for each time period by treated units 
subgroups. Family firms have on average higher ROA, but the negative impact on acquisition 
year t is more pronounced than for non-family firms. Despite that, they recover and they 
conclude time t+3 overcoming pre-acquisition ROA levels. From table 24 it is clear that ROA 
differences between subgroups are less evident than sales differences. For example, service 
companies tend to exhibit higher ROA than manufacturing ones, but their values are much more 
fluctuant over years. Differently from sales, companies acquired by European acquirers seem 
to outperform their non-European counterparts in profitability measures, but as for sales, 
industrial acquirers confirm their superiority over financial ones and companies whereby the 
CEO is confirmed are more profitable. Finally, acquisitions directed at large companies prefer 
more profitable targets (3.11% vs 1.35% in t-1), even if small and medium enterprises show 
better post-acquisition results. 
Table 28 complements our analysis by sub-groups reporting the change in the 3-years average 
ROA before and after acquisition. Overall, ROA boosts from 1.3% to 1.66%, which equals a 
27.69% improvement. Family businesses and manufacturing companies benefit from the 
acquisition more than their counterparts, but non-family firms and those operating in the service 
industries still report a positive outcome. On the contrary, in all other subgroups, there is clearly 
a positive and negative category. Companies targeted by European and industrial acquirers 
experience an improvement in their profitability from assets, while non-European and financial 
acquirer not only perform worse, but they induce a negative result. Confirming already 
mentioned results, companies where the CEO is endorsed exhibit a positive improvement and 
SME get more efficient than large corporations do. 
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Table 27 ROA trend by subgroups 
  Treated 
firms 
Avg 
ROA 
T-3 
Avg 
ROA 
T-2 
Avg 
ROA 
T-1 
Avg 
ROA 
T 
Avg 
ROA 
T+1 
Avg 
ROA 
T+2 
Avg 
ROA 
T+3 
Total 137 1,45% 0,72% 1,74% 0,57% 1,90% 1,71% 1,36% 
Family Business 
Family Business 53 2,52% 0,54% 1,95% -2,10% 2,61% 1,99% 2,61% 
Non Family Business 61 0,53% 0,87% 1,55% 2,89% 1,28% 1,47% 0,29% 
Sector 
Manufacturing 63 1,28% 1,49% 0,78% 2,05% 1,73% 1,89% 1,54% 
Service 51 1,67% -0,24% 2,92% -1,26% 2,11% 1,49% 1,14% 
Acquirer's Region 
European Countries 70 1,38% 0,83% 1,82% 2,27% 2,90% 1,72% 1,44% 
Non-European Countries 44 1,57% 0,53% 1,61% -2,14% 0,31% 1,70% 1,25% 
Type of acquirer 
Industrial acquirer 104 1,64% 0,66% 1,50% 0,44% 1,91% 1,90% 1,44% 
Financial Acquirer 10 -0,52% 1,27% 4,24% 1,84% 1,79% -0,24% 0,56% 
CEO change 
CEO change 61 1,20% 0,30% 0,01% 1,03% 1,29% 1,69% 0,59% 
No-CEO change 53 1,74% 1,19% 3,73% 0,03% 2,59% 1,73% 2,25% 
SME vs Large companies 
SME   89 1,55% 0,46% 1,35% 0,18% 2,13% 1,84% 1,76% 
Large Companies 25 1,11% 1,62% 3,11% 1,94% 1,06% 1,26% -0,03% 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author.  
 
Table 28 3-years average ROA for the target firms before and after the M&A by a foreign company 
 Avg ROA Pre M&A Avg ROA Post M&A Difference (%) 
Total firms 1,30% 1,66% 27,69% 
Family Business 1,67% 2,40% 43,71% 
Non-Family Business 0,98% 1,01% 3,06% 
Manufacturing 1,18% 1,72% 45,76% 
Service 1,45% 1,58% 8,97% 
European 1,34% 2,02% 50,75% 
Non-European 1,23% 1,08% -12,20% 
Industrial acquirer 1,27% 1,75% 37,80% 
Financial Acquirer 1,66% 0,70% -57,83% 
CEO change 0,50% 1,19% 138,00% 
No-CEO change 2,22% 2,19% -1,35% 
SME 1,12% 1,91% 70,54% 
Large firms 1,95% 0,76% -61,03% 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author 
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3.3.7 Trend for EBITDA Margin  
EBITDA margin is the second measure of profitability we consider. While ROA provides 
information on how efficiently a company uses its assets, EBITDA margin is an assessment of 
a firm’s operating ability to generate earnings relative to its revenues. It is helpful in comparing 
the profitability of different companies while factoring out the effects of decisions related to 
financing and accounting. Figure 17 displays EBITDA margin trend over the 7-years period for 
all acquisitions in our treated group, distinguished by year of acquisition. At first sight it is clear 
how EBITDA margin tends to increase in the first year post-acquisition, but then decreases in 
years t+2 and years t+3. Despite that, final values in the third year post-acquisition are slightly 
above pre-acquisition values. 
 
Figure 17 Average pre and post- acquisition EBITDA Margin  
Source: Personal elaboration of the author 
 
Table 29 provides us data on pre and post-acquisition EBITDA margin trend. Companies in the 
treated sample equally distribute among the four possible cases. Specifically, looking at those 
companies that had positive EBITDA margin growth before the acquisition, 24% of total 
sample companies maintained this positive trend even after the entrance of a new foreign owner, 
while 32% of companies experienced a deterioration in their performance and reported a 
negative EBITDA margin trend post-acquisition. Conversely, 24% manifested the opposite 
trend, from negative pre-deal trend to positive post-deal trend. In 20% of cases, the ownership 
change was unable to turn a negative pre-acquisition trend into positive. Overall, 74 companies 
reported positive EBITA margin trend post-acquisition, 78 had negative trends. 
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Table 29 Percentage of treated companies with positive and negative trend for EBITDA Margin (3 years 
CAGR) pre- and post-M&A  
  
EBITDA margin Pre 
Negative 
EBITDA margin Pre 
 Positive 
EBITDA margin Trend Post Negative 20% 32% 
EBITDA margin Trend Post Positive 24% 24% 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author. Positive trend is defined as trend ≥ 0, negative trend is defined as trend<0. 
Table 30 presents average EBITDA margin by year and by sub-groups. Differences between 
family and non-family businesses are not pronounced, but family firms exhibit slightly higher 
values. Similarly, target industry and target size are not so relevant as well, as distinctions 
between Service-Manufacturing and SME-large companies do not strongly affect margins. On 
the contrary, acquirers’ characteristics are more impactful. In particular, targets acquired by 
European acquirers register much higher EBITDA margins than targets of non-European 
acquirers, and conclude the 3-years post-acquisition period with almost double average margins 
(10.08% vs 5.65%). The same is true for financial acquirers, which boost operating profitability 
of target companies more than industrial acquirers do. The preservation of the CEO role 
confirms its positive effect on target performance. 
To further investigate on EBITDA margin post-acquisition trends, Table 31 reports the change 
in average EBITDA margin 3-years pre and post-acquisition by subgroups. Considering the 
total treated group, the profitability index increases by 22.16%, from 7.49% to 9.15%. All sub-
groups present positive differences, signalling that the EBITDA margin improvement does not 
depend on firms’ characteristics but it is widely spread. The only negative difference can be 
observed with regards to companies in which the CEO changed after the acquisitions, which 
confirms its negative impact on corporate performance. 
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Table 30 EBITDA Margin trend by subgroups 
  
Treated 
firms 
Avg 
EBITDA 
Margin 
T-3 
Avg 
EBITDA 
Margin 
T-2 
Avg 
EBITDA 
Margin 
T-1 
Avg 
EBITDA 
Margin 
T 
Avg 
EBITDA 
Margin 
T+1 
Avg 
EBITDA 
Margin 
T+2 
Avg 
EBITDA 
Margin 
T+3 
Total 137 7,33% 7,31% 7,84% 7,89% 10,61% 8,54% 8,31% 
Family Business 
Family Business 53 6,48% 7,98% 8,56% 7,86% 10,82% 8,61% 8,49% 
Non Family Business 61 7,86% 6,90% 7,39% 7,92% 10,47% 8,50% 8,20% 
Sector 
Manufacturing 63 7,10% 7,38% 7,11% 7,77% 11,88% 8,96% 7,97% 
Service 51 7,65% 7,22% 8,84% 8,07% 8,83% 7,96% 8,77% 
Acquirer's Region 
European Countries 70 8,93% 8,64% 9,62% 8,25% 11,12% 8,93% 10,08% 
Non-European Countries 44 4,93% 5,32% 5,16% 7,36% 9,83% 7,96% 5,65% 
Type of acquirer 
Industrial acquirer 104 7,24% 7,12% 7,60% 7,87% 10,38% 8,36% 8,17% 
Financial Acquirer 10 10,64% 13,76% 15,85% 8,59% 18,17% 14,52% 12,77% 
CEO change 
CEO change 61 5,37% 5,28% 5,24% 7,40% 10,81% 7,47% 7,21% 
No-CEO change 53 9,26% 9,30% 10,38% 8,38% 10,41% 9,59% 9,38% 
SME vs Large companies 
SME   89 7,10% 6,68% 7,91% 7,85% 10,75% 8,27% 7,71% 
Large Companies 25 7,91% 8,87% 7,64% 8,01% 10,24% 9,21% 9,80% 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author 
 
Table 31 3-years average EBITDA Margin for the target firms before and after the M&A by a foreign 
company 
  Avg EBITDA Margin Pre 
M&A 
Avg EBIDA MArgin Post 
M&A 
Difference (%) 
Total firms (treated) 7,49% 9,15% 22,16% 
Family Business 7,67% 9,31% 21,38% 
Non-Family 
Business 
7,38% 9,05% 22,63% 
Manufacturing 7,20% 9,60% 33,33% 
Service 7,90% 8,52% 7,85% 
European 9,06% 10,04% 10,82% 
Non-European 5,14% 7,81% 51,95% 
Industrial Acquirer 7,32% 8,97% 22,54% 
Financial acquirer 13,42% 15,15% 12,89% 
CEO change  15,15% 8,50% -43,89% 
No-CEO change  9,65% 9,79% 1,45% 
SME 7,23% 8,91% 23,24% 
Large firms 8,14% 9,75% 19,78% 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author 
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3.4 Conclusions 
The precedent chapter presented the working methodology and some exploratory descriptive 
statistics on our treated group consisting of 152 Italian companies acquired by foreign owners 
in the 2011-2014 period. The results shown above seem to indicate a general improvement of 
acquired companies’ performance. Indeed, at the aggregate level sales increase by 5.7%, ROA 
by 27.69% and EBITDA margin by 22.16%. The disaggregation of treated units by targets and 
acquirers characteristics enables us to identify the determinants of these effects and examine 
whether some factors boost acquired companies performance more than others. For example, 
family firms exhibit higher sales and ROA growth than non-family firms, and a comparable 
EBITDA margin change. However, data shown above do not have the power and reliability to 
indicate that these positive effects are the results of foreign acquisitions. In other words, since 
they do not discriminate for pre-acquisition target companies characteristics, they mix the 
impact of the acquisition with the normal course of the business, which would have occurred 
even in the absence of an acquisition. To separate these two components and verify whether 
foreign acquisitions are beneficial or not for Italian acquired companies, a more sophisticated 
technique is needed. 
 
 
 4. CHAPTER 
MEASURING THE POST-ACQUISITION 
PERFORMANCE OF ITALIAN ACQUIRED FIRMS: 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS USING A DIFFERENCE-IN-
DIFFERENCE MATCHING APPROACH  
4.1 Introduction 
Cross-Border mergers and acquisitions have long been a popular strategy and represent an 
important opportunity for corporate growth. However, political and managerial feelings toward 
investments coming from abroad are often mixed. On one hand, foreign investments are 
considered a sign of the economic welfare of a country and an opportunity for Italian companies 
modernization and growth. At the same time, they are also perceived as a source of external 
dependence and failure of domestic entrepreneurship. The underlying doubt is whether 
foreigners are really “better owners” for Italian companies than Italian owners are. The ultimate 
research goal of this work is to answer these doubts with an empirical analysis based on a 
custom-built dataset of foreign acquisitions of Italian companies. 
Given the dataset introduction presented in Chapter 3, the following Chapter will illustrate in 
detail the empirical methodology, which makes use of difference-in-difference combined with 
coarsened exact matching. Paragraph 4.2 will provide a theoretical background to the 
methodology and show the rationale behind the empirical research. We will then illustrate the 
results we obtained on the effects of foreign ownership on post-acquisition sales, ROA and 
EBITDA margin, first for aggregate data (Paragraph 4.3) and then on treated units subgroups. 
Specifically, Paragraph 4.4 will focus on acquirers characteristics, being the acquirer country 
of origin (Europe vs non-Europe) and type of acquirer (Industrial vs Financial). Paragraph 4.5 
will then suggest how target characteristics may impact on post-acquisition results, namely 
target macro industry (service vs manufacturing), size (SME vs large companies) and 
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organizational change (CEO change vs non-CEO change). Finally, Paragraph 4.6 will 
specifically focus on family firms, controlling for the impact of some of the aforementioned 
features when the acquired company is family-owned. Results discussion, implications and 
limitations will then conclude the Chapter. 
 
 
4.2 The empirical methodology  
Our research goal is to determine whether Italian companies are better off when acquired by 
foreign investors. In other words, we would like to compare their observed post-acquisition 
performance under foreign owners with their eventual performance under Italian previous 
owners. As this last case is not observable, we build a counterfactual setting using as reference 
the performance of companies that remained domestic over the same time period. Applying a 
difference-in-difference (DID) technique, we compare the difference in average outcome before 
and after the acquisition (the treatment) of acquired firms (the treated group) with the difference 
in average outcome during the same time period for those firms remaining domestic (the control 
group). However, before applying the difference-in-difference technique, we need to overcome, 
or at least reduce, the problem of sample selection bias. Indeed, plants acquired by foreign 
investors are unlikely to be a random sample from the population of companies. Foreign owners 
may “cherry pick” best companies or “lemons grab” low-performing ones. Regardless the case, 
simply comparing pre and post-acquisition performance would overestimate the effect of the 
acquisition itself, which would take credits of pre-acquisition differences between acquired and 
non-acquired companies. To take this into consideration, we combine the difference-in-
difference approach with Coarsened Exact Matching, a matching technique that allows to 
identify firms that were not acquired but had similar characteristics to firms that were acquired 
by foreigners. The matching procedure eliminates differences between treated and control units 
based on observable pre-acquisition characteristics. The difference-in-differences matching 
estimator eliminates unobservable time-invariant differences between the treatment and control 
groups.  
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As mentioned in Chapter 3, we chose three accounting-based 12outcome variables: sales, Return 
on Assets and EBITDA Margin. The first two are widely accepted measures of post-acquisition 
performance, both in Italy and abroad. In particular, sales provide a quick insights on 
company’s growth and market share variations (Bentivogli & Mirenda, 2017; Buckley et al., 
2014; Chari et al., 2009; Chen, 2011; Feys & Manigart, 2010; ICE & Prometeia, 2014; Liu et 
al., 2017). ROA enables to investigate the profitability situation of acquired companies, with 
particular reference to how efficiently they use their assets to generate earnings (Chang et al., 
2013; Chari et al., 2009; Chen; 2011; Feys & Manigart, 2010; Fukao et al.; 2006). On the 
contrary, EBITDA margin is a not common variable in the International Business literature 
when it comes to cross-border M&As performance valuation. Nevertheless,  we  include  this  
ratio  since  it can add on our knowledge on the company’s operating profitability as it disregard 
the impact of decisions related to financial and accounting decisions.  
4.2.1 The difference-in-difference technique 
Difference-in-difference is a statistical technique used in econometrics and quantitative 
research in the social sciences. In contrast to time-series estimates of the treatment effect on 
subjects (which analyses differences over time) or cross-section estimates of the treatment 
effect (which measures the difference between treatment and control groups), difference-in-
difference uses panel data to measure the difference between the treatment and control groups 
of the change in the outcome variables that occur over time. This approach is well suited to 
estimate the effect of sharp changes in the economic environment or changes in government 
policy. Indeed, previous literature on foreign ownership acquisition did frequently adopt DID 
as well. Among studies mentioned in Chapter 1, Bentivogli and Mirenda (2017), Chang, Chung 
and & Moon (2013), Chari, Chen, and Dominguez (2009), Chen (2011), Fukao, Ito, Kwon and 
Takizawa (2006), Girma and Gorg (2007), ICE and Prometeia (2014), Karpaty (2007), Shim 
and Okamuro (2006) all applied a DID estimator to assess the impact of foreign ownership on 
different outcome variables.  
                                                 
 
12In this regard, the literature on M&As performance is divided in two large streams: those that study the acquisition 
performance in terms of market reactions (measuring Cumulative Abnormal Returns) and those that use 
accounting-based measures. The latter have more than one advantage over the former: first, they indicate what 
really happened, and not market players’ expectations on what could happen. Second, they allow to separately 
analyse different aspects of corporate performance, i.e. profitability, efficiency, growth, etc. 
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Difference-in-difference requires data measured from a treatment group and a control group at 
two or more different time periods, specifically at least one time period before "treatment" and 
at least one time period after "treatment." In our case, the difference-in-difference estimator is 
implemented on two time periods, pre and post-acquisition. Pre-acquisition values are given by 
the average of the 3-years before the acquisition, while post-acquisitions values are the average 
of the 3-years after the acquisition. In this way, we ease our calculations by comparing one pre-
acquisition value to one-post acquisition value. The treated group is exposed to a treatment in 
the second period but not in the first period. The control group is not exposed to the treatment 
in neither of the two periods. Outcomes of interests are sales, ROA and EBITDA margins. 
Figure 18 shows a graphical representation of the DID mechanism, assuming that the casual 
effect is constant across the treated group. The outcome variable is measured in the pre (𝐴𝑖) and 
post-treatment (𝐵𝑖) period, for both the treated (𝑌1) and control (𝑌0) group. 𝐵1 and 𝐵0 differ 
more than 𝐴1 and 𝐴0, but not the whole difference can be explained by the treatment, because 
treated and control groups did not start out at the same point in the pre-acquisition period. DID 
calculates the difference between the two groups that would have occurred if neither group 
experienced the treatment. In short, DID assumes that if the treatement did not occurred, the 
two groups would have experienced the same trend. Point 𝐶1 represents the counterfactual. 
Therefore, the treatement effect is the difference between the observed outcome (𝐵1) and 
counterfactual outcome (𝐶1).  
Formally, the observed outcome in Figure 18 can be written as: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (1) 
 
The outcome variable is denoted as 𝑌𝑖𝑡, where i indicates each observed unit and t indicates the 
time period. 𝑡 ∈ {𝑃𝑟𝑒, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡} represents the 3-years average outcome before the acquisition 
(“𝑃𝑟𝑒”) or following the acquisition (“𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡”). The coefficient 𝛼𝑖 captures all the specific 
characteristics of companies over time. 𝜆𝑡 indicates the full set of time effects of the model. 𝐹𝑖𝑡 
∈ {0, 1} is a dummy variable equal to 1 if unit i belongs to the treated group, 0 if it belongs to 
the control group. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents company-specific errors.  
Assuming that [E(𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝑖, 𝑡)] = 0, the DID estimator is equal to 
[E(Y1iPost) − E(Y1iPre)] −  [E(Y0iPost) − E(Y0iPre)] = 
[λPost − λPre + β] − [λPost −  λPre] =  β      (2) 
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?̂? represents the effect of the new foreign ownership on the target companies’ outcomes of 
interest, taking into account pre-existing differences between treated and control groups and 
general time trend.  
 
Figure 18 Graphical representation of the Difference-in-Difference estimator 
Source: Personal elaboration of the author 
 
The key assumption for any DID strategy is that the outcome in treatment and control group 
would follow the same time trend in the absence of the treatment. This fundamental 
assumption is commonly known as “common trend” (or “paraller path”). Only if the common 
trend assumption holds, we can safely state that the average change in the comparison group 
represents the counterfactual change in the treated group if there were no treatment13.  
Basically, the assumption underlying DID estimation is that, in the absence of the treatment, 
individual i’s outcome at time t is given by 
𝐸[𝑌0𝑖𝑡] = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡    (3) 
which means that outcomes depend additively on two effects, a common trend and a company 
fixed effect. This previous formula contains two implicit identifying assumptions. First, the 
selection bias relates to fixed characteristics of individuals (𝛼𝑖) and it is independent of time, 
meaning that the magnitude of the selection bias term does not change over time. Second, that 
                                                 
 
13
 Note that the common trend assumption does not mean that the there is no trend in the outcome variable during 
the pre-treatment era (just the same trend across groups) and it does not require that the level of the outcome 
variable for the two groups be same in the pre-treatment period. 
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the time trend (𝜆𝑡) is the same for the treated and the control group. These two conditions are 
necessary for identification in difference-in-difference estimation and constitute the common 
trend assumption. The following equality formally summarizes it: 
E[(Y0Post − Y0Pre)|F = 1] = E[(Y0Post − Y0Pre)|F = 0]        (4) 
 
The issue concerning the common trend assumption is that is it difficult to verify. Usually, 
pre-treatment data are compared to show that trends are the same, but even if pre-trends 
coincide, one still has to worry about other policies changing the same time. Moreover, in our 
specific case, the pre-treatment period is limited to 3 years, which does not allow us to 
empirically verify the assumption in the long-run. Figure 17, 18 and 19 in Appendix II 
illustrate the treated and control groups trends in outcome variables, sales, ROA and EBITDA 
margin. Although we cannot empirically support the parallel trend assumption for a long 
period due to a lack of balance sheet data before the acquisition  (i.e. we do not have data prior 
to 2008), we verified the assumption for each outcome of interest since 2008 to 2011. For all 
three outcome variables the common trend assumption is verified from 2010 to 2011. The 
trend of treated and control groups is parallel for the whole period 2008-2011 for sales, while 
it is similar but not exactly parallel for ROA and EBITDA margin. However, trends are similar 
enough to confidently support the parallel trend assumption and are more similar than in case 
of the original unmatched groups.  
In order to determine the difference-in-difference estimator β, we use a regression model in 
first-difference. Plugging in t=Pre, Post in equation (1), we get that the outcome variable of 
interest before and after the treatment is defined as 
𝑌𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡    (5) 
𝑌𝑖𝑃𝑟𝑒 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑃𝑟𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖𝑃𝑟𝑒     (6) 
 
The DID estimator can be obtained from the regression in first-difference starting from the 
two precedent equations:  
Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜆
′ + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + Δ𝜀𝑖      (7) 
 
where Δ𝑌𝑖 is the difference in the outcome of interests 𝑌𝑖; 
 𝛽 is the coefficient of interests which measures the treatment effect; 
𝜆′ is the difference between  𝜆𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 and 𝜆𝑃𝑟𝑒which captures the time effect of the model. 
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Using the statistical software Stata, we estimate Equation 7 including the cem_weights14 
variables generated by the CEM algorithm. The resulting ?̂? will represent the effect of foreign 
acquisition on each outcome of interest, isolated from any selection bias. We did not include 
any covariate Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡 in the regression to control for the remaining imbalance, since we do not 
have any time-varying that is not influenced by the treatment. Nevertheless, we already 
accounted for the most important covariates through the matching procedure.  
Equation 7 allows us to determine the effect of foreign acquisitions on sales, ROA and 
EBITDA margin for the whole treated group. We also performed some additional analysis on 
sub-groups. We were thus able to examine the differences between Family or Non-Family 
businesses, macro-industry (manufacturing vs services), size (SME vs large companies), type 
of acquirer (industrial vs financial), acquirer’s region (European vs Non-European) and 
organizational change (CEO change vs non-CEO change). To test for these differences we 
adapted Equation 7 adding an interaction term, as illustrated in the following paragraphs.  
 
4.2.2 Coarsened Exact Matching  
As previously pointed out, applying a difference-in-difference estimator simply comparing 
treated and control groups’ average effects as they are would likely result in a biased estimate. 
The average effect would be assigned entirely to the treatment, without taking into 
consideration pre-acquisition differences between acquired and non-acquired companies. To 
overcome the problem of sample selection bias, we first apply Coarsened Exact Matching to 
eliminate observable differences between the two subgroups. 
The goal of matching is, for every treated unit, to find one (or more) non-treated unit(s) with 
similar observable characteristics against whom the effect of the treatment can be assessed. By 
matching treated units to similar non-treated units, matching enables to estimate the effect of 
                                                 
 
14
 The CEM procedure adds three new variables to the original dataset every time the CEM command runs. The 
new variables are  
• cem_strata: The stratum to which each case was assigned by CEM. 
• cem_matched: Indicates whether or not this observation was matched. This variable is coded 0 (not matched) and 
1 (matched). 
• cem_weights: Provides weights for each case based on the most recent matching solution. The weight is specific 
to stratum to which the case has been assigned and representative of the proportion of all members present in the 
stratum. Unmatched cases have a weight of 0. 
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the treatment reducing bias due to confounding so that the remaining observations have better 
balance between the treated and the control groups. To do so, matching techniques compare the 
distribution of covariates (𝑋𝑖𝑡−1) between treated and control units. In general terms, covariates 
are characteristics of units subjected to a treatment, which may affect the outcome of the 
experiment. Having a better balance between the treated and control groups means that the 
empirical distribution of the covariates in the two groups are more similar. 
Many matching methods exist. They differ in how they define the “similarity” between treated 
and control units. On one extreme, exact matching matches a treated unit to all the control units 
with the same covariates value. The result is a perfectly balanced, but often small, data sample. 
In fact, because of the richness of covariates, the method often produces very few matches. To 
overcome this shortcoming, many approximate methods have been developed. Approximate 
matching methods specify a metric to find control units that are close to treated units. This 
metric is often the Mahalanobis distance or the propensity score, which measures the probability 
of being treated, conditional on the covariates. A problem with this type of solutions is that they 
are very time consuming; they require the user to set the size of the matching solution ex ante, 
and then check for balance ex post. Thus analysts must check for balance after the algorithm is 
finished, then re-specify a matching model and recheck balance, etc. This process repeats until 
the user obtains an acceptable amount of balance. Despite that, propensity score matching is 
very diffused.  
CEM is a relatively new procedure elaborated by Iacus, King and Porro (2009) which is 
designed to reduce imbalance and improve casual inference. CEM is part of a general class of 
methods termed “monotonic imbalance bounding” (MIB), which has beneficial statistical 
properties as compared to prior “equal percent bias reducing” (EPRB) models of which 
propensity score matching and Mahalanobis distance are examples. In MIB methods, the 
balance between the treated and the control group is chosen ex ante by the user rather than being 
discovered after the algorithm has finished through the laborious process of checking and 
readjusting the matching several times. 
The central motivation for CEM is that while exact matching provides perfect balance, it 
typically produces few matches. To overcome this issue, CEM temporality coarsen each 
variable into substantively meaningful groups, perform exact match on these coarsened data, 
and then retain only the original (uncoarsened) values for matched data to perform additional 
analyses. 
Formally, the CEM algorithm works as follow (Blackwell, Iacus, King & Porro, 2009): 
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1. Begin with the covariates 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 and make a copy, which we denote as 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1
∗  
2. Coarsen 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1
∗  according to user-defined cut points or CEM’s automatic binning 
algorithm. 
3. Create one stratum per unique observation of 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1
∗ , and place each observation in a 
stratum. 
4. Assign these strata to the original data, 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1, and drop any observation whose stratum 
does not contain at least one treated and one control unit. 
Once completed, these strata are the foundations for calculating the treatment effect. 
As highlighted in point 2, the user may rely on CEM’s automatic binning algorithm or define 
data customized cut points to coarsen each covariate. More coarsening (larger bins) will result 
in fewer strata, which means that more diverse observations are grouped together within the 
same strata. The number of matched units will be greater, but treated-control groups imbalance 
will be higher as well. The lower the number of bins, the more CEM gets closer to exact 
matching, which results in low imbalance but also in a more reduced data set to calculate the 
treatment effect. It is important to notice that CEM prunes both treated and control units to build 
a matched dataset with balanced distribution, meaning lower confounding and selection bias.  
Iacus, King and Porro (2012) show that CEM possesses a wide range of statistical properties 
not available in most other matching methods, but it is at the same time exceptionally easy to 
comprehend and use. By choosing the coarsening ex ante, users can control the amount of 
imbalance in the matching solution, before running the effective matching command. This 
means that it does not require a separate step prior to matching, where data are restricted to the 
region of common empirical support of the treated and control units. The CEM command 
automatically identifies the region of common empirical support and perform matching in one 
unique command. CEM dominates commonly used existing matching methods (e.g. propensity 
score and Mahalanobis matching) in its ability to reduce imbalance, model dependence, 
estimation error, bias, variance, mean square error, and other criteria. 
In our case, the purpose of matching is to pair each foreign acquired company with a remained-
domestic one, in such a way that the domestic company’s sales, ROA and EBITDA margin 
dynamics can be studied to generate the counterfactual for the foreign owned units. To do so, 
the first step is the choice of the covariates to match treated and control groups. Such choice is 
affected by the empirical literature and by the user’s knowledge on the factors that may affect 
the outcome of interest. Second, a reasonable coarsening for each covariate 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 should be 
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selected. The CEM command can work as an automated binning algorithm which automatically 
selects a coarsening for each variable. However, a customized coarsening is often advisable. In 
general, we want to set the coarsening for each variable such that substantively 
indistinguishable values are grouped and assigned the same numerical value. Groups may be of 
different sizes if appropriate. To efficiently determine the cut points for coarsening, the user 
should rely on its knowledge of data, of the measurement scale of each variable and the 
empirical distribution of it. The CEM command provides difference matching according to the 
coarsened selected, and even a decimal point may have a considerable impact on results. Of 
course, the more coarsening we allow, the more matched units we will have, but also higher 
imbalance. 
4.2.3 Basic evaluation and analysis of unmatched data 
To introduce our analysis, we first present DID estimation of unmatched data to show what 
happens in case treated and control units covariates’ distributions are not balanced.  
Our unmatched data sample it made by 152 treated units and 238.261 control units. A dummy 
𝐹𝑖𝑡 signals whether unit i belongs to the treated or to the control group. The (unadjusted and 
therefore likely biased) DID can be found by a simple linear regression of Δ𝑌𝑖 on the treatment. 
Tables 32, 33 and 34 show Stata’s outputs for the three dependent variables, sales, ROA and 
EBITDA margin. Foreign ownership has a non-significant effect on all three outcomes of 
interest. The effect on sales (Table 32) is positive and non-significant (B=1950.96; t=0.88; 
p>0.1). The effect on ROA (Table 33) is positive and non-significant (B=0.0269; t= 0.95; 
p>0.1). The effect on EBITDA margin ( Table 34) is positive and non-significant (B=0.0283; 
t= 0.05; p>0.1). 
 
Table 32 DID estimation on unmatched data through a regression model: output variable Sales   
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Table 33 DID estimation on unmatched data through a regression model: output variable ROA   
 
 Table 34 DID estimation on unmatched data through a regression model: output variable EBITDA 
margin  
 
However, because the treatment was not randomly assigned, the pre-treatment covariates differ 
between the treated and control group. Without matching, the two distributions remain highly 
imbalanced. To see this, we compute the ℒ1 statistic, introduced by Iacus, King and Porro 
(2012) as a comprehensive measure of global imbalance. It is based on the 𝐿1 difference 
between the multidimensional histogram of all pre-treatment covariates in the treated group and 
the same in the control group. ℒ1 varies between 0 and 1; ℒ1 = 0 indicates perfect global 
balance, while ℒ1 = 1 indicates complete separation between the two distributions. The 
goodness of a matching solution can be valued on ℒ1 reduction. Indeed, unmatched results do 
also serve to valuate improvements in covariates’ balance. The ℒ1statistic measure of 
unmatched data acts as a reference point for all following matching. To compute it, we use the 
imbalance command in Stata: 
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Where mean_sales_pre indicates average sales from t-3 to t-1, mean_roa_pre  is average ROA 
from t-3 to t-1, mean_ebitdam_pre is the average EBITDA margin from t-3  to  t-1,  
ateco073digit  is the 3-digit ATECO 2007 code and  maeeffectivedateyear  stands for the 
acquisition year (for the treated units) and the availability of balance sheet data for the analysis 
(for control units).  
The ℒ1 statistic of 0.9649 indicates that there is an extremely high-level imbalance between the 
two groups, with ℒ1 really close to 1 which stands for complete separation. As pointed out, this 
0.9649 is not valuable on its own, but as reference point for any matching procedure. In fact, 
the CEM commands provides a table similar to the above one, which indicates the level of 
imbalance of matched units given the chosen coarsening. Once we have a matching solution, 
we will compare its ℒ1 value to 0.9649 and gauge the increase in balance due to the CEM 
solution from that difference. 
The first column in the output table that is labelled L1 is the ℒ1 statistic for each one of the 
variables (not including interactions). The second column in the table labelled “mean,” reports 
the difference in means between treated and untreated units. The remaining columns in the table 
report the difference in the quantiles of the distributions of the two groups for the 0th (min), 
25th, 50th, 75th, and 100th (max) percentiles for each variable (Blackwell et al., 2009). These 
values are useful to determine in which part of the distribution variables are unbalanced. For 
example, mean_sales_pre is imbalanced in the raw data in many ways. This points out that 
balancing only the means between the treated and the control groups does not necessarily 
guarantee balance in the rest of the distribution. Most important, of course, is the overall  ℒ1 
measure, because even if the marginal distribution of every variable is perfectly balanced, the 
joint distribution can still be highly imbalanced (Blackwell et al., 2009). 
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4.2.4 Matched data 
Given the reference point of unmatched results and imbalance, we applied Coarsened Exact 
Matching several times and analysed the goodness of each matching solution. Covariates used 
for matching are both continuous and dichotomous, namely15: 
 ateco073digit is the 3-digit ATECO 2007 code, to match treated and control units 
operating in the same sector and control for industry-related factors; 
 mean_sales_pre: average 3-years pre-acquisition sales, to control for size related 
factors; 
 mean_roa_pre and mean_ebitdam_pre: average 3-years pre-acquisition ROA and 
EBITDA margin, to control for financial performance and profitability; 
 maeffectivedateyear: M&A year for treated units and the year signalling the availability 
of financial statements for control units, to match same time period data. 
 
Each covariate’s coarsening has been designed according to our knowledge of data and the 
variable’s empirical distribution. The goal is to maximize the number of matched units to 
preserve dataset information, while minimizing the value of the ℒ1 statistic. Variables 
ateco073digit and maeffectivedateyear are not coarsened to impose exact matching on these 
two dimensions. In this way, treated units are matched only with control units operating in the 
same industry and with same period data (meaning that companies acquired in time t are 
matched with control units that have data from t-3 to t+3). Sales are coarsened based on ISTAT 
classification in micro-firms (sales<€ 2 million), small firms (sales< €10million), medium firms 
(€10million <sales< €50million) and large companies (sales> €50million). ROA and EBITDA 
margin are coarsened based on their distribution between the two groups (e.g. looking at their 
percentiles) and trying to preserve relevant information, for example imposing 0 as cut points 
so that companies with positive (negative) values are not matched with companies with negative 
(positive) values. 
 
                                                 
 
15 Sales, ROA and EBITDA margin are both outcome variables and covariates. The average of the 3-years pre-
acquisition is used in the matching procedure as covariate, the average of the 3-years post-acquisitions is used in 
the DID regressions as outcome variable. 
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Table 35 reports the matching summary. Out of 12785 combinations, only 124 have at least one 
treated company and one control company in it (i.e. matched strata). The ℒ1 statistic is equal to 
0.381, which shows a great improvement compared to the unmatched reference point (0.9649). 
This reduction in imbalance comes at the cost of a reduced dataset as 26 units in the treated 
sample have not been matched with any control unit. 
Table 35 Matching summary (CEM) 
 
4.3 Empirical results: matched sample 
Given the Coarsened Exact Matching presented in Table 35, we can now estimate the effect of 
foreign acquisition with a Difference-in-Difference approach, free of selection bias. We will 
first conduct an analysis of the three outcomes of interest, sales, ROA and EBITDA margin on 
the aggregate data. Further, we will disaggregate these effects by matched data sub-groups to 
dig into what factors drive the aggregate effect. In particular, we will separately investigate the 
effects of targets and acquirers’ characteristics, the former being macro-sector (Manufacturing 
vs Service), size (SME vs Large companies) and organizational change (CEO change vs Not-
CEO change), the latter being acquirers origin (European vs non-European; Latin Europe vs 
Other countries) and type of acquirer (Industrial vs Financial). Finally, Paragraph 4.6 will 
present our results on family businesses, by applying some of the just mentioned distinctions 
and verify when and how the effect of these factors change in presence of a family leading the 
business.  
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4.3.1 Sales 
Academic literature results on foreign acquisitions’ effect on target sales are mixed, but leaning 
to a positive effect. Bentivogli and Mirenda (2017), Buckley et al. (2014), Chen (2011), ICE 
and Prometeia (2014) and Liu et al. (2017) observe a positive effect on sales growth following 
the acquisition. Conversely, the opposite result is observed by Chari et al. (2009) and Feys and 
Manigart (2010). Chen (2011) finds no significant effects on sales. 
Table 36 shows Stata’ output of a first-difference regression analysis of sales on the treatment 
(where dsales16 = Δsales). The model supports a positive effect of foreign ownership on sales 
(B=14144.11), however it is not statistically significant (t=1.19; p>0.1). 
 
Table 36 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable Sales 
 
Our results do not confirm precedent studies conducted in Italy by Bentivogli and Mirenda 
(2017) and ICE and Prometeia (2014), who show that foreign ownership effect on sales is 
statistically significant, despite indicating different magnitude (Bentivogli and Mirenda register 
a 7% increase, while ICE and Prometeia a 2.8%). On the contrary, our results seem to suggest 
that foreign owners are not better than domestic owners in boosting company’s growth. A 
possible explanation may be that foreign owners might be not interested in targets’ sales 
potential, but in acquiring its know-how and capabilities. Or, new reporting and control 
structure imposed by the foreign owner result in higher bureaucracy, reducing flexibility and 
                                                 
 
16 The variables dsales, droa and debitdam presented in this and the following paragraphs are built as the difference 
between average outcome variables in the 3-years post acquisition and average outcome variable in the 3-years 
pre-acquisition. 
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thereby scaling down sales (Feys & Manigart, 2010). Moreover, considering that Bentivogli 
and Mirenda (2017) find that the greatest effects in net sales emerge 3 years after the takeover, 
our 3-years time frame may be not sufficient to detect a significant positive effect in sales and 
an extended time horizon could be preferable. 
4.3.2 ROA 
Similarly to sales, we do not find a significant effect of foreign acquisitions on target companies 
Return on Assets. The first-difference regression analysis of ROA on the treatment shown in 
Table 37 (where droa = ΔROA) reveals that foreign ownership has a negative and non-
significant effect on ROA (B= -0.0083; t= -0.21; p>0.1). 
 
Table 37 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable ROA 
 
In this regard, literature results are mixed. Thanos and Papadakis (2012)’s review of studies 
using ROA as a measure of M&A performance indicate that acquisitions on average deteriorate 
financial performance. In Italy, Crinò and Onida (2008) find that companies owned by 
multinationals exhibit lower ROA. On the other side, Chang et al. (2013), Chari et al. (2009), 
Chen (2011), Feys and Manigart (2010) and Fukao et al. (2006) find a positive effect of foreign 
ownership on Return on Assets. However, it is worth noticing that Chari et al. (2009), Chen 
(2011) and Fukao et al. (2006) observe that ROA improvements manifest only from the third 
post-acquisition year on, while in the first years target companies experience a profitability 
decline. Such pattern is consistent with improvements in firm-efficiency and restructuring 
activities that generate beneficial effects just after the third year.  Possible  explanations for 
lower ROA could  be MNEs’  transfer  of  profits  in  more  fiscally  convenient  locations,  
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higher  international competition which forces to limit price margins, or lower incentives to 
reinvest earning to push growth due to large recourse of intra-firm loans (Crinò & Onida, 2008).  
4.3.3 EBITDA Margin 
EBITDA margin is not commonly used in the literature on foreign M&As effects on targets’ 
performance. However, given its usefulness in comparing companies’ operational performance, 
we included it as an outcome of interest. Crinò and Onida (2008) are the only ones using this 
ratio to compare the performance of foreign acquired companies with that of domestic 
companies. They find that both groups present a positive increase in EBITDA margin in the 
period considered, but MNEs controlled companies underperform domestic ones. Bertrand and 
Zitouna (2008) analyse French foreign-acquired companies and do not find a significant effect 
on EBITDA, which means that foreign owners do not significantly increase profits.  
In order to analyse the effect of foreign-acquisition on EBITDA margin, we performed a first-
difference regression analysis (Table 38). The relationship is negative and statistically 
significant at a 95% confidence interval (B= -0.2222; t= -2.31; p<0.05). This result lead us to 
conclude that the entry of a foreign owner determines a deterioration in the acquired company 
profitability, confirming the negative (despite non-significant) effect of ROA mentioned above 
(Table 37). This negative outcome might be the result of inefficiencies linked to the integration 
between the acquirer and target processes, which is further complicated by the fact the two 
companies have different cultural backgrounds. Moreover, as hypothesized for ROA, 
improvements in firm efficiency and restructuring activities may take time to manifest their 
expected positive outcomes. To a certain extent, some short-term operational losses may be 
physiological and unavoidable. More than in the other cases, an extension of the analysed time 
period could be valuable to understand whether this deterioration is temporary or it is a signal 
of steady operational inefficiency. Moreover, we should not forget that EBITDA margin has 
some limitations; for example, it ignores changes in working capital, which is usually needed 
in growing a business and it does not take into account capital expenditures to replace assets on 
the balance sheet.  
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Table 38 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable EBITDA margin 
4.4 Empirical results based on acquirers’ characteristics 
4.4.1 Acquirers’ region of origin 
Hypothesis 1 (Paragraph 3.2) proposes that cultural distance is negatively associated with post-
acquisition performance. To test this hypothesis, we include in Equation 7 a new variable 
representing acquirer’s origin.  
In order to control for cultural distance, we apply Ronen and Shenkar (2013)’s cluster map 
(Figure 19). Their model is based on the concept of frictions, which denote the difficulties in 
interaction between people and organizations belonging to different cultures. In particular, 
based on countries’ similarities in language, religion and geography, they empirically derive a 
clusterization of 70 analysed national cultures into 11 clusters. Their contribution has been 
particularly valuable in the internationalization theory, as it suggests that companies belonging 
to the same cultural cluster should face lower difficulties in interaction.  
We also performed a second analysis based on the pure concept of geographic distance, 
distinguishing between European and non-European acquirers. Despite not answering to our 
hypothesis on cultural distance, this distinction can still be valuable as it takes into consideration 
the lower regulatory and trade obstacles European acquirers have.  
 
Measuring the post-acquisition performance of Italian acquired firms: empirical results using a difference-in-difference 
matching approach 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
123 
Figure 19 Ronen and Shenkar’s cluster map 
Source: Ronen, S, & Shenkar, O., 2013 
 
4.4.1.1 Acquirers based in Latin Europe vs other countries 
According to Ronen and Shenkar (2013)’s model, Italy is located in the Latin Europe cluster 
which includes France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland (French-speaking) and Israel. Given 
𝐿𝐸𝑖  equal to 1 if the acquirer is based in Latin Europe and equal to 0 if the acquirer is not based 
in Latin Europe, the equation used to estimate the effect of foreign M&As on the outcome of 
interest is 
Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜆
′ + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐿𝐸𝑖) + Δ𝜀𝑖    (9) 
Out of 126 matched treated companies, 24 have been acquired by Latin-European companies 
and 102 by firms located in other countries. 
We performed a first-difference regression analysis on sales to investigate the effect of foreign 
ownership according to acquirers’ provenience from Latin Europe17 countries or not (Table 39). 
The model shows a non-significant effect on sales (p-value=0.3220>0.1). In both cases, the 
effect is positive (respectively B=18148.85 and B=13201.82) and non-significant (p>0.1).  
                                                 
 
17 Note: the command “lincom” that we use in this paragraph and in the following ones test hypotheses on linear 
combination of regression coefficients. With interactions effects, it is necessary to construct hypotheses tests and 
confidence intervals on linear combinations of regression coefficients. In this specific case, the estimated effect of 
foreign acquisition by a European acquirer is given by the combination of β and 𝛿. 
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Table 40 shows the regression analysis indicated in Equation 9 on ROA. Overall, the model (p-
value>0.1) does not show a statistically significant relationship between the dependent and the 
independent variables. However, when the acquirer comes from a Latin Europe country, the 
effect of foreign ownership is negative and significant (B=-0.0655; t=-1.78; p<0.1). On the 
contrary, the effect is positive but non-significant for companies acquired by non-Latin Europe 
MNEs (B=0.0051; t=0.11; p>0.1). 
 
Table 41 shows Stata’s output of a first-difference regression analysis on EBITDA margin. The 
model’s p-value (0.0518) is lower than 0.1 and indicates a significant effect of the independent 
variables in explaining EBITDA margin. Latin-Europe acquirers exhibit a negative (B= -
0.1788) and significant effect at a 90% confidence interval (t=-1.67; p<0.1) on EBITDA 
margin. Non-Latin Europe acquirers show a negative (B= -0.2324) and significant effect at a 
95% confidence interval (t=-2.09; p<0.05).  
 
Table 39 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable Sales (Latin 
European vs Other Acquirers)  
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Table 40 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable ROA (Latin 
European vs Other Acquirers) 
 
Table 41 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable EBITDA Margin (Latin 
European vs Other Acquirers)  
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4.4.1.2 European vs non-European acquirers 
Out of 126 matched treated companies, 78 have been acquired by European companies and 48 
by non-European companies. Among the latter, United States acquirers are prevailing. 
Given 𝐸𝑈𝑖 equal to 1 if the acquirer is European and equal to 0 if the acquirer is non-European, 
the equation used to estimate the effect of the foreign M&A on the outcome of interests is: 
 
Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜆
′ + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐸𝑈𝑖) + Δ𝜀𝑖    (8) 
 
Table 42 shows the results of a first-difference regression analysis to investigate the relationship 
between foreign ownership and sales, distinguishing between European and non-European 
acquirers. The effect on sales is positive but non-significant for both subgroups. Foreign 
ownership by a European investor has a positive but non-significant effect (B=12800.4; t=1.06; 
p>0.1). Foreign ownership by a non-European investor has a positive but non-significant effect 
as well (B=16327.64; t=1.35; p>0.1).  
 
Table 42 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable Sales (European 
vs non-European Acquirers) 
 
We also performed a first-difference regression analysis to investigate the effect of foreign 
ownership on ROA, distinguishing between European and non-European acquirers (Table 43). 
The model has a p-value lower than 0.05 and shows a negative and statistically significant 
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relationship between foreign ownership by non-European acquirer and ROA (B= -0.0676; t= -
2.58; p=0.01). On the contrary, foreign ownership by a European investor does not exhibit a 
significant effect on sales (B=0.0281; t=0.5; p>0.1). 
Table 44 shows Stata’s output for a first-difference regression analysis of EBITDA margin on 
the treatment, when the acquirer is European or not. Differently to ROA, in this case it is foreign 
ownership by a European acquirer that shows a negative and significant effect (B=-0.2569; t=-
2.1; p<0.05). Foreign ownership by non-European acquirer does not show a statistically 
significant effect on EBITDA margin (B=-0.1657; t=-1.28; p>0.1).  
 
Table 43 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable ROA (European vs 
non-European Acquirers) 
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Table 44 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable EBITDA margin 
(European vs non-European Acquirers) 
 
4.4.2 Type of acquirers: industrial vs financial acquirers 
A further differentiation on acquirers’ characteristics regards acquirers’ core business. We 
distinguish between industrial acquirers (e.g. suppliers, customers, competitors, playing in 
related or unrelated industries) and financial acquirers (e.g. private equity, venture capitalists, 
hedge funds, etc.). The distinction may be particularly relevant given the different focus these 
two type of players have and their decision-making drivers. Industrial buyers typically engage 
in M&As to extract value from synergies. Their goal is to find compatible companies which 
can synergistically integrate in their business (in terms of know-how, capabilities, technologies, 
product offering, etc.) to improve their P&L performance. On the contrary, financial buyers are 
in the business of making investments; they will not integrate the target company in their 
corporate structure, they are interested just in its growth opportunity and cash generating ability 
to enhance its value and earn from its future sale in a 5 to 10-years period. Therefore, their 
approach toward the acquisition and following management policies are extremely different.  
Out of our 126 matched companies, only 11 have been acquired by financial buyers, whereas 
115 have been targeted by industrial acquirers. This large disproportion in our matched dataset 
reflects the wider tendency in the Italian Private Equity and Venture Capital market in the 
period of analysis. According to AIFI (Associazione Italiana del Private Equity, del Venture 
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Capital e Private Debt), in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 foreign capital was 21%, 11%, 26% and 
44% of total capital raised, respectively. The increment in 2014 marked a raise in foreign 
investments in Italy in the following years, which represented 35% of total raised capital on 
average in the period 2015-2018. Consequently, our dataset is affected by the scarcity of data 
in the period of analysis (AIFI, 2018). 
Equation 10 provides our first-difference model. Let 𝐼𝐴𝑖  be a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
target has been acquired by an industrial buyer and equal to 0 if it has been acquired by a 
financial buyer: 
Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜆
′ + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐼𝐴𝑖) + Δ𝜀𝑖                  (10) 
 
We performed a first-difference regression analysis in Stata (Table 45) in order to analyse the 
relationship between foreign ownership and sales, distinguishing for industrial and financial 
acquirers. The result show that foreign ownership is not statistically significant for sales (p-
value>0.1). Both type of acquirers are associated to a positive (B=14506.51 and B=10355.4, 
respectively) but non-significant effect on sales (t=1.21; p>0.1 and t=0.86; p>0.1, respectively). 
Table 46 shows the results of a first-difference regression analysis of ROA on the treatment for 
industrial and financial acquirer. The model’s p-value=0.07 signals a statistically significant 
relationship between ROA and the independent variables. In particular, the effect is negative 
and significant for companies acquired by financial buyers (B=-0.1273; t=-2.24; p<0.05), while 
it is positive but non-significant for companies acquired by industrial buyers (B=0.0030; t=0.07; 
p>0.1).  
Table 47 regards EBITDA margin first-difference regression. The model reveals a statistically 
significant relationship between EBITDA margin and the independent variables, foreign 
acquisition and type of acquirer. Specifically, the effect is negative and significant for both type 
of acquirers (B= -0.1525 for industrial buyers, B= -0.9502 for financial buyers). Companies 
acquired by industrial buyers show a negative effect significant at a 90% confidence interval 
(t= -1.67; p>0.1), while the effect for companies acquired by financial buyers does show an 
even stronger significance at a 95% confidence interval (t= -2.11; p<0.05).   
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Table 45 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable Sales (industrial vs 
financial acquirers) 
 
Table 46 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable ROA (industrial vs 
financial acquirers) 
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Table 47 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable EBITDA margin 
(industrial vs financial acquirers)  
 
 
4.5 Empirical results based on acquired companies’ characteristics 
4.5.1 Target macro-industry: Manufacturing vs Service companies 
Out of 126 matched companies, 72 belongs to the manufacturing sector and 54 to the service 
sectors. Let 𝑀𝑖 be a dummy variable equal to 1 when the company operates in manufacturing 
and equal to 0 when the company operates in service sectors. Then, the model to determine the 
effect of foreign ownership, distinguishing for target macro-industry is 
Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜆
′ + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑀𝑖) + Δ𝜀𝑖    (11)  
 
We performed a first-difference regression analysis to assess the effect of foreign ownership on 
sales, controlling for target industry. Results are shown in Table 48. The model does not present 
a statistically significant relationship between sales and the independent variables. Both 
acquired companies operating in the manufacturing sector (B=14449.13; t=1.19; p>0.1) and 
services (B=13737.42; t=1.15; p>0.1) show a non-significant positive effect on sales. 
Table 49 reports the same regression analysis conducted on ROA as independent variable. The 
p-value of the model (0.3857) indicates its low quality and non-significant effect on ROA. 
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However, the two subgroups present opposite effects. Companies operating in the 
manufacturing industry report a negative and non-significant effect on ROA (B= -0.0341; t= -
1.24; p>0.1), while companies in the service sector report a positive and non-significant effect 
(B= 0.0261; t=0.34; p>0.1).  
Table 50 shows the Stata’s output of a first-difference regression analysis on EBITDA margin. 
The p-value of the model (0.0707) reveals a significant effect of the independent variables on 
EBITDA margin. In particular, when the target operates in the manufacturing industry, foreign 
ownership has a negative and significant effect (B= -0.2563; t=-2.02; p<0.05). On the contrary, 
when it operates in the service industry, the effect is negative but non-significant (B=-0.1766; 
t=-1.42; p>0.158).  
 
Table 48 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable Sales 
(Manufacturing vs Services) 
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Table 49 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable ROA 
(Manufacturing vs Services) 
 
 
 
 
Table 50 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable EBITDA margin 
(Manufacturing vs Services) 
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4.5.2 Target size: SME vs Large companies 
In order to define small, medium and large companies, we follow ISTAT classification of Italian 
enterprises based on total revenues. Therefore, small companies are those that have less than 
€10million revenues, medium companies are those that have total revenues in the €10-
€50million range, and large companies are those that have more than €50million revenues. The 
measure of sales taken into consideration is average sales 3-years pre-acquisition. 
Out of 126 matched companies, 100 are SME and 26 are large companies. Let 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑖 be a 
dummy equal to 1 when the company is a SME and equal to 0 when it is a large company. Then 
our model is:  
Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜆
′ + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐸𝑈𝑖) + Δ𝜀𝑖    (12) 
 
We first performed a first-difference regression analysis to assess the effect of foreign 
ownership on sales when the target company was a SME or a large company at the moment of 
the acquisition. Table 51 shows the Stata result. The model has a p-value greater than 0.1 and 
does not show a statistically significant relationship between sales and the independent 
variables. Specifically, the effect is positive and non-significant for both SME (B= 12658.92; 
t=1.07; p>0.1) and large companies (B=19856.39; t=1.38; p>0.1).  
Table 52 shows the result of a first-difference regression analysis on ROA. Similarly to sales, 
the model p-value (0.7648) does not allow us to conclude that ROA is significantly explained 
by the independent variables. The effect on ROA is negative and non-significant both when the 
target company is a SME (B= -.0046; t= -0.10; p>0.1) and when it is a large company (B= -
0.0229; t= -0.72; p>0.1). 
Finally, we looked at EBITDA margin (Table 53), performing the same regression analysis as 
the two precedent cases to verify whether the independent variables are statistically significant 
in explaining the profitability measure. The model p-value (0.0702) allows us to accept this 
hypothesis. However, the effect on EBITDA margin is only significant for small and medium 
enterprises (B= -0.2650; t= -2.31: p<0.05), while is not significant for large companies (B= -
0.0576; t=-0.91; p-value>0.1).  
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Table 51 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable Sales (SMEs vs 
large companies)  
 
Table 52 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable ROA (SMEs vs 
large companies) 
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Table 53 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable EBITDA Margin 
(SMEs vs large companies) 
 
4.5.3 Organizational change: CEO change vs CEO confirmation  
Hypothesis 2 discusses how organizational change, and specifically CEO change, may exert 
different effects on the post-acquisition performance of acquired companies. Hypothesis 2a 
suggests that CEO change is positively associated to post-acquisition performance as it triggers 
a faster implementation of integration plans and supports the pace of change. Conversely, 
Hypothesis 2b is based on the opposite reasons and suggests that CEO change is negatively 
related to post-acquisition performance as it likely leads to disorder and employees’ resistance. 
In order to verify which ones of the two hypothesis is empirically demonstrated by our data, we 
include in our model a dummy variable, 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖, equal to 1 when the target’s CEO changes or is 
flanked following the acquisition and equal to 0 when the target’ CEO does not change. Our 
model does become: 
Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜆
′ + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖) + Δ𝜀𝑖   (13) 
 
In out matched dataset of 126 companies, 68 experienced a CEO change following the 
acquisition, whereas in 58 cases the target’s CEO was confirmed.  
We performed a first-difference regression analysis to assess whether foreign ownership is 
statistically significant in explaining sales, distinguishing for CEO change or CEO confirmation 
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(Table 54). The model’s p-value (0.4792) indicates that there is not a statistically significant 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The effect is positive and non-
significant for both companies whereby the CEO changed (B=13827.63; t=1.14; p>0.1) and 
where the CEO did not (B=14515.15; t=1.21; p>0.1). 
Table 55 shows Stata’s output for first-difference regression analysis on ROA. Similarly to 
sales, the model is not statistically significant in explaining ROA. Despite that, the effect is 
negative and significant for companies that experienced a CEO change (B= -0.0496; t= -1.73; 
p<0.1), whereas it is positive but non-significant for companies whereby the CEO did not 
change (B= 0.0400; t =0.56; p>0.1). 
We then performed a first-difference regression analysis on EBITDA margin (Table 56). In this 
case, the model’s p-value (0.0635) indicates that the relationship between independent variables 
and the outcome of interest is statistically significant. In particular, the effect is negative and 
significant when the CEO of the target company changed (B= -0.2111; t= -1.98; p<0.05), while 
it is negative but not-significant for companies whereby the CEO did not change (B= -0.2352; 
t= -1.56; p>0.1).  
 
Table 54 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable Sales (CEO Change 
vs not-CEO change) 
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Table 55 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable ROA (CEO Change 
vs not-CEO change) 
 
Table 56 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable EBITDA Margin 
(CEO Change vs not-CEO change)  
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4.6 Empirical results based on Family businesses 
Hypothesis 3 proposes that acquired family firms post-acquisition performance is better than 
acquired non-family firms. In order to test this hypothesis, we performed first-difference 
regression analyses on Sales, ROA and EBITDA Margin, introducing a dummy variable, 𝐹𝑂𝑖, 
equal to 1 when the company is a family firm and equal to 0 when it is not. Therefore, in order 
to estimate the effect of foreign ownership on target performance, distinguishing for family and 
non-family firms, our starting model is 
Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜆
′ + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐹𝑂𝑖) + Δ𝜀𝑖              (14) 
 
Out of our 126 matched companies, 58 are family businesses, whereas 68 are not. 
Table 57 shows the output of a first-difference regression analysis on sales conducted on Stata 
to assess whether the dependent variable has a statistically significant relationship with the 
independent variables. The model’s p-value (0.4954) does not allow to accept this hypothesis. 
In fact, the effect is positive but non-significant both when the company is a family firm (B= 
14185.33; t=1.17; p>0.1) and when it is not (B=14108.95; t=1.17; p>0.1). 
We then performed a first difference regression analysis on ROA. Table 58 shows that in this 
case as well there is not a statistically significant relationship between ROA and the independent 
variables. Specifically, when the company is a family firm, the effect is negative and non-
significant (B=-0.0405; t= -1.58; p>0.1). on the contrary, family firms exhibit  a positive effect 
on ROA, but non statistically significant (B= 0.0191; t=0.30; p>0.1).  
Table 59 shows the results of a first-difference regression analysis conducted on EBITDA 
margin. In this case, the model p-value (0.0415) allows to identify a statistically significant 
relationship between foreign ownership and EBITDA margin, distinguishing for family and 
non-family firms. In particular, when the company is a family firm, the effect is negative and 
significant at a 95% confidence interval (B= -0.1682; t= -2.14; p<0.05), when the company is 
not a family firm, the effect is also negative and significant, but at a 90% confidence interval 
(B= -0.2683; t= -1.76; p<0.1).  
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Table 57 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable Sales (Family 
businesses vs non-family businesses)  
 
 
Table 58 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable ROA (Family 
businesses vs non-family businesses)  
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Table 59 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable EBITDA Margin 
(Family businesses vs non-family businesses)  
 
Hypothesis 3a further suggests that family firms performance is higher when the family remains 
in the business. In order to test this hypothesis, we introduce two dummy variables: 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐼𝑁𝑖 
which is equal to 1 when the family remains in the business even if it does not control the 
company anymore, and equal to 0 otherwise. 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖 which is equal to 1 when the family 
leaves the business and equal to 0 otherwise.  
 
Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜆
′ + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐼𝑁𝑖) + 𝛾(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖)+ Δ𝜀𝑖      (15) 
 
Out of our 58 matched family firms, in 25 cases the family remained in the business, in 33 cases 
the family left the business after having sold the majority stake. 
Table 60 presents Stata’s output of first difference regression to determine the effect of foreign 
ownership on sales, distinguishing for family’s presence in the post-acquisition setting of 
acquired family firms. The model’s p-value (0.5548) does not show a statistically significant 
relationship between sales and the independent variables. The effect is positive but non-
significant both when the company remained in the business (B=17081.54; t=1.34; p>0.1) and 
when the family leaves the business (B=11991.23; t=0.97; p>0.1) 
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We then performed a first-difference regression analysis (Table 61) to assess the effect of 
foreign ownership on ROA, distinguishing for family’s presence in the post-acquisition setting 
of acquired family firms. When the family remains in the business post-acquisition, the effect 
on ROA is negative and significant (B=-0.0514; t=-1.85; p<0.1). On the contrary, the effect is 
negative and non-significant when the family does not remain active in the business (B=-
0.0322; t=-1.06; p>0.1). The model’s p-value (0.2563) does not show a statistically significant 
relationship between ROA and the independent variables.  
Table 62 shows the result of a first-difference regression analysis on EBITDA Margin. The 
model’s p-value (0.0932) allows to observe a statistically significant relationship between 
EBITDA Margin and foreign ownership, distinguishing for family’s presence in the post-
acquisition setting. In particular, the effect is negative and significant for both companies 
whereby the family remained in the business (B= -0.2554; t= -1.82; p<0.1) and companies 
whereby the family left the business (B= -0.1021; t= -1.65; p=0.1).  
Table 60 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable Sales (Family IN 
vs Family OUT) 
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Table 61 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable ROA (Family IN vs 
Family OUT) 
 
Table 62 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable EBITDA Margin 
(Family IN vs Family OUT) 
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4.6.1 Family business and organizational change 
Hypothesis 2c and 2d discuss how family firms’ performance may react to a CEO change, in 
particular taking into consideration the extraordinary importance of the organizational culture 
and personality of the leader in such organizations. In order to test this hypothesis, we include 
in our model an interaction term between the dummy variables Family Ownership and CEO 
change to observe how the CEO change modifies the effect of family ownership for treated 
units. 
Out of our 58 matched family business, in 25 cases the CEO changed, in 33 cases the CEO did 
not change. In order to distinguish for CEO change, we estimate the model indicated by 
Equation 16: 
 
Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜆
′ + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐹𝑂𝑖) + 𝜇(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐹𝑂𝑖 × 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒) + Δ𝜀𝑖   (16) 
 
Table 63 shows Stata’s output of Equation 16 on Sales as outcome variable. The model’s p-
value (0.6661) does not indicate a statistically significant relationship between sales and the 
independent variables. The effect is positive and non-significant both for family firms whose 
CEO changes (B=15251.49; t=1.20; p>0.1) and for family firms whose CEO did not change 
(B=12777.99; t= 1.05; p>0.1).   
We then performed a first-difference regression analysis to assess whether foreign ownership 
has a significant effect on ROA, distinguishing for family firms and CEO change (Table 64). 
In this case as well, the model’s p-value (0.3525) indicates the model low quality and the 
absence of a statistically significant relationship. However, the effect on ROA is negative and 
statistically significant for family businesses whereby the CEO changed (B= -0.0516; t= -1.66; 
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p<0.1). It is negative and non-significant for family firms whereby the CEO did not change (B= 
-0.0258; t= -0.99; p>0.1). 
Table 65 shows a first-difference regression analysis on EBITDA margin. The model’s p-value 
(0.0790) indicates a significant relationship between EBITDA and the independent variables. 
In particular, the significant effect can be observed for family companies whereby the CEO 
changed (B= -0.1772; t= -2.11; p<0.05). On the contrary, in family firms where the CEO did 
not change the effect of foreign ownership on EBITDA margin is negative but non-significant 
(B= -0.1563; t= -1.29; p>0.1).  
 
Table 63 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable Sales (Family 
Businesses and CEO change) 
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Table 64 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable ROA (Family 
Businesses and CEO change) 
 
Table 65 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable EBITDA Margin 
(Family Businesses and CEO change) 
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4.6.2 Family businesses and acquirer’s country of origin 
Hypothesis 1a proposes that the negative effect of cultural distance on post-acquisition 
performance holds also when the acquired firm is a family business. Similarly to the precedent 
case, to test this hypothesis we introduce in our equation an interaction term between the 
dummies Family Ownership and Latin Europe, in order to verify how the provenience of the 
acquirer from a culturally close (Latin Europe) or culturally distant (non-Latin Europe) country 
modifies the effect of family ownership for treated units.  
Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜆
′ + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐹𝑂𝑖) + 𝜃(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐹𝑂𝑖 × 𝐿𝐸𝑖) + Δ𝜀𝑖   (16) 
 
Out of our 58 matched family businesses, 15 have been acquired by Latin Europe acquirers, 43 
by acquirers located elsewhere.  
We performed a first difference regression analysis on Stata, estimating equation 16 on the 
outcome variable Sales. Table 66 shows that there is not a statistically significant relationship 
between sales and the independent variables. The effect is positive and non-significant for both 
family firms acquired by Latin Europe acquirers (B=22587.51; t=1.64; p>0.1) and for family 
firms acquired by non-Latin Europe acquirers (B=11254.34; t=0.92; p>=0.1). 
Table 67 shows the results of a first-difference regression analysis to assess the effect of foreign 
ownership on ROA, distinguishing for family firms acquired by Latin Europe acquirers and 
family firms acquired by acquirers located elsewhere. The model’s p-value (0.0899) indicates 
that it exists a statistically significant relationship between ROA and the independent variables.  
In fact, the effect is negative and significant for family firms acquired by Latin-Europe acquirers  
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(B= -0.0828; t= -2.43; p<0.05). However, it is negative but non-significant for companies 
acquired by acquirers located elsewhere (B= -0.0257; t= -0.95; p>0.1). 
Further, Table 68 presents the results for Equation 16’s estimation on EBITDA margin outcome 
variable. In this case as well, the model’s p-value (0.0602) allows us to identify a significant 
relationship between EBITDA margin and the independent variables. Specifically, the effect is 
positive and significant for both family firms acquired by Latin Europe acquirers (B= -0.1247; 
t= -2.33; p<0.05) and for family firms acquired by acquirers located elsewhere (B= -0.1833;   
t= -1.91; p<00.1). 
 
Table 66 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable Sales (Family 
Businesses and Latin Europe acquirers) 
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Table 67 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable ROA (Family 
Businesses and Latin Europe acquirers) 
  
Table 68 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable EBITDA margin 
(Family Businesses and Latin Europe acquirers) 
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For the sake of information, we also present the results of the just illustrated analysis in case 
we do not consider the construct of cultural distance but pure geographic distance. To do so, 
we substitute the variable Latin Europe with the dummy variable European Acquirer presented 
in Paragraph 4.4.1.2. Thus, the model is: 
Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜆
′ + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐹𝑂𝑖) + 𝜃(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐹𝑂𝑖 × 𝐸𝑈𝑖) + Δ𝜀𝑖    (17) 
 
Out of our 56 matched family firms, 36 have been targeted by Europe-based acquirers, 22 by 
acquirers based in the rest of the world. 
Table 69 shows the result of a first-difference regression analysis to assess the effect of foreign 
ownership on sales, distinguishing for Family businesses acquired by European acquirers or 
non-European acquirers. The model’s p-value (0.6388) indicates that there is not a statistically 
significant relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The effect is positive 
and non-significant for both family firms acquired by European acquirers (B= 13088.35; t= 
1.05; p>0.1) and for family firms acquired by non-European acquirers (B= 15980.39; t= 1.28; 
p>0.1). 
We then performed a first difference regression analysis modelled by Equation 17 on ROA as 
outcome variable. Table 70 shows that in this case as well the relationship in not statistically 
significant (p-value>0.1). In particular, the effect is negative and non-significant for both family 
firms acquired by European acquirers (B= -0.0375; t= -1.28; p>0.1) and for family firms 
acquired by non-European acquirers (B= -0.0454; t= -1.58; p>0.1). 
Table 71 shows the results for Equation 17 using EBITDA margin as dependent variable. In 
this case, the model’s p-value (0.0947) indicates that the independent variables are statistically 
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significant in explaining EBITDA margin. In particular the effect is negative and significant for 
family businesses acquired by European companies (B= -0.2084; t= -1.98; p<0.05), while it is 
negative and non-significant for companies acquired by non-European acquirers (B= -0.1024; 
t= -1.43; p>0.1). 
 
Table 69 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable Sales (Family 
Businesses and European acquirers) 
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Table 70 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable ROA (Family Businesses and 
European acquirers) 
 
Table 71 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable EBITDA Margin 
(Family Businesses and European acquirers) 
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4.7 Discussion  
Our empirical research on Italian firms acquired by foreign investors contributes to the existing 
knowledge on post-acquisition performance of inward cross-border acquisitions in our country. 
However, differently from Barbaresco et al. (2018), Bentivogli and Mirenda (2017), ICE & 
Prometeia (2014) and Piscitello & Rabbiosi (2005) we do not support the hypothesis that 
foreign owners are better than domestic ones in driving the company performance. Table 72 
reports the results of the DID matching estimator. In each cell, the first term shows the effect 
of foreign M&A on the target firm’s 3-years average outcome of interest (i.e. sales, ROA, 
EBITDA margin) after the takeover. Robust standard errors are enclosed in parentheses. While 
we do not find significant effects on Sales and ROA, we do find a significant relationship 
between foreign ownership and EBITDA margin. Companies acquired by foreign investors 
experience a deterioration in their operating performance. Indeed, there are some well-known 
real cases proving how tragically true this could be. It is the case of Pernigotti S.p.A., the born-
Italian producer of chocolate and other confectionery, which in 2013 has been acquired by the 
Turkish Toksöz Group. In November 2018, the controlling company announced the shutdown 
of the Italian production facilities. Just the intervention of the Italian state and the separate 
acquisition of its main business units by Italian investors has allowed the preservation of the 
business18.  On top of that, the negative effect on target companies profitability is also confirmed 
                                                 
 
18 Pernigotti S.p.A. is one of the 152 treated units composing our data sample. According to AIDA data, the 
company’s moved from a 9.7x average EBITDA margin in the 3-years acquisition period to a negative average 
EBITDA margin in the 3-years post-acquisition. 
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by Buckley et al. (2014). The authors observe that foreign acquirers do not always increase the 
profitability of target companies. They for sure result in a stabilization of the profitability trend, 
which is observed to be less volatile compared to the pre-acquisition situation, but whether the 
profitability is improved or not is associated to some moderating factors, e.g. the experience of 
the acquirer in the target country.  
 In order to dig into the components of these effects, we performed some sub-groups 
analysis based on acquirers and targets’ characteristics. The following paragraphs will comment 
on the empirical results shown above. 
 
Acquirers’ characteristics 
In Paragraph 3.2 we enounced Hypothesis 1: 
Cultural distance is negatively associated with post-acquisition performance. 
 
To verify the validity of this assumption we used Ronen and Shenkar (2013)’s cluster map 
model on cultural distance. Both companies acquired by Latin Europe acquirers and non-Latin 
Europe acquirers experience a deterioration in their operating performance, however the 
magnitude of the effect is greater when the acquirer comes from a non-Latin Europe country, 
i.e. a culturally distant country. This result confirms Hypothesis 1 and supports the stream of 
literature arguing that higher cultural distance translates into higher integration costs and lower 
corporate performance (Barbaresco et al., 2018; Piscitello & Rabbiosi, 2005; Mariotti, Onida 
& Piscitello, 2003). 
Following precedent works on post-acquisition performance (Barbaresco et al., 2018;  Piscitello 
& Rabbiosi, 2005) we also controlled for pure geographic distance, separating Europe-based 
acquirers from others. This measure is less informative than cultural distance in terms of 
organizational similarities between target and acquirer, but it takes into consideration the 
openness to trade and lower degree of regulatory barriers European acquirers face. Previous 
studies on the topic provide mixed results on the effect of the acquirers’ country of origin. In 
Italy, Barbaresco et al. (2018) and Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005), observe that acquired 
companies performance is greater when the acquirer is European, in particular comparing it to 
US-based acquirers. US MNEs’ worse performance may be due to their lower sensitivity to 
local labour pressures, but also to a different attitude towards the investment. US companies 
are likely to set in Italy just a bridgehead that does not require an immediate sequential 
investment and adopt a try-and-see attitude with a slower adaptive learning on the local 
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environment. On the contrary, studies conducted in other European countries, observe that firms 
under US ownership tend to be best-performer (Bertrand & Zitouna, 2008). Our results do not 
clearly lean in favour of one position or another. In terms of ROA, we observe a negative and 
significant effect when the acquirer comes from a non-European country, whereas EBITDA 
margin regression shows a negative and significant effect when the acquirer is European. The 
lack of a statistically significant relationship in the other cases does not allow us to identify a 
unique common trend.  
 We completed our investigation on acquirers’ characteristics by distinguishing between 
industrial and financial acquirers. It is worth noticing that, despite the relevant differences in 
their strategies and decision-making criteria, the issue has been scarcely investigated by the 
literature on foreign acquisition performance. To the best of our knowledge, the only study 
applying this distinction is Barbaresco et al. (2018)’s work. Its results on target companies’ 
profitability (measured by ROI) support the idea that financial buyers are more successful than 
industrials in enhancing the company performance, even if the effect is not-statistically 
significant. While companies acquired by industrial buyers experience a ROI decline by 1.5%, 
companies acquired by financial players exhibit a ROI improvement by 2.7%. However, the 
authors observe that these two opposite trends are heavily affected by ex-ante selection bias19, 
in that financial buyers acquired companies with much lower pre-acquisition profitability in 
order to implement their project of takeover - efficiency improvement - way out. Therefore, the 
registered relative improvement is highly affected by a lower-than-average pre-acquisition 
performance.  
Our results reveal that companies in our sample acquired by financial buyers experience a 
performance deterioration greater than the companies acquired by industrial ones. This negative 
effect upsets the common knowledge that financial buyers should be beneficial for company 
performance as their focus is to boost the company’s value and extract a gain from the sale of 
the business in a 5-10 years time frame. Apparently, financial buyers in our dataset did not 
succeed in doing so. A possible explanation may arise adopting an organizational perspective. 
Acquired companies in our dataset are by assumption industrial, as financial sectors have been 
excluded from our initial research. Therefore, the foreign acquisition by a financial buyer has a 
                                                 
 
19
 Barbaresco et al. (2018) methodology does not eliminate ex-ante characteristics of acquired companies, as our 
empirical methodology combining CEM and DID does.  
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double meaning to them: first, the shift of ownership and the entry of a new controlling owner 
coming from abroad, second, the shift of management goals, which are no more those of an 
industrial owner but those of a fund, whose strategies are exclusively financially-driven. From 
an organizational point of view, the post-acquisition phase is even more complex. Employees 
will have to adapt to a new mind-set and way of managing the business from a double point of 
view. Besides that, financial investors’ focus is on company’s growth. Their goal is to boost the 
company’s turnover and cash generating ability to maximize its value once they will liquidate 
their investments. The reorganization implemented to this end may not necessarily turn into 
performance improvements in terms of greater operational profitability in the first post-
acquisition years. A clear example illustrating the case is the acquisition of Nuova Castelli 
S.p.A., a producer and exporter of parmesan cheese, which is included in our treated group. In 
2014, the UK-based private equity fund Charterhouse acquired the 80% of the company’s 
equity. At that moment, the company’s turnover amounted to €290million for a €37million 
EBITDA. In 2018, when Charterhouse started looking for new investors, sales were increased 
up to €460million and EBITDA went down to €27million. The EBITDA margin decreased from 
12.75% to 5,87%, despite a sales CAGR of 58,6%.   
 
Acquired companies characteristics 
Hypothesis 2 discusses the possible outcomes of a change in the acquired companies CEO 
following the acquisition. A reshuffle at the top of the structure may help the new property in 
catalysing change and implement the post-acquisition plan reducing the resistance to change at 
the top. Conversely, it may also lead to enhanced disorder and disruption in the company’s 
community. Therefore, CEO change (as a proxy for reorganizational change) may be positively 
or negatively related to post-acquisition performance.  
Hypothesis 2a: CEO change is positively related to post-acquisition performance. 
Hypothesis 2b: CEO change is negatively related to post-acquisition performance. 
 
To investigate which of the two opposing hypothesis holds in our dataset, we verified the effect 
of a CEO change on our outcome variables through Equation 13. Results lead us to support 
Hypothesis 2b and refuse Hypothesis 2a. In fact, those companies whereby the CEO changed 
experience a deterioration in both ROA and EBITDA margin, which on the contrary is not 
significant for companies whereby the CEO did not change. Our results are consistent with 
Cannella and Hambrick (1993) and Krishnan, Miller and Judge (1997), who observe that the 
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departure of target CEO and top-management team has a negative effect on post-acquisition 
performance. 
Following Bentivogli and Mirenda (2017), Crinò and Onida (2008), ICE and Prometeia 
(2014) we expanded our analysis on target companies characteristics by differentiating between 
Manufacturing and Service companies. Indeed, the bulk of literature on foreign acquisition 
performance highlights the importance of controlling for target industry. Industry-level 
characteristics have been frequently identified as factors affecting the motives behind M&As, 
as well as the desired level and type of post-acquisition integration. Market growth, market 
structure, sensitivity to regulation, the level of capital and labour intensity are all relevant 
drivers to consider for the post-integration management, and thereby performance (Kang & 
Johansson, 2000). Bentivogli and Mirenda (2017) observe that the impact of foreign ownership 
on acquired companies performance is not homogeneous across the two groups (and within the 
two groups as well).  Moreover, their empirical analysis suggests that foreign ownership is a 
significant predictor of post-acquisition performance only for companies operating in the 
service sector, but not for those working in the manufacturing industries.  
Our results show the opposite trend, i.e. the effect of foreign ownership on acquired companies 
performance (EBITDA Margin) is significant only for companies operating in the 
manufacturing industries, while it is not significant in the service sector. A possible explanation 
of this phenomenon could derive from the observation that it is more difficult to integrate two 
companies in the service sector, than to integrate two manufacturing plants. The service 
industry is characterized by an higher level of intangible assets and dependence on human 
capital skills. While operational transformation in production processes are relatively mechanic 
to implement, it is way harder to enforce changes that regard people and intangibles. Therefore, 
the impact of foreign ownership on the operational efficiency may be less notable and non-
significant in the first post-acquisition years.  
 Further, in order to complete our investigation on targets’ characteristics, we 
distinguished among small and medium enterprises and large companies. The theory of mergers 
and acquisitions has often developed around large deals, in particular in those cases in which 
the measure of performance was the market reaction to acquisition announcements. However 
small and medium enterprises are not less frequently object of M&As. In particular in the Italian 
context, which is largely dominated by SMEs, distinguishing for firms’ size is particularly 
relevant. Target company dimension is a critical factor in explaining the motives of acquisitions 
and consequently the objectives to achieve during the integration phase. SMEs are typically 
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less sophisticated and structured, which turns to higher flexibility and low rigidity. Their 
adaptability may result in an easier post-acquisition integration management, but may also 
represent a limit to the implementation of more developed control structures imposed by the 
new holding, that they are not used to. Results confirms this last observation. Indeed, small and 
medium enterprises experience a significant deterioration in their operational profitability 
measured by EBITDA margin, which is not observed for large companies. Apparently, the 
mind-set change resulting from the entry of a foreign acquirer is a more traumatic event for 
SMEs than for large companies. The latter are presumably more accustomed to international 
standards and reporting structures, which may be a novelty for small and medium enterprises. 
Therefore, we may expect that the short-term post-acquisition integration is relatively easier for 
large companies.  
 
Family businesses 
The ultimate interest of research of this study is to assess whether foreign acquisitions determine 
different effects on post-acquisition performance when the acquired company is a family firm. 
In particular, following our literature review presented in Chapter 2, we developed the 
following Hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: Post-acquisition performance is higher for acquired family firms. 
 
Paragraph 4.8 provides our empirical results in this regard. In particular, results on EBITDA 
margin regression confirms the assumption under Hypothesis 3. While the effects on sales and 
ROA are non-significant for both family and non-family firms, both groups experience a 
significant deterioration in their EBITDA margin. However, looking at the magnitude of these 
effects ((B= -0.1682 for family firms vs B= -0.2683 for non-family firms), we can conclude 
that the presence of a family in the business alleviates the negative effect of foreign acquisitions 
on operating performance. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is empirically supported: post-acquisition 
performance is higher for acquired family firms. This outcome supports the idea that family 
firms over-perform compared to their non-family counterparts, a result that has been 
empirically demonstrated by several studies in the Family Business literature (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003a; Andres, 2008; Barontini & Di Caprio, 2006; Favero, Giglio, Honorati & Panunzi, 
2006; Maury, 2006; Minichilli, Corbetta & MacMillan, 2010; Sraer & Thesmar, 2007; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006), but that has not been tested in the M&A context yet.  
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Further, Hypothesis 3a introduces an additional element, proposing that the presence of the 
family in the post-acquisition allocation of interests enhances the target company performance, 
as it preserves the family firm value and reduces post-acquisition disruption.  
Hypothesis 3a: When the family remains in the business, post-acquisition performance 
is higher. 
 
Differently from the previous case, empirical results do not support this Hypothesis. While first-
difference regression analysis on sales and ROA does not show significant results, the negative 
effect on EBITDA margin is confirmed. Both family firms whereby the family remained in the 
business and those whereby the family completely left the company experience a deterioration 
in their operating performance. However, the effect is larger for those companies in which the 
family maintained a role (as minority owner or as manager) in the post-acquisition setting. 
Apparently, the signal of continuation that we expected to be positive for the corporate 
performance turned out to be detrimental. Possibly, the involvement of the family is perceived 
as an anchor to the past and an obstacle to the realization of the organizational change imposed 
by the new ownership. In this sense, the family may (also involuntarily) enhance employees’ 
resistance to change and efforts to preserve their established routines. On top of that, the 
relegation of the family to a minority status in the company they used to own may trigger 
employees’ loyalty toward precedent owners and a counterfactual hostility towards the new 
ones. Accordingly, lower post-acquisition performance is likely the result of a non-
collaborative and adverse climate. 
Connected to that, Hypothesis 2c and 2d discuss on the effect of a reshuffle at the top structure 
on family firms performance: 
Hypothesis 2c: CEO change is positively related to post-acquisition performance of 
family firms. 
Hypothesis 2d: CEO change is negatively related to post-acquisition performance of 
family firms. 
 
Empirical evidences presented in Paragraph 4.6.1 confirm previous results on CEO change for 
aggregate data, i.e. CEO change is detrimental for corporate performance of family firms. These 
findings corroborate the idea of family businesses unity and loyalty toward the leader, whose 
departure leads to organizational disorder.  
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The organizational perspective has also been the backing theoretical framework for Hypothesis 
1a, which takes the point of view of cultural distance between acquirer and target family firms: 
Hypothesis 1a: Cultural distance is negatively associated with post-acquisition 
performance of acquired family firms. 
Results on the topic have been illustrated in Paragraph 4.8.2. Both Latin-Europe and non-Latin 
Europe acquirers are associated to a negative effect on the operating profitability of acquired 
family businesses, however, once again, the magnitude of the effect is lower for family firms 
acquired by investors coming from Latin Europe countries, meaning that lower cultural distance 
alleviates the negative effect on company’s performance. Therefore, we may accept Hypothesis 
1a and conclude that culturally similar acquirers lead to better post-acquisition performance 
both when the analysis focuses on family firms only or on aggregate data. 
 
Table 72 Difference in difference: The effects of foreign M&As on target firm's performance 
   Sales-diff ROA-diff EBITDA margin-diff 
Aggregate results  14144.11 -0.0083 -0.2222** 
  (11893.29) (-0.0391) (-0.0961) 
Acquirers characteristics 
EU acquirers 12800.4 0.0281  -0.2569** 
  (12023.86) (0.0563) (0.1222) 
Non-EU acquirers 16327.64 -0.0676*** -0.1658 
  (12106.57) (0.0262) (0.1291) 
Latin Europe 18148.85 -0.0655* -0.1788* 
  (12705.09) (0.0367) (0.1071) 
Non-Latin Europe 13201.82 0.0051 -0.2324** 
  (11939.74) (0.0454) (0.1114) 
Industrial acquirers 14506.51 0.0030 -0.1525* 
  (11944.01) (0.0415) (0.0913) 
Financial acquirers 10355.4 -0.1273**  -0.9502** 
  (12009.87) (0.0567) (0.4508) 
Acquired companies characteristics 
Manufacturing 14449.13 -0.0342 -0.2563** 
  (12123.39) (0.0275) (0.1267) 
Service 13737.42 0.0261 -0.1766 
  (11941.57) (0.0764) (0.1248) 
SME 12658.92 -0.0046 -0.2650** 
  (11802.55) (0.0464) (0.1146) 
Large company 19856.39 -0.0229 -0.0576 
  (14413.66) (0.0317) (0.0631) 
CEO Change 13827.63 -0.0496* -0.2111** 
  (12133.84) (0.0286) (0.1065) 
NO-CEO Change 14515.15 0.0400 -0.2352 
  (11963.2) (0.0710) (0.1504) 
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Family Businesses 
Family Business 14185.33 -0.0405 -0.1682** 
  (12135.34) (0.025) (0.0784) 
Non-Family Business 14108.95 0.019 -0.2683* 
  (12008.97) (0.063) (0.1525) 
Family IN -0.0322321 -0.0514* -0.2554* 
  (0.0303145) (0.027) (0.1404) 
Family OUT -0.0322321 -0.0322  -0.1021* 
  (0.0303145) (0.0303) (0.0619) 
Family-CEO Change 15251.49 -.0516* -0.1772** 
  (12688.09) (0.031) (0.0838) 
Family- non CEO change 12777.99 -0.0259 -0.1563 
  (12169.76) (0.0262) (0.1211) 
Family-Latin EU 22587.51 -0.0828** -0.1247** 
  (13789.71) (0.034) (0.0536) 
Family- non Latin EU 11254.34 -0.0257 -0.1833* 
  (12168.6) (0.0270) (0.0959) 
Family-EU 13088.35 -0.0375 -0.2084** 
  (12472.04) (0.0293) (0.1052) 
Family- non EU 15980.39 -0.045 -0.1024 
  (12484.26) (0.028) (0.0716) 
Notes: 
(i)  N=252 companies (126 treated and 126 control)  
(ii)  Robust standard errors are enclosed in parentheses. 
(iii)  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.8 Theoretical and managerial implications 
This work contributes to the cross-border post-acquisition performance literature and to 
research on family firms. One of the unique features of this study is that it aims at reducing the 
existing literature vacuum on family firms in the context of cross-border acquisitions, 
specifically as target companies of such transactions. The body of research has amply 
demonstrated that family firms are distinct from non-family firms along many dimensions, 
including financial characteristics, objectives, incentives and decision-making processes 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010; Villalonga & Amit, 2009) and that they 
may be value-creating acquirers (André, Ben Amar & Saadi, 2014; Basu, Dimitrova & Peglis, 
2008; BenAmar & André, 2006; Feldman, Amit & Villalonga, 2019). However, as stressed out 
in Chapter 2, the empirical evidences on acquired family firms are scarce and incomplete. Our 
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study advances this literature by providing an empirical support based on Italian firm-level data. 
In particular, we are able to provide new insights on how family firms react to an ownership 
change when the new investor is a foreigner, and how their operating performance will be like. 
To the best of our knowledge, no existing work investigated this issue. Our work seems to 
demonstrate that family firms performance advantage (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006) holds in acquisition transactions as well, as their performance in the 3-years post- 
acquisition is superior to non-family firms. Moreover, we also provide new evidences on the 
role of the family in the post-acquisition setting, an issue that has been scarcely considered in 
the literature, but is extremely relevant according to us.  
A second theoretical contribution to the literature of cross-border acquisition performance may 
come from the different sub-groups analysed. Unlike previous studies conducted in Italy, we 
included in our dataset both manufacturing and service firms to provide a full view on the Italian 
productive world. Moreover, our analysis does not focus only on industrial acquirers’ 
transactions, but does also consider the differential impact of financial acquirers.  
From a methodological point of view, we are one of the first to combine DID with coarsened 
exact matching. The bulk of literature on the topic adopts propensity score matching. However, 
Iacus, King and Porro (2009) highlight how CEM dominates commonly used existing matching 
methods in its ability to reduce imbalance, model dependence, estimation error, bias, variance, 
mean square error. 
 This work carries important implications for managers and practitioners. Results suggest 
that foreign companies interested in acquiring Italian firms should carefully consider the post-
acquisition integration between the two businesses and the level of autonomy of the acquired 
companies. In fact, our analysis demonstrate that acquirers from culturally closed countries (as 
defined by Ronen and Shenkar (2013)’ cluster map) are associated with higher post-acquisition 
profitability of acquired companies. This confirms the idea that lower frictions and 
organizational disorders result when people and organizations sharing similar cultural 
backgrounds interact. Moreover, higher performance does also result when the CEO of the 
acquired company is confirmed. Considering the change of the top manager as a proxy of the 
organizational change imposed on the acquired company, we would suggest that best-
performing acquisitions are those in which the acquirer does not impose great changes and leave 
the target with a certain degree of autonomy. Further, the absence of significant effects on large 
companies and those operating in the service industry induces us to suggest that affecting the 
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performance of these companies is harder than for their counterparts. The acquisition plan 
should be even more carefully managed when dealing with such types of organizations.  
Finally, for what it concerns family businesses, our suggestion would be that once the family 
decides to sell the control of the company, it should definitely leave the business. In fact, 
differently from what we expected, the presence of the family in the business following the 
acquisition is detrimental for corporate performance.  
 
4.9 Limitations and future research 
The empirical analysis performed in this work presents a number of limitations and suggests 
some interesting opportunities for future research. Firstly, our empirical methodology based on 
post-acquisition accounting results imposes some limits on the selection of treated units. In 
particular, the dataset is restricted to those companies that are still active and under the same 
owner (the acquirer) for at least three years following the foreign acquisitions, so that we are 
guaranteed that their financial statements are the result of the foreign owner’s influence. 
Companies that failed, ceased or have been re-sold within three years are excluded from our 
analysis, even though, on the contrary, their number is particularly significant in the analysis of 
foreign owners’ ability to successfully guide the company. The necessary observation of the 
only companies that survive imply the presence of the “survivorship bias” problem that appears 
to be technically not eliminable from the existing literature (Barbaresco et al., 2018). Further, 
our analysis is based on the comparison between foreign acquired firms and domestically 
owned companies. However, we do not account for ownership changes in the control group. 
The fact that those companies remain Italian in the study time 2008-2017 does not exclude that 
they have been target of other domestic owners. If the occurrence of domestic acquisitions 
targeting control units is significant, their performance may not be a proper counterfactual any 
more and bias our estimate of foreign ownership effects estimated using a DID matching 
approach. 
This study valuates acquired companies performance using accounting-based measures. 
Despite some advantages over other performance criteria (e.g. market returns), they also present 
some drawbacks. In particular, they do take corporate financial performance into account. 
Future studies may complement operating and accounting performance of acquired firms with 
a measure of financial performance.   
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Further, future research may include additional covariates to improve the quality and 
completeness of the model. For example, interesting results may stem by the analysis of related 
or unrelated acquisitions, acquirers past experience in Italy, deal purpose, etc. All these factors 
may complement on the knowledge of performance determinants. Similarly, it may be 
particular interesting to expand the empirical knowledge with a more qualitative and personal 
analysis based on interviews with acquired companies’ managers. Their words may explain 
some of the results that have been statistically demonstrated and enrich the understanding of a 
so complex venture as an acquisition. 
Finally, future studies may definitely benefit from an extension of the dimension of the sample, 
as well as of the considered time frame.  As suggested by Chen (2011) acquisitions effects may 
manifest after years from the closure of the deal and not be captured in our 3-years analysis. 
However, no clear consensus has emerged on the proper timing.  
 
 
 
  
5. APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 
Appendix I 
Table 15: Number of company by 3-digit ATECO 2007 code 
3-digit 
ATECO 
2007 
Description of activities 
Treated 
group 
Control 
group 
Total 
104 Produzione di software, consulenza informatica e attività connesse 1 245 246 
105 Produzione, trasmissione e distribuzione di energia elettrica 2 1090 3,09 
106 Fabbricazione di altre macchine di impiego generale 1 372 373 
107 Fabbricazione di altre macchine per impieghi speciali 1 1277 2,277 
108 Fabbricazione di macchine di impiego generale 2 877 879 
141 Fabbricazione di articoli in materie plastiche 1 2640 3,64 
151 Commercio all'ingrosso di beni di consumo finale 1 1187 2,187 
152 Fabbricazione di medicinali e preparati farmaceutici 1 1474 2,474 
172 
Fabbricazione di strumenti e apparecchi di misurazione, prova e 
navigazione; orologi 1 1337 2,337 
181 
Fabbricazione di macchine per l'industrial alimentare, delle bevande 
e del tabacco  1 4133 5,133 
200 Commercio al dettaglio di altri prodotti in esercizi specializzati 1 67 68 
203 Collaudi ed analisi tecniche 1 422 423 
204 Altri servizi di assistenza sanitaria 1 447 448 
205 Attività sportive 2 1032 3,032 
211 Industria lattiero-casearia 1 36 37 
212 Produzione di altri prodotti alimentari 3 410 413 
222 Fabbricazione di altri prodotti chimici 4 5783 9,783 
233 Fabbricazione di materiali da costruzione in terracotta 2 323 325 
241 Trattamento e rivestimento dei metalli; lavori di meccanica generale 1 159 160 
243 Fabbricazione di apparecchiature per le telecomunicazioni 1 365 366 
251 
Fabbricazione di strumenti per irradiazione, apparecchiature 
elettromedicali ed elettroterapeutiche 1 3495 4,495 
253 Fabbricazione di cablaggi e apparecchiature di cablaggio 1 21 22 
256 Fabbricazione di apparecchiature per illuminazione 2 633 8,33 
259 Fabbricazione di altre apparecchiature elettriche 1 2346 3,346 
263 Fabbricazione di strumenti e forniture mediche e dentistiche 2 451 453 
265 
Commercio all'ingrosso di prodotti alimentari, bevande e prodotti del 
tabacco 3 625 628 
266 Commercio all'ingrosso specializzato di altri prodotti 2 255 257 
267 Attività degli studi di architettura, ingegneria ed altri studi tecnici 1 101 102 
273 Ricerche di mercato e sondaggi di opinione 2 768 770 
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274 Produzione di oli e grassi vegetali e animali 2 742 744 
279 
Lavorazione delle granaglie, produzione di amidi e di prodotti 
amidacei 2 1930 3,93 
280 Produzione di prodotti da forno e farinacei 1 101 102 
281 
Confezione di articoli di abbigliamento (escluso abbigliamento in 
pelliccia) 5 2047 7,0 
282 
Preparazione e concia del cuoio; fabbricazione di articoli da viaggio, 
borse, pelletteria e selleria; preparazione e tintura di pellicce 8 6675 14,7 
289 Fabbricazione di calzature 7 4158 11,2 
293 Fabbricazione di articoli di carta e cartone 3 1045 4,0 
301 Stampa e servizi connessi alla stampa 1 685 686,0 
303 Fabbricazione di prodotti chimici 1 75 76,0 
310 
Fabbricazione di pitture, vernici e smalti, inchiostri da stampa e 
adesivi sintetici 1 2125 3,1 
323 
Fabbricazione di saponi e detergenti, di prodotti per la pulizia e la 
lucidatura, di profumi e cosmetici 1 137 138,0 
325 Fabbricazione di prodotti farmaceutici di base 2 717 719,0 
332 Siderurgia 1 1348 2,3 
351 
Fabbricazione di altri prodotti della prima trasformazione 
dell'acciaio 9 5120 14,1 
412 Fabbricazione di elementi da costruzione in metallo 1 218 1,0 
463 
Fabbricazione di generatori di vapore (esclusi i contenitori in metallo 
per caldaie per il riscaldamento centrale ad acqua calda) 2 577 7,4 
464 Fabbricazione di altri prodotti in metallo 4 21592 25,6 
465 Fabbricazione di strumenti ottici e attrezzature fotografiche 1 1973 3,0 
466 Fabbricazione di macchinari ed apparecchiature nca 1 6661 7,7 
467 Costruzione di navi e imbarcazioni 2 11505 13,5 
471 
Fabbricazione di aeromobili, di veicoli spaziali e dei relativi 
dispositivi 1 3753 4,8 
477 Fabbricazione di mobili 3 9091 12,1 
494 Fabbricazione di articoli sportivi 2 5854 7,8 
521 Installazione di macchine ed apparecchiature industriali 1 614 615,0 
522 Costruzione di edifici residenziali e non residenziali 1 4152 5,2 
551 Commercio all'ingrosso di apparecchiature ict 1 5069 6,1 
563 Commercio all'ingrosso di altri macchinari, attrezzature e forniture 1 3861 4,9 
582 Commercio al dettaglio in esercizi non specializzati 1 119 120 
610 Trasporto di merci su strada e servizi di trasloco 1 131 132 
611 Magazzinaggio e custodia 1 40 41 
620 Attività di supporto ai trasporti 15 14016 29,0 
631 Alberghi e strutture simili 1 6184 7,2 
681 Bar e altri esercizi simili senza cucina 1 30413 31,4 
701 Edizione di software 2 4638 6,6 
702 Telecomunicazioni 2 7577 9,6 
711 Telecomunicazioni fisse 2 4572 6,6 
712 Elaborazione dei dati, hosting e attività connesse; portali web 3 1368 4,4 
732 Compravendita di beni immobili effettuata su beni propri 2 992 994 
743 Attività di direzione aziendale 1 103 104 
771 Attività di consulenza gestionale 1 469 470 
774 Traduzione e interpretariato 1 256 257 
829 Noleggio di autoveicoli 1 3812 4,8 
869 
Concessione dei diritti di sfruttamento di proprietà intellettuale e 
prodotti simili (escluse le opere protette dal copyright) 3 3471 6,5 
931 Servizi di supporto alle imprese nca 3 3901 6,9 
960 Altre attività di servizi per la persona 1 2250 3,3 
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Appendix II 
Note: trends for the matched groups are compared before 2011 (2011 represents the first 
treatment year in our sample). In this way we are sure that treated companies are domestically-
owned before the M&A. 
 
Figure 17 Evidence of parallel trend assumption before 2011 for sales (matched dataset: treated and control 
groups) 
Source: elaboration of the author  
 
Figure 18 Evidence of parallel trend assumption before 2011 for EBITDA margin (matched dataset: treated and 
control groups) 
Source: elaboration of the author  
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Figure 19 Evidence of parallel trend assumption before 2011 for ROA (matched dataset: treated and control 
groups) 
Source: elaboration of the author 
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